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Abstract
Watermarking models a copyright protection mechanism where an original data sequence is
modied before distribution to the public in order to embed some extra information. The
embedding should be transparent (i.e., the modied data should be similar to the original
data) and robust (i.e., the information should be recoverable even if the data is modied
further). In this thesis, we describe the information-theoretic capacity of such a system as a
function of the statistics of the data to be watermarked and the desired level of transparency
and robustness. That is, we view watermarking from a communication perspective and
describe the maximum bit-rate that can be reliably transmitted from encoder to decoder.
We make the conservative assumption that there is a malicious attacker who knows how
the watermarking system works and who attempts to design a forgery that is similar to
the original data but that does not contain the watermark. Conversely, the watermarking
system must meet its performance criteria for any feasible attacker and would like to force
the attacker to eectively destroy the data in order to remove the watermark. Watermarking
can thus be viewed as a dynamic game between these two players who are trying to minimize
and maximize, respectively, the amount of information that can be reliably embedded.
We compute the capacity for several scenarios, focusing largely on Gaussian data and
a squared dierence similarity measure. In contrast to many suggested watermarking tech-
niques that view the original data as interference, we nd that the capacity increases with
the uncertainty in the original data. Indeed, we nd that out of all distributions with the
same variance, a Gaussian distribution on the original data results in the highest capacity.
Furthermore, for Gaussian data, the capacity increases with its variance.
One surprising result is that with Gaussian data the capacity does not increase if the
original data can be used to decode the watermark. This is reminiscent of a similar model,
Costa's \writing on dirty paper", in which the attacker simply adds independent Gaussian
noise. Unlike with a more sophisticated attacker, we show that the capacity does not change
for Costa's model if the original data is not Gaussian.
Thesis Supervisor: Amos Lapidoth
Title: Associate Professor of Electrical Engineering
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Watermarking can model situations where source sequences need to be copyright-protected
before distribution to the public. The copyright needs to be embedded in the distributed
version so that no adversary with access to the distributed version will be able produce a
forgery that resembles the original source sequence and yet does not contain the embedded
message. The watermarking process should, of course, introduce limited distortion so as to
guarantee that the distributed sequence closely resembles the original source sequence. The
original source sequence can be any type of data such as still image, audio or video that
can be modied slightly and still maintain its inherent qualities.
Watermarking research has exploded over the past several years. For example, see
[KP00b, LSL00, PAK99, SKT98] and their extensive references. This interest has stemmed
from the ease by which data can now be reproduced and transmitted around the world,
which has increased the demand for copyright protection. Furthermore, ordinary encryption
is not suÆcient since, in order to be enjoyed by the public, the data must be accessed at
some point. Thus, there is a need to embed information directly in the distributed data,
which is precisely what a watermarking system does. Much of the work on watermarking has
focused on designing ad-hoc systems and testing them in specic scenarios. Relatively little
work has been done in assessing the fundamental performance trade-os of watermarking
systems. In this thesis, we seek to describe these performance trade-os.
The main requirements for a watermarking system are transparency and robustness. For
copyright protection, transparency means that the distributed data should be \similar"
to the original data, while robustness means that the embedded information should be
13
recoverable from any forgery that is \similar" to the distributed data. Another way of
thinking about robustness is that only by destroying the data could a pirate remove the
copyright. We formalize these requirements by specifying a distortion measure and claiming
that two data sequences are \similar" if the distortion between them is less than some
threshold. The threshold for transparency is in general dierent from the threshold for
robustness.
In this thesis, we view watermarking as a communication system and we seek to nd
the trade-o between transparency, robustness, and the amount of information that can
be successfully embedded. In particular, we nd the information-theoretic capacity of a
watermarking system depending on the transparency and robustness thresholds and the
statistical properties of the data to be watermarked.
For a general watermarking system, the data distributed to the public and the data
that is used to recover the embedded information will be dierent. This dierence might be
caused by a variety of signal processing techniques, e.g., photocopying or cropping an image
and recording or ltering an audio clip. Instead of making any assumptions on the type of
signal processing that will take place, we make the conservative assumption that there is
a malicious attacker whose sole intent is to disrupt the information ow. For example, a
pirate might wish to remove copyright information in order to make illegal copies. In order
to please his customers, this pirate would also want the illegal copies to be of the highest
quality possible. Conversely, the watermarking system wishes to ensure that the act of
removing the embedded information causes the data to be unusable to such a pirate. We
can thus think of watermarking as a game between two players: a communication system
(encoder and decoder) and an attacker. The players are trying to respectively maximize
and minimize the amount of information that can be embedded.
We assume throughout the thesis that the attacker can only use one watermarked version
of the original data sequence to create a forgery. That is, we assume one of following two
things about the system. The rst possible assumption is that only one watermark will be
embedded in each original data sequence. Such an assumption is plausible if the watermark
only contains copyright information. The second possible assumption is that even though
many dierent versions exist, an attacker can only access one of them. This assumption
is reasonable if the cost of obtaining multiple copies is prohibitively high. A system that
has to deal with attackers with dierent watermarked copies is usually called a ngerprint-
14
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Figure 1-1: A diagram of watermarking. The dashed line is used in the private version, but
not in the public version.
ing system, although the terms \watermarking" and \ngerprinting" are sometimes used
interchangeably. See Section 2.3.3 for more about ngerprinting.
We consider two versions of watermarking. In the private version, the decoder can use
both the forgery and the original data sequence recover the embedded information. In the
public version, the decoder must recover the embedded information from the forgery alone.
The private version is sometimes called non-oblivious or non-blind watermarking and the
public version is sometimes called oblivious or blind watermarking. The private version is
easier to analyze and is applicable, for example, when a copyright system is centralized.
The public version is more diÆcult to analyze, but it is applicable in a much wider context.
Surprisingly, we nd that when the original data is Gaussian, then the capacity is the same
for both versions. However, the capacity-achieving technique is more complex for the public
version.
Our model of the watermarking game is illustrated in Figure 1-1 and can be described
briey as follows. A more thorough mathematical model is given below in Section 2.1. The
rst player consists of the encoder and decoder who share a secret key 
1
that allows them
to implement a randomized strategy. The attacker is the second player and it is assumed
to have full knowledge of the rst player's strategy. We now discuss the functions of each of
the encoder, the attacker and the decoder. The encoder takes the original data sequence U
(which we will call the \covertext") and the watermark W and produces the \stegotext" X
for distribution to the public. The encoder must ensure that the covertext and the stegotext
are similar according to the given distortion measure. The attacker produces a forgery Y
from the stegotext, and he must also ensure that the forgery and the stegotext are similar
according to the given distortion measure. Finally, the decoder uses the forgery (in the
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public version) or both the forgery and the covertext (in the private version) in order to
produce an estimate of the watermark
^
W . Although the encoder, attacker and decoder act
in that order, it is important to remember that the encoder and decoder are designed rst
and then the attacker is designed with knowledge of how the encoder and decoder work,
but not with knowledge of the realizations of their inputs.
Although we have and will use copyright protection as the main watermarking applica-
tion, a modied watermarking model can be used to describe several other scenarios. For
example, the covertext could be a signal from an existing transmission technique (e.g., FM
radio) and the watermark could be supplemental digital information [CS99]. The stego-
text produced by the encoder would be the signal that is actually transmitted. Since the
transmitted signal is required to be similar to the original signal, existing receivers will still
work while newer (i.e., more expensive) receivers will be able to decode the supplemental
information as well. For this example, instead of an active attacker that arbitrarily modies
the stegotext, it is more reasonable to say that the received signal is simply the transmitted
signal plus independent ambient noise. This modied watermarking model can also be used
to analyze a broadcast channel (i.e., one transmitter, many receivers) [CS01]. In this case,
the transmitter can use its knowledge of the signal it is sending to one user to design the
signal it is simultaneously sending to another user. The modied watermarking model with
Gaussian covertext and Gaussian ambient noise is also known as \writing on dirty paper"
[Cos83]; see Section 2.5.4 for more on this model including two extensions.
We conclude the introduction by considering an example watermarking system. Let's
say that the rock band The LIzarDS has created a new hit song (this corresponds to our
covertext U). Instead of directly releasing the song to the public, the band submits it to a
watermarking system. This system takes the original song and the watermark (e.g., song
title, artist's name, etc.) and produces a version that will be distributed to the public (this
is our stegotext X). To respect the band's artistic integrity, the distributed version should
be similar to the original version (hence, our transparency requirement). Whenever the song
is played on the radio, the watermarking system could decode the watermark and ensure
that the proper royalty is paid to the artist. The system could also block copying over
the Internet based on the contents of the watermark, as the music industry would like to
happen. Finally, the watermarking system would like to be able to recover the information
in the watermark even if the distributed song has been altered, but is still essentially the
16
same (hence, our robustness requirement). Note that the watermarking system is primarily
interested in the information embedded in the watermark and is only indirectly interested
in the song itself through the transparency and robustness requirements. In other words,
the part of the watermarking system that listens to the song is only required to extract the
watermark and is not required to improve the quality of the song.
1.1 Outline of Thesis
This thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we give a precise denition of watermarking
and give our results on the capacity of a watermarking system for several scenarios. We also
compare our watermarking model to other watermarking research and to two well-studied
information theoretic problems { communication with side information and the arbitrarily
varying channel. We conclude this chapter with two extensions of a communication with side
information problem, Costa's writing on dirty paper, which is similar to our watermarking
model. In Chapter 3, we dene and solve two mutual information games which are related
to the private and public versions of watermarking. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 are devoted to
proving the main watermarking capacity results. In Chapter 7, we give some conclusions
and some directions for future work.
1.2 Notation
We use script letters, e.g., U and X , to denote sets. The n-th Cartesian product of a set
U (e.g., U  U      U) is written U
n
. Random variables and random vectors are written
in upper case, while their realizations are written in lower case. Unless otherwise stated,
the use of bold refers to a vector of length n, for example U = (U
1
; : : : ; U
n
) (random) or
u = (u
1
; : : : ; u
n
) (deterministic).
For real vectors, we use k  k and h; i to denote the Euclidean norm and inner product,
respectively. That is, for any ; 2 R
n
, h; i =
P
n
i=1

i
 
i
, and kk =
p
h;i. If
h; i = 0, then we say that  and  are orthogonal and write  ?  . We denote by  
?
the linear sub-space of all vectors that are orthogonal to  . If  6= 0, then j
 
denotes the
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projection of  onto  , i.e.,
j
 
=
h; i
k k
2
 :
Similarly, j
 
?
denotes the projection of  onto the subspace orthogonal to  , i.e.,
j
 
?
=   j
 
:
We use P to denote a generic probability measure on the appropriate Borel -algebra.
For example, P
U
() is the distribution of U on the Borel -algebra of subsets of U
n
. Simi-
larly, P
XjU
denotes the conditional distribution of X given U , and f
XjU
(xju) denotes the
conditional density, when it exists.
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Chapter 2
Watermarking Model and Results
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.1, we give precise denitions of water-
marking and its information-theoretic capacity. In Section 2.2, we summarize our main
results on the watermarking capacity for six dierent scenarios. In Section 2.3, we compare
our model and results to prior work that has been done on watermarking. In Section 2.4,
some of the assumptions we have made in our watermarking model are discussed, with
an emphasis on which assumptions can be dropped and which need improvement. In Sec-
tion 2.5, we show that watermarking can be thought of as a combination of two well-studied
information-theoretic problems: communication with side information and the arbitrarily
varying channel. In Section 2.5.4, we consider a specic communication with side informa-
tion model { Costa's writing on dirty paper { and describe two extensions to this model.
2.1 Precise Denition of Watermarking
We now give a more detailed description of our watermarking model. Recall that this model
is illustrated in Figure 1-1 above.
Prior to the use of the watermarking system, a secret key (random variable) 
1
is gener-
ated and revealed to the encoder and decoder. Independently of the secret key 
1
, a source
subsequently emits a blocklength-n covertext sequence U 2 U
n
according to the law P
U
,
where fP
U
g is a collection of probability laws indexed by the blocklength n. Independently
of the covertext U and of the secret key 
1
, a copyright message W is drawn uniformly
over the set W
n
= f1; : : : ; b2
nR
cg, where R is the rate of the system.
Using the secret key, the encoder maps the covertext and message to the stegotext X.
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For every blocklength n, the encoder thus consists of a measurable function f
n
that maps
realizations of the covertext u, the message w, and the secret key 
1
into the set X
n
, i.e.,
f
n
: (u; w; 
1
) 7! x 2 X
n
:
The random vector X is the result of applying the encoder to the covertext U , the message
W , and the secret key 
1
, i.e.,X = f
n
(U ;W;
1
). The distortion introduced by the encoder
is measured by
d
1
(u;x) =
1
n
n
X
i=1
d
1
(u
i
; x
i
);
where d
1
: UX ! R
+
is a given nonnegative function. We require that the encoder satisfy
d
1
(U ;X)  D
1
; a.s.; (2.1)
where D
1
> 0 is a given constant called the encoder distortion level, and a.s. stands for \al-
most surely", i.e., with probability 1. We will also consider an average distortion constraint
on the encoder; see Section 2.2.3.
Independently of the covertext U , the message W , and the secret key 
1
the attacker
generates an attack key (random variable) 
2
. For every n > 0, the attacker consists of a
measurable function g
n
that maps realizations of the stegotext x and the attack key 
2
into
the set Y
n
, i.e.,
g
n
: (x; 
2
) 7! y 2 Y
n
: (2.2)
The forgery Y is a random vector that is the result of applying the attacker to the stego-
text X and the attacker's source of randomness 
2
, i.e., Y = g
n
(X;
2
). The distortion
introduced by the attacker is measured by
d
2
(x;y) =
1
n
n
X
i=1
d
2
(x
i
; y
i
);
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where d
2
: X Y ! R
+
is a given nonnegative function. The attacker is required to satisfy
d
2
(X ;Y )  D
2
; a.s.; (2.3)
where D
2
> 0 is a given constant called the attacker distortion level. We will also consider
an average distortion constraint on the attacker; see Section 2.2.3.
In the public version of watermarking, the decoder attempts to recover the copyright
message based only on realizations of the secret key 
1
and the forgery y. In this version
the decoder is a measurable mapping

n
: (y; 
1
) 7! w^ 2 W
n
(public version).
In the private version, however, the decoder also has access to the covertext. In this case
the decoder is a measurable mapping

n
: (y;u; 
1
) 7! w^ 2 W
n
(private version):
The estimate of the message
^
W is a random variable that is the result of applying the
decoder to the forgery Y , the covertext U (in the private version), and the same source of
randomness used by the encoder 
1
. That is,
^
W = 
n
(Y ;U ;
1
) in the private version,
and
^
W = 
n
(Y ;
1
) in the public version.
The realizations of the covertext u, message w, and sources of randomness (
1
; 
2
)
determine whether the decoder errs in decoding the copyright message, i.e., if the estimate
of the message w^ diers from the original message w. We write this error indicator function
(for the private version) as
e(u; w; 
1
; 
2
; f
n
; g
n
; 
n
) =
8
>
<
>
:
1 if w 6= 
n

g
n
 
f
n
(u; w; 
1
); 
2

;u; 
1

0 otherwise
;
where the expression for the public version is the same, except that the decoder mapping

n
does not take the covertext u as an argument. We consider the probability of error
averaged over the covertext, message and both sources of randomness as a functional of the
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mappings f
n
, g
n
, and 
n
. This is written as

P
e
(f
n
; g
n
; 
n
) = E
U ;W;
1
;
2
[e(U ;W;
1
;
2
; f
n
; g
n
; 
n
)]
= Pr
 
^
W 6=W

;
where the subscripts on the right hand side (RHS) of the rst equality indicate that the
expectation is taken with respect to the four random variables U , W , 
1
, and 
2
.
We adopt a conservative approach to watermarking and assume that once the water-
marking system is employed, its details | namely the encoder mapping f
n
, the distributions
(but not realizations) of the covertext U and of the secret key 
1
, and the decoder mapping

n
| are made public. The attacker can be malevolently designed accordingly. The wa-
termarking game is thus played so that the encoder and decoder are designed prior to the
design of the attacker. This, for example, precludes the decoder from using the maximum-
likelihood decoding rule, which requires knowledge of the law P
Y jW
and thus, indirectly,
knowledge of the attack strategy.
We thus say that a rate R is achievable if there exists a sequence f(f
n
; 
n
)g of allowable
rate-R encoder and decoder pairs such that for any sequence fg
n
g of allowable attackers
the average probability of error

P
e
(f
n
; g
n
; 
n
) tends to zero as n tends to innity.
The coding capacity of watermarking is the supremum of all achievable rates. It depends
on ve parameters: the encoder distortion function d
1
(; ) and level D
1
, the attacker dis-
tortion function d
2
(; ) and level D
2
, and the covertext distribution fP
U
g. The distortion
functions will be made obvious from context, and thus we write the generic coding capacity
of watermarking as C
priv
(D
1
;D
2
; fP
U
g) and C
pub
(D
1
; D
2
; fP
U
g) for the private and public
version, respectively.
2.2 Capacity Results for Watermarking
In this section, we describe the capacity of watermarking under various assumptions on the
covertext distribution, distortion constraints, and attacker capabilities. We nd the capacity
for the standard watermarking model of Section 2.1 when the covertext distribution is IID
scalar Gaussian (Section 2.2.1), IID vector Gaussian (Section 2.2.4) and IID Bernoulli(1=2)
(Section 2.2.6). We deviate from the standard model by considering an attacker that only
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has to meet the distortion constraint in expectation (Section 2.2.3) and an attacker that can
only inject additive noise (Section 2.2.2). Finally, we nd a general formula for the capacity
when no covertext is present (Section 2.2.5). The detailed proofs of all of these results can
be found in later chapters; we present a proof sketch and a reference to the detailed proof
following each result.
2.2.1 Scalar Gaussian Watermarking Game
We now consider a watermarking system where all of the alphabets are the real line (i.e.,
U = X = Y = R) and where the distortion measures for both the encoder and attacker will
be squared error, i.e., d
1
(u; x) = (x   u)
2
and d
2
(x; y) = (y   x)
2
. Of particular interest
is when the covertext U is a sequence of independent and identically distributed (IID)
random variables of law N (0; 
2
u
), i.e., zero-mean Gaussian. We refer to the scalar Gaussian
watermarking (SGWM) game when the distortion constraints and covertext distribution are
as specied above. Surprisingly, we nd that the capacity of the SGWM game is the same
for the private and public versions. Furthermore, we show that for all stationary and ergodic
covertext distributions, the capacity of the watermarking game is upper bounded by the
capacity of the SGWM game.
To state our results on the capacity of the SGWM game we need to dene the interval
A(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
) =

A : max

D
2
;


u
 
p
D
1

2

 A 


u
+
p
D
1

2

; (2.4)
and the mappings
s(A;D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
) =
D
1
D
2

1 
D
2
A

1 
(A  
2
u
 D
1
)
2
4D
1

2
u

; (2.5)
and
1
C

(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
)
=
8
>
<
>
:
max
A2A(D
1
;D
2
;
2
u
)
1
2
log
 
1 + s(A;D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
)

if A(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
) 6= ;
0 otherwise
: (2.6)
1
Unless otherwise specied, all logarithms in this thesis are base-2 logarithms.
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Note that a closed-form solution for (2.6) can be found by setting the derivative with
respect to A to zero. This yields a cubic equation in A that can be solved analytically; see
Lemma A.1. Further note that C

(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
) is zero only if D
2
 
2
u
+D
1
+ 2
u
p
D
1
.
The following theorem demonstrates that if the covertext has power 
2
u
, then the coding
capacity of the private and public watermarking games cannot exceed C

(D
1
; D
2
; 
2
u
). Fur-
thermore, if the covertext U is an IID zero-mean Gaussian sequence with power 
2
u
, then
the coding capacities of the private and public versions are equal, and they coincide with
this upper bound.
Theorem 2.1. For the watermarking game with real alphabets and squared error distortion
measures, if fP
U
g denes an ergodic covertext U such that E

U
4
k

<1 and E

U
2
k

 
2
u
,
then
C
pub
(D
1
;D
2
; fP
U
g)  C
priv
(D
1
; D
2
; fP
U
g) (2.7)
 C

(D
1
; D
2
; 
2
u
): (2.8)
Equality is achieved in both (2.7) and (2.8) if U is an IID Gaussian sequence with mean
zero and variance 
2
u
, i.e. if P
U
= (N (0; 
2
u
))
n
for all n.
This theorem shows that, of all ergodic covertexts with a given power, the IID zero-
mean Gaussian covertext has the largest watermarking capacity. Although the covertext
can be thought of as additive noise in a communication with side information situation (see
Section 2.5.2), this result diers from usual \Gaussian is the worst-case additive noise" idea,
see e.g., [CT91, Lap96]. The basic reason that a Gaussian covertext is the best case is that
the encoder is able to transmit the watermark using the uncertainty of the covertext, and a
Gaussian distribution has the most uncertainty (i.e., highest entropy) out of all distributions
with the same second moment.
As an example, consider an IID covertext in which each sample U
k
is either  
u
or +
u
with probability 1=2 each, so that E

U
2
k

= 
2
u
. If D
1
= D
2
 
2
u
, then C

(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
) 
1=2 bits/symbol, but a watermarking system could not reliably transmit at nearly this rate
with this covertext. To see this, let us further consider an attacker that creates the forgery
by quantizing each stegotext sample X
k
to the nearest of  
u
or +
u
. Even in the private
version, the only way the encoder could send information is by changing U
k
by at least 
u
,
and the encoder can do this for only a small percentage of the samples since D
1
 
2
u
.
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Indeed, using the results of Section 2.2.6 on the binary watermarking game, we see that the
largest achievable rate for this xed attacker is
2
H
b
 
D
1
=
2
u

bits/symbol, which is smaller
than 1=2 bits/symbol for D
1
=
2
u
< 0:11, i.e., the regime of interest. Note that the capacity
for this scenario is even smaller since we have only considered a known attacker.
We also nd that the capacity of the SGWM game is increasing in 
2
u
; see Figure 2-1.
Thus, again we see that the greater the uncertainty in the covertext the more bits the
watermarking system can hide in it.
Another interesting aspect of this theorem is that, as in the \writing on dirty paper"
model (see Section 2.5.4 below and [Cos83]), the capacity of the SGWM game is unaected
by the presence or absence of side-information (covertext) at the receiver. See [Cov99] for
some comments on the role of receiver side-information, particularly in card games.
Moulin and O'Sullivan [MO99, MO00] give a capacity for the SGWM game that is
strictly smaller than C

(D
1
; D
2
; 
2
u
). In particular, they claim that the capacity is given by
1
2
log(1+s(A;D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
)) when A is xed to 
2
u
+D
1
instead of optimized over A(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
)
as in (2.6), while the optimal A is strictly larger than 
2
u
+ D
1
; see Lemma A.1. This
dierence is particularly noticeable when 
2
u
+ D
1
< D
2
< 
2
u
+ D
1
+ 2
u
p
D
1
, since
C

(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
) > 0 in this range while the capacity given in [MO99, MO00] is zero. An
example of the two capacity expressions is plotted in Figure 2-1. Both capcity expressions
are bounded above by
1
2
log

1 +
D
1
D
2

and approach this bound as 
2
u
increases. Note that
the watermarking game here is dened dierently than in [MO99, MO00], but we believe
that the capacity of the SGWM game should be the same for both models. Indeed, the
general capacity expression in [MO99, MO00] is similar to our mutual information game
(see Chapter 3), and we nd that the value of the mutual information game for a Gaussian
covertext is also C

(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
) (see Theorem 3.1).
Theorem 2.1 is proved in Chapter 4 in two steps: a proof of achievability for Gaussian
covertexts and a converse for general covertexts. Although achievability for the public
version implies achievability for the private version, we give separate proofs for the private
version (Section 4.2) and the public version (Section 4.3). We have chosen to include both
proofs because the coding technique for the private version has a far lower complexity (than
the coding technique for the public version) and may give some insight into the design of
practical watermarking systems for such scenarios. We now provide a sketch of the proof.
2
We use H
b
() to denote the binary entropy, i.e., H
b
(p) =  p log p  (1   p) log(1  p).
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Figure 2-1: Scalar Gaussian watermarking capacity versus 
2
u
with D
1
= 1 and D
2
= 4.
The dashed line is the capacity expression from [MO99, MO00].
Achievability
We now argue that for a Gaussian covertext all rates less than C

(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
) are achievable
in the public version; see Section 4.3 for a full proof. This will also demonstrate that all
such rates are achievable in the private version as well. The parameter A corresponds to
the desired power in the covertext, i.e., our coding strategy will have n
 1
kXk  A. We
now describe a coding strategy that depends on A (and the given parameters D
1
, D
2
and

2
u
) and can achieve all rates up to
1
2
log(1 + s(A;D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
)). Hence, all rates less than
C

(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
) are achievable with the appropriate choice of A. The coding strategy is
motivated by the works of Marton [Mar79], Gel'fand and Pinsker [GP80], Heegard and
El Gamal [HEG83], and Costa [Cos83]. The encoder/decoder pair use their common source
of randomness to generate a codebook consisting of 2
nR
1
IID codewords that are partitioned
into 2
nR
bins of size 2
nR
0
each (hence, R = R
1
 R
0
). Each codeword is uniformly distributed
on an n-sphere with radius depending on A. Given the covertext u and the watermark w, the
encoder nds the codeword in bin w that is closest (in Euclidean distance) to u. Let v
w
(u)
be the chosen codeword. The encoder then forms the stegotext as a linear combination of
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the chosen codeword and the covertext,
x = v
w
(u) + (1  )u;
where  is a constant that depends on A. The distortion constraint will be met with high
probability if R
0
is large enough. The decoder nds the closest codeword (out of all 2
nR
1
codewords) to the forgery, and estimates the watermark as the bin of this closest codeword.
If R
1
is small enough, then the probability of error can be made arbitrarily small. The two
constraints on R
0
and R
1
combine to give the desired bound on the overall rate R.
Converse
We now argue that no rates larger than C

(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
) are achievable in the private version
for any ergodic covertext distribution with power at most 
2
u
; see Section 4.5 for a full proof.
The main idea is to show using a Fano-type inequality that in order for the probability of
error to tend to zero, a mutual information term must be greater than the watermarking
rate. The mutual information term of interest is roughly I(X;Y jU ), which is related
to the capacity with side information at the encoder and decoder; see Section 2.5.2. A
consequence of this proof is that these rates are not achievable even if the decoder knew the
statistical properties of the attacker. The basic attacker that guarantees that the mutual
information will be small is based on the Gaussian rate distortion forward channel. That is,
such an attacker computes A (i.e., the power in the stegotext) and implements the channel
that minimizes the mutual information between the stegotext and the forgery subject to
a distortion constraint, assuming that the stegotext were an IID sequence of mean-zero
variance-A Gaussian random variables. The method that the attacker uses to compute A is
critical. If A is the average power of the stegotext (averaged over all sources of randomness),
then the mutual information will be small but the attacker's a.s. distortion constraint might
not be met. If A is the power of the realization of the stegotext, then the a.s. distortion
constraint will be met but the encoder could potentially use A to transmit extra information.
A strategy that avoids both of these problems is to compute A by quantizing the power
of the realization of the stegotext to one of nitely many values. This attacker will both
meet the distortion constraint (if the quantization points are dense enough) and prevent
the encoder from transmitting extra information.
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2.2.2 Additive Attack Watermarking Game
In this section, we describe a variation of the watermarking game for real alphabets and
squared error distortions, which we call the additive attack watermarking game. (When it
is necessary to distinguish the two models, we will refer to the original model of Section 2.1
as the general watermarking game.) The study of this model will show that it is suboptimal
for the attacker to produce the forgery by combining the stegotext with a power-limited
jamming sequence generated independently of the stegotext. Similarly to Costa's writing
on dirty paper result (see Section 2.5.4 and [Cos83]), we will show that if the covertext U
is IID Gaussian then the capacities of the private and public versions are the same and are
given by
1
2
log(1 +
D
1
D
2
). This result can be thus viewed as an extension of Costa's result to
arbitrarily varying noises; see Section 2.5.4 for more discussion of this extension.
In the additive attack watermarking game the attacker is more restricted than in the
general game. Rather than allowing general attacks of the form (2.2), we restrict the
attacker to mappings that are of the form
g
n
(x; 
2
) = x+ ~g
n
(
2
) (2.9)
for some mapping ~g
n
. In particular, the jamming sequence
~
Y = ~g
n
(
2
) (2.10)
is produced independently of the stegotext X, and must satisfy the distortion constraint
1
n


~
Y


2
 D
2
; a.s.: (2.11)
The capacity of the additive attack watermarking game is dened similarly to the capacity
of the general game and is written as C
AA
priv
(D
1
;D
2
; fP
U
g) and C
AA
pub
(D
1
;D
2
; fP
U
g) for the
private and public versions, respectively. Our main result in this section is to describe these
capacities.
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Theorem 2.2. For any covertext distribution fP
U
g,
C
AA
pub
(D
1
;D
2
; fP
U
g)  C
AA
priv
(D
1
; D
2
; fP
U
g) (2.12)
=
1
2
log

1 +
D
1
D
2

: (2.13)
Equality is achieved in (2.12) if U is an IID Gaussian sequence.
We rst sketch the converse for both versions. An IID mean-zero, variance-D
2
Gaussian
sequence
~
Y does not satisfy (2.11). However, for any Æ > 0, an IID mean-zero, variance-
(D
2
  Æ) Gaussian sequence
~
Y satises n
 1
k
~
Y k  D
2
with arbitrarily large probability for
suÆciently large blocklength n. Since the capacity here cannot exceed the capacity when
U is absent, the capacity results on an additive white noise Gaussian channel imply that
the capacity of either version is at most
1
2
log(1 +
D
1
D
2
).
We now argue that the capacity of the private version is as in the theorem. When the
sequence U is known to the decoder, then the results of [Lap96] can be used to show that all
rates less than
1
2
log(1+
D
1
D
2
) are achievable using Gaussian codebooks and nearest neighbor
decoding. This establishes the validity of (2.13).
To complete the proof of this theorem, we must show that
1
2
log(1+
D
1
D
2
) is achievable in
the public version of the game with IID Gaussian covertext. We present a coding strategy
and demonstrate that all such rates are achievable in Chapter 4.3.
Since any allowable additive attacker is also an allowable general attacker, the capacity
of the additive attack watermarking game provides an upper bound to the capacity of the
general watermarking game. However, comparing Theorems 2.1 and 2.2, we see that for an
IID Gaussian covertext this bound is loose. Thus, for such covertexts, it is suboptimal for
the attacker in the general watermarking game to take the form (2.9). See Section 2.5.4 for
more discussion on the additive attack watermarking game.
2.2.3 Average Distortion Constraints
In this section, we show that if the almost sure distortion constraints are replaced with
average distortion constraint, then the capacity is typically zero. That is, we replace the
a.s. constraints (2.1) and (2.3) on the encoder and attacker, respectively, with
E [d
1
(U ;X)]  D
1
; (2.14)
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and
E [d
2
(X;Y )]  D
2
; (2.15)
where the expectations are with respect to all relevant random quantities. In particular, we
have the following theorem.
Theorem 2.3. For the watermarking game with real alphabets and squared error distortion,
if the covertext U satises
lim inf
n!1
E

1
n
kUk
2

<1; (2.16)
and if the average distortion constraints (2.14), (2.15) are in eect instead of the a.s.
distortion constraints (2.1), (2.3), then no rate is achievable in either version of the game.
This result is reminiscent of results from the theory of Gaussian arbitrarily varying
channels (AVCs) [HN87] and from the theory of general AVCs with constrained inputs and
states [CN88a], where under average power constraints no positive rates are achievable
3
.
The detailed proof of this theorem is given in Appendix B.1; the basic idea is as follows.
The average power of the covertext is bounded and hence the average power of the stegotext
is bounded as well. Thus, the attacker can set the forgery equal to the zero vector with
some xed probability and still meet the average distortion constraint. For this attacker, the
probability of error is bounded away from zero for any positive rate. Hence, no positive rates
are achievable when the attacker is only required to meet an average distortion constraint.
2.2.4 Vector Gaussian Watermarking Game
We now consider a generalization of the SGWM game, where the covertext consists of an IID
sequence of zero-mean Gaussian vectors of a given covariance. This will be called the vector
Gaussian watermarking (VGWM) game. Here, the alphabets are all the m-dimensional
Euclidean space, i.e., U = X = Y = R
m
, and the distortion measures are squared Euclidean
distance, i.e., d
1
(u;x) = kx  uk
2
and d
2
(x;y) = ky   xk
2
. Furthermore, the covertext is
an IID sequence of m-vectors U = (U
1
; : : : ;U
n
), where each U
i
is a zero-mean Gaussian
random vector with a given m m covariance matrix S
u
. Note that the vector size m is
3
The -capacity is, however, typically positive for  > 0
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xed, while the blocklength n is allowed to be arbitrarily large. We use C
VGWM
priv
(D
1
;D
2
; S
u
)
and C
VGWM
pub
(D
1
;D
2
; S
u
) to denote the capacity of the VGWM game for the private and
public versions, respectively.
Theorem 2.4. For the vector Gaussian watermarking game,
C
VGWM
pub
(D
1
;D
2
; S
u
) = C
VGWM
priv
(D
1
; D
2
; S
u
) (2.17)
= max
D
1
0 : e
t
D
1
D
1
min
D
2
0 : e
t
D
2
D
2
m
X
j=1
C

(D
1j
;D
2j
; 
2
j
); (2.18)
where C

(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
) is dened in (2.6), (
2
1
; : : : ; 
2
m
) are the eigenvalues of S
u
and e is
the m-vector containing all 1's.
This theorem is proved in detail in Chapter 5, but we now briey describe the coding
strategy that achieves the desired rates for the public version. The covariance matrix K
u
can be diagonalized using an orthogonal transformation that does not aect the distortion.
Thus, we can assume that K
u
is diagonal so that U consists of m components, each a
length-n sequence of IID zero-mean Gaussian random variables with respective variances
(
2
1
; : : : ; 
2
m
) = 
2
. After choosing m-dimensional vectors D
1
,
~
D
2
and A, the encoder
encodes component j using the scalar encoder for the SGWM game (see the discussion
after Theorem 2.1 and Chapter 4) based on A = A
j
, D
1
= D
1j
, D
2
=
~
D
2j
, and 
2
u
= 
2
j
.
Thus, the vector
~
D
2
acts as an estimate of the amount of distortion the attacker will place
in each component. Every attacker is associated with a feasible D
2
(not necessarily equal
to
~
D
2
), where D
2j
describes the amount of distortion the attacker inicts on component j.
However, for the optimal choice of
~
D
2
by the encoder, the attacker will choose D
2
=
~
D
2
in order to minimize the achievable rates. This allows us to describe the achievable rates
using the simple form of (2.18).
We now discuss some aspects of this theorem, focusing on the dierences and similarities
between SGWM and VGWM. One major similarity is that in both cases the public and
private versions have the same capacity. One major dierence between the two games is
that in the vector version an attacker based on the Gaussian rate distortion solution is no
longer optimal, i.e., it does not necessarily prevent rates larger than capacity from being
achievable. A rate-distortion based attacker calculates the second order statistics of the
stegotext, and designs the attack to minimize (subject to an average distortion constraint)
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the mutual information between the stegotext and the forgery, assuming that the stegotext
was Gaussian. In the SGWM game, this attacker does not necessarily meet the almost sure
distortion constraint, but it does prevent rates higher than capacity from being achievable.
However, in the vector version, if such an attacker is used, then rates strictly larger than
capacity can be achieved. See Section 5.7 for more detail. The dierence is that an optimal
attacker does not distribute his distortion to the dierent components of the stegotext
using the familiar waterlling algorithm (see e.g., [CT91]). However, having chosen the
correct distortion distribution, a parallel concatenation of optimal attackers for the SGWM
game (and hence a parallel concatenation of scalar Gaussian rate distortion solutions) does
prevent rates larger than capacity from being achievable.
We also note that the order in which the watermarking game is played remains critical
in the vector version. In particular, the max and min in (2.18) cannot be switched. We
highlight the signicance of this observation by restricting the encoder and attacker to
parallel concatenations of optimal scalar strategies based on some vectors D
1
and D
2
.
There is no single vector D
2
that the attacker could pick to ensure that no rates higher
than the capacity are achieved. Instead, the attacker must use his advantage of playing
second (i.e., his knowledge of the encoder's strategy) in order to accomplish this goal. This
diers from the vector Gaussian arbitrarily varying channel [HN88] where the attacker (resp.
encoder) can choose a distortion distribution to ensure that no rates more than (resp. all
rates up to) the capacity can be achieved.
2.2.5 Discrete Alphabets, No Covertext
In this section, we examine an extreme watermarking scenario in which there is no covertext
to hide the message in. In this situation, the attacker can directly modify (subject to a
distortion constraint) the codeword produced by the encoder. This can be viewed as an
extension of [CN88a], which found the random coding capacity of an arbitrarily varying
channel (AVC) with constrained inputs and states (see Section 2.5.3 for more on the AVC).
The primary dierence is that in [CN88a] the inputs and states are chosen independently
of each other, while here the states of the channel are chosen as a function of the input
sequence.
Before stating the main result of this section, we rst give our assumptions and some
notation. We assume that the alphabets X and Y are nite. Since there is no covertext,
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the distortion constraint (2.1) is replaced by n
 1
P
n
i=1
d
1
(X
i
)  D
1
a.s. for some function
d
1
: X 7! R
+
. The distortion constraint (2.3) imposed on the attacker remains the same.
The lack of covertext also means that there is no distinction between the private and public
versions, and thus we write the capacity for this scenario as C
NoCov
(D
1
;D
2
). For any
distributions P
X
and P
Y jX
, we write I
P
X
P
Y jX
(X;Y ) to be the mutual information between
random variables X and Y under joint distribution P
X
P
Y jX
.
Theorem 2.5. When there is no covertext and discrete alphabets, the capacity of the wa-
termarking game is given by
C
NoCov
(D
1
; D
2
) = max
P
X
:E
P
X
[d
1
(X)]D
1
min
P
Y jX
:E
P
X
P
Y jX
[d
2
(X;Y )]D
2
I
P
X
P
Y jX
(X;Y ): (2.19)
The proof of this Theorem can be found in Section 6.1; we now briey sketch the
arguments behind the proof.
Achievability
For a xed n, the encoder chooses a distribution P
X
such that the constraint in (2.19) is
satised and n  P
X
(x) is an integer for every x 2 X . The encoder then generates 2
nR
IID
codewords fX
1
; : : : ;X
2
nR
g, with each codeword uniformly distributed over all n-sequences
whose empirical distribution is given by P
X
. Given the codebook and the watermark w, the
transmitted sequence is simply x
w
. Note that n
 1
d
1
(x
w
) = E
P
X
[d
1
(X)]  D
1
, and thus
the distortion constraint is satised. The decoder uses the maximum mutual information
(MMI) decoding rule. That is, the estimate of the watermark is given by
w^ = argmax
1w
0
2
nR
I(x
w
0
^ y);
where I(x ^ y) is the mutual information between random variables X and Y when they
have the joint empirical distribution of x and y. The probability of error only depends on
the attacker through the conditional empirical distribution of y given x. Using techniques
from [CK81], we can show that the probability of error goes to zero as long as the rate
R is less than I(x
w
^ y) for the correct watermark w. Finally, the conditional empirical
distribution of y given x must satisfy the constraint in (2.19) in order for the attacker to
meet his distortion constraint, and thus the encoder can guarantee that the score of the
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correct codeword I(x
w
^y) is arbitrarily close to C
NoCov
(D
1
;D
2
) by making the blocklength
n large enough.
Converse
The attacker nds the minimizing P
Y jX
in (2.19) for the empirical distribution of the trans-
mitted sequence x. He then implements a memoryless channel based on this P
Y jX
. The
distortion constraint will be met with high probability as long as any
~
D
2
< D
2
is used
instead of D
2
in (2.19). A Fano-type inequality can be used to show that no rates higher
than C
NoCov
(D
1
;
~
D
2
) are achievable for this attacker. The converse follows by continuity of
(2.19) in D
2
.
2.2.6 Binary Watermarking Game
In this section, we consider the watermarking game binary alphabets, i.e., U = X = Y =
f0; 1g. Further, we assume that the covertext U is an IID sequence of Bernoulli(1=2) random
variables, i.e., Pr(U
i
= 0) = Pr(U
i
= 1) = 1=2. We use Hamming distortion constraints for
both encoder and decoder, i.e., d
1
(u;x) = n
 1
w
h
(ux) and d
2
(x;y) = n
 1
w
h
(xy). We
write the capacity in this scenario as C
BinWM
priv
(D
1
;D
2
) and C
BinWM
pub
(D
1
; D
2
) for the private
and public versions, respectively.
Theorem 2.6. For the binary watermarking game with 0  D
1
 1=2 and 0  D
2
 1=2,
C
BinWM
priv
(D
1
; D
2
) = H
b
(D
1

D
2
) H
b
(D
2
); (2.20)
and
C
BinWM
pub
(D
1
;D
2
) = max
2D
1
g1
g

H
b

D
1
g

 H
b
(D
2
)

; (2.21)
where D
1

D
2
= D
1
(1 D
2
) + (1  D
1
)D
2
and H
b
() is the binary entropy, i.e., H
b
(p) =
 p log p  (1  p) log(1  p).
See gure 2-2 for an example plot of C
BinWM
priv
(D
1
; D
2
) and C
BinWM
pub
(D
1
;D
2
). Note that
C
BinWM
priv
(D
1
;D
2
) > C
BinWM
pub
(D
1
;D
2
) for 0 < D
1
< 1=2 and 0 < D
2
< 1=2. Thus, unlike the
Gaussian watermarking games, the capacity of the private version can exceed the capacity
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Figure 2-2: Binary watermarking capacity (private and public versions) versus D
1
with
D
2
= 0:15.
of the public version. Also note that the maximizing g in (2.21) is given by
g

=
8
>
<
>
:
D
1
1 2
 H
b
(D
2
)
if D
1
< 1  2
 H
b
(D
2
)
1 otherwise
; (2.22)
where 1  2
 H
b
(D
2
)
 1=2 and thus g

 2D
1
. Further, we can rewrite (2.21) as
C
BinWM
pub
(D
1
;D
2
) =
8
>
<
>
:
D
1


H
b
(1 2
 H
b
(D
2
)
) H
b
(D
2
)
1 2
 H
b
(D
2
)

if D
1
< 1  2
 H
b
(D
2
)
;
H
b
(D
1
) H
b
(D
2
) otherwise
: (2.23)
Note that Barron, Chen and Wornell [BCW00] found identical expressions for the capac-
ity when the attacker is xed to be a binary symmetric channel with crossover probability
D
2
. Indeed, we prove the converse part of this theorem by xing the attacker to be such a
channel and computing the resulting capacity using an extension (Lemma 2.1) of Gel'fand
and Pinsker's work [GP80] on channels with side information. The detailed proof of the
converse and the achievability parts of the theorem can be found in Section 6.2. We give a
brief sketch of the achievability proofs below.
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Achievability for Private Version
The encoder and the decoder can use their combined knowledge of the covertext U to
provide secrecy about a transmitted sequence chosen independently of U . To see this, let a
codeword
~
X = f
n
(W;
1
) be chosen independently of U (but depending on the watermark
W and the secret key 
1
). The encoder will form the stegotext as X = U 
~
X, and thus
the distortion constraint on the encoder becomes n
 1
w
h
(
~
X)  D
1
a.s.. Furthermore, U is
an IID sequence of Bernoulli(1=2) random variables, and thus X and
~
X are independent.
Thus, any rate achievable for the AVC with constrained inputs and states is achievable
here; see Section 2.5.3 and [CN88a]. In particular, all rates less than C
BinWM
priv
(D
1
; D
2
) are
achievable.
Achievability for Public Version
Let us rst x a parameter g as in (2.21). The encoder/decoder pair select ng indices
uniformly out of all subsets of f1; : : : ; ng of size ng. The encoder will use only these indices
of the covertext to encode the watermark. We use a codebook similar to that used for
the public version of the SGWM game. In particular, every watermark w 2 f1; : : : ; 2
nR
g
corresponds to a bin of 2
nR
0
codewords. Each codeword is a length-ng IID sequence of
Bernoulli(1=2) random variables. Given the watermark w and the covertext u, the encoder
nds the codeword in bin w that agrees with the covertext at the selected indices as closely
as possible. The encoder then creates the stegotext by replacing the selected positions of
the covertext with the closest codeword. The distortion constraint will be satised if
R
0
> g 

1 H
b

D
1
g

: (2.24)
The decoder nds the codeword closest to the forgery at the selected indices, and estimates
the watermark as the bin of this codeword. Let
~
y = y  x be the dierence between the
forgery and the stegotext. The probability of error only depends on the attacker through
the Hamming weight of
~
y, which can be at most nD
2
. With high probability, the Hamming
weight of
~
y at the selected positions will not greatly exceed ngD
2
. This observation allows
us to show that the probability of error tends to zero as long as
R+R
0
< g  (1 H
b
(D
2
)) : (2.25)
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The combination of (2.24) and (2.25) completes the proof.
2.3 Prior Work on Watermarking
In this section, we discuss some of the related literature and compare it to the results
presented above. We rst briey describe some techniques that have been proposed, and
we then give an overview of the information-theoretic work that has been done.
2.3.1 Practical Approaches to Watermarking
The simplest watermarking systems convey information by modifying the least signicant
parts of the covertext data, e.g., changing the low-order bits in a digital representation
of an image. These systems are transparent, but they are easily corrupted. For example,
lossy compression will remove the least signicant portions of the data or an attacker might
replace low-order bits with random bits without greatly aecting the quality of the data. It
was recognized [CKLS97] that in order to achieve robustness, information must be embedded
in signicant portions of the data. Thus, for a given desired watermarking rate, there is a
non-trivial trade-o between robustness and transparency.
The most widely studied class of watermarking systems consist of \spread spectrum"
techniques, introduced in [CKLS97]. In these systems, a noise-like sequence is added to the
covertext at the encoder and a correlation detector is used at the decoder. The watermark
(i.e., the added sequence) is often scaled to achieve the desired robustness or transparency
requirement, but otherwise the watermark is independent of the covertext. The watermark
can be added either directly or in transform domains like Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT)
[CKLS97], Fourier-Mellon transform [ORP97] or wavelets [XA98]. One important feature
of such systems is that when the covertext is not available at the decoder (i.e., the public
version), then the covertext acts as interference in the decoding process. Thus, as the
variability in the original data increases, the amount of information that can be embedded
in this manner decreases. However, we have seen that the capacity for our watermarking
model can increase as the variability of the covertext increases, e.g., for the SGWM game.
Thus, forming the stegotext by linearly combining the covertext and a signal that only
depends on the watermark is suboptimal.
One new watermarking method that does not suer from the problem of interference
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from the covertext is Quantization Index Modulation (QIM), introduced by Chen and Wor-
nell [Che00, CW01]. In QIM, a quantizer is used for the covertext depending on the value
of the watermark. By varying the number and coarseness of the quantizers, one can trade
o between transparency, robustness and data rate. Some of the watermarking techniques
described in this thesis are similar to distortion compensated QIM, in which the stegotext
is a linear combination of the covertext and the quantized version of the covertext (where
again the quantizer depends on the value of the watermark). For example, in the public
version of the SGWM game, the stegotext is a linear combination of the covertext and a
codeword selected from the bin associated with the watermark; see the discussion after The-
orem 2.1 and Section 4.3. The process of selecting the codeword is similar to quantization
since the chosen codeword is the one closest to the covertext. In [Che00, CW01], it was
shown that distortion compensated QIM achieves the capacity for situations with a known
attacker. Here, we show that a similar technique also achieves the capacity for an unknown
and arbitrary attacker.
2.3.2 Information-Theoretic Watermarking
The basic information theoretic model of watermarking was introduced by O'Sullivan,
Moulin and Ettinger [MO99, MO00, OME98]. They investigated the capacity of a model
that is similar to that described above but with several important dierences. First, they
assume a maximum likelihood decoder, which requires the decoder to be cognizant of the
attack strategy. In contrast, we require that one encoder/decoder pair be robust against
any potential attack. Second, they focus exclusively on average distortion constraints,
while we compare the average and almost sure constraints. In fact, we nd that average
distortion constraints typically result in a capacity of zero. Finally, despite our stricter
requirements, we have seen that our capacity with a Gaussian covertext is larger than
that given in [MO99, MO00]; see Figure 2-1 for a comparison of the two capacities. Mit-
telhozer [Mit99] independently introduced a similar model for watermarking. Still others
[BBDRP99, BI99, LC01, LM00, RA98, SPR98, SC96] have investigated the capacity of
watermarking systems, but only for specic encoding schemes or types of attacks.
The most similar model to ours has been recently proposed by Somekh-Baruch and
Merhav [SBM01a, SBM01b]. In their model, the probability that the distortion introduced
by the encoder or the attacker is greater than some threshold must decay to zero exponen-
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tially, i.e., Pr fd
2
(X ;Y ) > D
2
jX = xg  e
 n
for some  and for all x 2 X
n
, and similarly
for the encoder. This type of constraint is equivalent to our a.s. constraints when  = 1.
In [SBM01a], they nd a general expression (that does not depend on ) for the coding
capacity of the private version for nite alphabets. This result supersedes our result of The-
orem 2.5 on the capacity of the watermarking game with no covertext and nite alphabets.
Their capacity expression is similar to the mutual information game of [MO99, OME98].
We also see that for a scalar Gaussian covertext, the capacity is the same as the value of a
related mutual information game; compare Theorems 2.1 and 3.1.
Besides capacity, several other information theoretic quantities have begun to be ad-
dressed for watermarking. Merhav [Mer00] and Somekh-Baruch and Merhav [SBM01a,
SBM01b] have studied error exponents (i.e., how the probability of error decreases to zero
as the blocklength increases for rates less than capacity) for a similar watermarking model,
but with slightly dierent distortion constraints; see above. Also, Steinberg and Merhav
[SM01] have investigated the identication capacity of a watermarking system with a xed
attack channel. In identication, questions of the form \Was watermark w sent?" need to
be answered reliably instead of the usual \Which watermark was sent?". This more lenient
requirement results in a doubly exponential growth in the number of watermarks; see also
[AD89]. Furthermore, questions of this form might be what needs to be answered in some
copyright protection applications. Finally, Karakos and Papamarcou [KP00a] have studied
the trade-o between quantization and watermarking rate for data that needs to be both
watermarked and compressed.
2.3.3 Similar Models: Steganography and Fingerprinting
In this section, we consider some models that are similar to watermarking and that have also
generated recent interest. In steganography, the objective is to embed information so that
an adversary cannot decide whether or not information has been embedded. This diers
from our watermarking model since we assume that the attacker knows that information
has been embedded, but has only limited means to remove it. For more on steganography
see e.g., [AP98, Cac98, KP00b]. In ngerprinting, the embedded information is used to
identify one of many users as opposed to a single owner. That is, the same covertext
is given to dierent users with dierent watermarks. Thus, collusive attacks are possible
on a ngerprinting system, while they are not possible on a watermarking system. In a
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collusive attack, many users contribute their distinct ngerprinted copies in order to create
a better forgery. Several researchers [BBK01, BS98, CFNP00, CEZ00, SEG00] have studied
the number of ngerprinted objects that a system can distribute under various conditions.
The research on ngerprinting has focused largely on combinatorial lower bounds on the
number of possible ngerprints, while there has been less work on information-theoretic
upper bounds.
2.3.4 Communication Games
We have seen that watermarking can be viewed as a communication game. At a low
level, the encoder and decoder are playing a game against the attacker in which they are
trying to communicate over a channel where the encoder's input sequence can be changed
arbitrarily (subject to a distortion constraint), while the attacker is trying to prevent such
reliable communication. This is similar to the arbitrarily varying channel (AVC), in which
the encoder and decoder have to be designed to reliably send a message over a channel
with many possible states, in which the channel state can change arbitrarily (as opposed
to stochastically). At a higher level, the encoder and decoder are trying to to maximize
the set of achievable rates while the attacker tries to minimize this set. This is similar to
many mutual information games, in which a communicator and a jammer try to maximize
and minimize, respectively, a mutual information expression. The solution to a mutual
information game can sometimes be used to describe the maximum achievable rate for a
communication system. The AVC and a mutual information game are discussed in more
detail in Section 2.5.3 and Chapter 3, respectively.
We now consider a sample of other communication games that have been investigated.
In one game [Bas83, BW85], a power-constrained transmitter tries to send a sequence of
Gaussian random variables to a receiver with minimum mean-squared error, while a jammer
(with some knowledge of the transmitter's input) attempts to maximize the error. In another
game [MSP00], a transmitter can choose which slots in a slotted communication channel
to transmit and the jammer can choose which slots to jam. Both transmitter and jammer
are constrained by a dissipative energy model so that if power P
n
(which can be either zero
or some xed value) is used in slot n, then
P
m 1
n=0
Æ
n
P
m n
 P
max
for all m where Æ and
P
max
are given constants. In a nal game [GH99, SV00], a transmitter tries to use the
timing of packets to send information over a network (as in \Bits through Queues" [AV96]),
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while a jamming network provider attempts to minimize the information rate subject to a
constraint that he must deliver the packets in a timely fashion.
2.4 Assumptions in Watermarking Model
In this section, we review some of the assumptions made in the watermarking model. In
Section 2.4.1, we briey discuss if capacity is a good measure for a watermarking sys-
tem. We then discuss randomization, and in particular when it is not necessary, for the
encoder/decoder (Section 2.4.2) and for the attacker (Section 2.4.3). In Section 2.4.4, we dis-
cuss the distortion constraints that we impose in the watermarking model. In Section 2.4.5,
we discuss the covertext distributions that we have chosen to study.
2.4.1 Is Capacity Meaningful?
In Section 2.2, we described the watermarking capacity for many scenarios, but we have
not addressed whether the capacity of a watermarking system is a meaningful concept; we
now discuss this issue. In order for the asymptotic analysis in the denition of capacity to
be meaningful, there should be eectively limitless covertext data and unending watermark
information to embed. This might not always be the case for a copyright protection appli-
cation, since there would usually be a xed length covertext and one of a xed number of
messages to embed. However, in many instances the data to be watermarked is quite long
(e.g., a movie or an album), and the asymptotic regime can be safely assumed. Further-
more, there are other applications, such as hybrid digital/analog transmission and closed
captioning, in which the above assumptions are met more generally. In any case, we think
that the capacity achieving scheme should shed light on how to design a good watermarking
system even for a non-asymptotic situation.
2.4.2 Randomization for Encoder/Decoder
There is a dierence between the randomized coding used here and Shannon's classical
random coding argument (see, for example, [CT91, Chap. 8.7]). In the latter, codebooks
are chosen from an ensemble according to some probability law, and it is shown that the
ensemble-averaged probability of error is small, thus demonstrating the existence of at least
one codebook from the ensemble for which the probability of error is small. For the water-
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marking game, on the other hand, randomization is not a proof technique that shows the
existence of a good codebook, but a dening feature of the encoding. For example, the ran-
domization at the encoder prevents the attacker from knowing the particular mapping used
for each message; the attacker only knows the strategy used for generating the codewords.
See [LN98] for more on this subject.
Nevertheless, in the private version of the watermarking game, common randomness is
typically not needed between the encoder and the decoder and deterministic codes suÆce.
For example, consider an IID Gaussian covertext. Part of the covertext to which both the
encoder and the decoder have access, can be used instead of the secret key 
1
. Indeed,
the encoder could set x
1
= 0, and use the random variable U
1
as the common random
experiment. The extra distortion incurred by this policy can be made arbitrarily small by
making n suÆciently large. Since U
1
is a real-valued random variable with a density, it is
suÆcient to provide the necessary randomization.
Even if the covertext does not have a density, a similar technique can be used to show
that a secret key is not necessary in the private version, as long as the number of samples
from the covertext used for randomization does not asymptotically aect the distortion.
Indeed, Ahlswede [Ahl78] has shown that only
4
O(n
2
) codebooks are necessary to achieve
randomization in many situations. Thus, only O(log n) random bits available to both the
encoder and decoder are needed to specify which codebook to use. Thus, if the covertext is
a discrete memoryless source, then O(log n) samples from the covertext (which is known to
both the encoder and decoder in the private version) can be used to specify the codebook.
In order to prevent the attacker from learning anything about the codebook, the encoder
should make the stegotext samples independent of the covertext samples that are used to
specify the codebook, which results in some extra distortion. However, if the distortion
constraint is bounded, then the extra distortion that is needed to implement this scheme is
O

log n
n

, which can be made negligible by making the blocklength n large enough.
2.4.3 Randomization for Attacker - Deterministic is SuÆcient
We allow the attacker to implement a randomized strategy. However, to prove achievability
in the watermarking game, we can without loss of generality limit the attacker to determin-
4
For any two functions f(n) and g(n), f(n) = O(g(n)) if f(n)=g(n) is bounded for all n.
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istic attacks. That is, it is suÆcient to show that the average probability of error (averaged
over the side information, secret key and message) is small for all attacker mappings
y = g
n
(x) (2.26)
instead of the more general g
n
(x; 
2
). With an attacker of this form, the distortion constraint
(2.3) can be rewritten as d
2
(X ; g
n
(X))  D
2
, almost surely.
Indeed, we can evaluate the average probability of error (averaged over everything in-
cluding the attack key 
2
) by rst conditioning on the attack key 
2
. Thus, if the average
probability of error given every attacker mapping of the form (2.26) is small, then the aver-
age probability of error for any general attacker mapping of the form (2.2) is also small. This
idea is similar to the argument (which we outlined about in Section 2.4.2) that deterministic
codebooks are suÆcient for a xed channel.
2.4.4 Distortion Constraints
Admittedly, the technique we have used to decide whether two data sequences are \similar"
has some aws. However, the simplicity of our technique allows us to derive closed form
solutions that hopefully will give some intuition for more realistic scenarios. To review, we
say that data sequences x and y are similar if n
 1
P
i
d(x
i
; y
i
)  D for some non-negative
function d(; ) and some thresholdD. The rst potential problem is that y could be a shifted
or rotated version of x and thus very \similar" to x. However, our distortion measure would
not recognize the similarity. This will aect our watermarking performance since we only
require decoding from forgeries that are similar according to our distortion measure. One
way to overcome this problem is to watermark in a domain (e.g., Fourier) that is relatively
robust to such transformations [LWB
+
01, ORP97]. Another way to overcome this problem is
for the encoder to use some its available distortion to introduce a synchronization signal that
the decoder can use to align the samples of the covertext and the forgery [PP99]. The second
potential problem is that there might not be a pointwise function d(; ) so that our distortion
measure corresponds to perceptual distortion. Much work has been devoted to developing
models of human perception to design good data compression schemes; see e.g., [JJS93,
MS74] and references therein. It is clear that the squared dierence distortion measure that
we have mainly used does not directly correspond to human perceptual distortion, but our
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distortion measure is tractable and provides a decent rst approximation. We would like
to integrate some more knowledge of the human perceptual system into our watermarking
model in the future.
We require that the attacker satisfy a distortion constraint between the stegotext X
and the forgery Y . This is plausible because the attacker observes the stegotext and thus
he knows exactly what forgeries are allowed. Since one basic purpose of this constraint is to
ensure that the forgery is similar to the covertext U , some have suggested that the attacker's
constraint be between U and Y [Mou01]. However, with this alternative constraint, if the
amount of distortion the attacker can add is small (but non-zero), then the watermarking
system can send unlimited information, which seems unreasonable. On the other hand, for
the SGWM game (with our original constraint) we saw that the capacity is zero only if
D
2
> 
2
u
+D
1
+
p

2
u
D
1
, while if D
2
> 
2
u
, then the attacker could set the forgery to zero,
resulting in no positive achievable rates and a distortion between U and Y of approximately

2
u
< D
2
. Thus, the capacity under our constraint is potentially too large for large attacker
distortion levels, while the capacity under the alternative constraint is potentially too large
for small attacker distortion levels.
2.4.5 Statistics of Covertext
In our study of watermarking, we have largely focused on Gaussian covertext distributions.
Such a distribution might arise in transform domains where each sample is a weighted aver-
age of many samples from the original domain, in which case one would expect the central
limit theorem to play a role. Indeed, some studies [BBPR98, JF95, Mul93] have found that
the discrete cosine transform (DCT) coeÆcients for natural images are well modeled as gen-
eralized Gaussian random variables, which include the standard Gaussian distribution as a
special case
5
. While a Gaussian model is reasonable for many types of sources that might
need to be watermarked, there are other sources that require watermarking that cannot be
so modeled; examples include VLSI designs [Oli99] and road maps [KZ00].
A shortcoming of the Gaussian assumption is that the data we are interested in will be
stored on a computer, and hence the distribution could only be a quantized approximation
5
The generalized Gaussian density is dened by f
X
(x) =
()
2 (1=)
exp( (()jx=j)

), where () =
p
 (3=)= (1=),  () is the usual gamma function and  is the so-called shape parameter. The generalized
Gaussian is equivalent to the standard Gaussian when  = 2.
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of a Gaussian distribution. If the quantization is too coarse, then the Gaussian assumption
would not be reasonable. For example, one-bit quantization of every covertext sample would
lead to the binary watermarking game, which we have seen to have much smaller capacity
than the scalar Gaussian watermarking game. However, we are more likely to be interested
in high delity storage of the data, and the Gaussian approximation is more reasonable in
this case.
2.5 Uncertainty in the Watermarking Model
In watermarking, an encoder/decoder pair has to deal with two sources of uncertainty, the
covertext and the attacker. In our model, the covertext is generated stochastically from
some known distribution while the attacker can take on any form subject to a distortion
constraint.
In Section 2.5.1, we formalize the dierences between these two types of uncertainty
into stochastically generated states and arbitrarily generated states. We then consider two
models: one that contains only stochastically generated states (communication with side
information, Section 2.5.2) and one that contains only arbitrarily generated states (the
arbitrarily varying channel, Section 2.5.3). In Section 2.5.4, we consider an instance of
communication with side information, Costa's \writing on dirty paper" model [Cos83], and
describe two extensions to this model.
2.5.1 Types of State Generators
In order to discuss the types of state generators, we consider a communication channel that
has a transition probability that depends on a state s. That is, given the value of the
current state s and the current input x, the output of the channel is a random variable
Y with distribution P
Y jX;S
(jx; s), where we assume throughout that P
Y jX;S
is known.
Furthermore, given the state sequence s and the input sequence x, the output sequence Y
is generated in a memoryless fashion, so that
P (Y jx; s) =
n
Y
i=1
P
Y jX;S
(Y
i
jx
i
; s
i
): (2.27)
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Figure 2-3: Watermarking model with state sequences.
We would like to describe the coding capacity for such a channel. That is, we would like
to answer the usual question, \For rates R can we reliably communicate nR bits using the
channel n times?". In general, reliable communication means that the probability of error
can be as small as desired by making the blocklength n large enough. The denition of
probability of error that we use aects the capacity and depends on how the state sequence is
generated. Unless stated otherwise, we focus on probability of error averaged
6
(as opposed
to maximized) over all possible bit sequences and sequence-wise probability of error (as
opposed to bit-wise). We will also assume that the encoder and decoder share a source of
randomness and that the probability of error is averaged over this source of randomness as
well.
We now consider two possible methods for generating the state sequence:
1. The state sequence S could be generated stochastically from some known distribution
P
S
(usually independently of the other sources of randomness). In this case, we will
be interested in the probability of error averaged over the possible values of the state
sequence.
2. The state sequence s could be generated arbitrarily, possibly subject to some con-
straint. In this case, we will want to insure that the probability of error can be made
small for every possible state sequence s.
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Restatement of Watermarking Model
We can think of our watermarking model as having two state sequences, one generated
stochastically and one generated arbitrarily. This idea is depicted in Figure 2-3 (for the
public version only). Here, the stochastically generated state U is the covertext and the
arbitrarily generated state
7
S describes the mapping between the stegotext X and the
forgery Y . For example, ifX and Y are real random vectors, then S could be the dierence
between Y and X and P
Y jX;S
(jx; s) is the unit mass on x+ s. This form is particularly
useful when the attacker's distortion function can be written d
2
(x; y) = d
2
(y   x). In this
case, the attacker's distortion constraint becomes a constraint solely on the sequence S.
Note that the attacker knows the stegotext X, and thus the arbitrary state sequence S is
actually a mapping from X
n
into Y
n
. Thus, the encoder/decoder pair wishes to make the
average probability of error small for every possible attacker mapping, where the probability
of error is averaged over all sources of randomness including the covertext. Both the encoder
and the arbitrary state sequence S are subject to distortion constraints. Thus, although
the stochastically generated state sequence U does not directly aect the channel, it does
indirectly aect the channel through the constraint on the encoder's output.
2.5.2 Communication with Side Information
We now consider a model with only stochastically generated states, like the covertext in the
watermarking game. When known at the encoder or decoder, the state sequence is called
side information and thus this model is referred to as communication with side information.
An example where the side information is known at the encoder only is depicted in Figure 2-
4. All of the models in this section assume that the stochastic state sequence is generated
in an IID manner according to a known distribution P
U
.
Shannon [Sha58] rst studied this problem under the assumption that the encoder must
be causal with respect to the side information. That is, the ith channel input x
i
can be a
function of only the message and the channel states up to and including time i. Gel'fand and
Pinsker [GP80] later found the capacity assuming (as we do in the watermarking game) that
the encoder has non-causal access to the side information. That is, the channel input vector
6
We make the usual assumption that all bit sequences are equally likely.
7
This arbitrarily generated state is actually an arbitrary mapping s(X) that we write as the random
vector S.
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Figure 2-4: Communication with side information at the encoder.
x 2 X
n
can be a function of the message and the channel state vector u 2 U
n
. A causal
encoder makes practical sense in many real time applications, but a non-causal encoder also
makes sense in other situations, such as watermarking or storing information on a partially
defective hard drive. Heegard and El Gamal [HEG83] considered a generalization of [GP80]
where the state sequence can be described non-causally to both the encoder and decoder,
but only using rates R
e
and R
d
, respectively.
Capacity Results
We now give the capacity of the channel with side information in two scenarios: when the
state sequence U is known non-causally to the encoder only, and when the state sequence U
is known to non-causally to both the encoder and decoder. As in the watermarking game,
we will refer to these scenarios as the public and private versions, respectively. Note that
these results are proved assuming that the sets X , U and Y are nite.
For the private version with non-causal side information, the capacity is given by [Wol78,
HEG83]
C
NCSI
priv
= max
P
XjU
I(X;Y jU); (2.28)
where the mutual information is evaluated with respect to the joint distribution P
U;X;Y
=
P
U
P
XjU
P
Y jX;U
. Recall that P
U
and P
Y jX;U
are given.
For the public version with non-causal side information, the capacity is given by [GP80,
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HEG83]
C
NCSI
pub
= max
P
V jU
; f :VU7!X
I(V ;Y )  I(V ;U); (2.29)
where V is an auxiliary random variable with alphabet jVj  jX j+ jUj   1, and the mutual
informations are evaluated with respect to the joint distribution
P
U;V;X;Y
(u; v; x; y) =
8
>
<
>
:
P
U
(u)P
V jU
(vju)P
Y jX;U
(yjx; u) if x = f(v; u)
0 otherwise
: (2.30)
The achievability of this capacity is proved using a random binning argument that we will
also use to prove the watermarking capacity result. Note that the capacity with causal side
information is similar [Sha58], except that P
V jU
is replaced by P
V
in (2.29) and (2.30). The
capacity with non-causal side information can be strictly greater than the capacity with
causal side information. Thus, we would not expect the results on watermarking to directly
carry over to a causal situation.
Fixed Attack Watermarking
One potential attack strategy in the watermarking game is a memoryless channel based on
some conditional distribution P
attack
Y jX
. Of course, the attacker should choose this distribution
so that the distortion constraint is met either with high probability or in expectation.
Assuming such an attack strategy is used and known to both the encoder and decoder, an
extension of (2.28) or (2.29) can be used to describe the achievable rates for this scenario.
In the following lemma, we describe the capacity of the public version with non-causal
side information when the encoder is required to meet a distortion constraint between the
side information and the channel input, which can be used to describe the watermarking
capacity with a xed attack channel.
Lemma 2.1. For the communication with side information model with nite alphabets, if
the side information is available non-causally to the encoder only and the encoder is required
to satisfy
1
n
n
X
i=1
d
1
(u
i
; x
i
)  D
1
; a.s.; (2.31)
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for some non-negative function d
1
(; ). Then, the capacity is given by
C
NCSI
pub
(D
1
) = max
P
V jU
; f :VU7!X ;
E[d
1
(U;X)]D
1
I(V ;Y )  I(V ;U); (2.32)
where V is an auxiliary random variable with nite alphabet, and the mutual informations
are evaluated with respect to the joint distribution (2.30).
The proof of this lemma can be found in Appendix B.2. The achievability part and
most of the converse part of the proof follow directly from the proof of Gel'fand and Pinsker
[GP80]. One tricky part involves showing that the conditional distribution P
XjV;U
is de-
terministic (i.e., only takes values of 0 and 1). We will use this lemma to simplify the
evaluation of the public version of the binary watermarking game; see Section 6.2.2.
An attacker in the watermarking game cannot implement a general channel based on
both the input and the state since the attacker does not directly know the state sequence U
(i.e., the covertext). However, this result can be used to analyze xed attack watermarking
by substituting P
Y jX;U
(yjx; u) = P
attack
Y jX
(yjx) for all u 2 U .
This analysis inspires the mutual information games that we will describe in Chapter 3.
In short, the mutual information game will further modify (2.32) and the analogous result for
the private version by adding a minimization over feasible attack \channels" P
attack
Y jX
, where
feasible means that the distortion constraint is met in expectation. It is not clear that the
solution to the mutual information game describes the capacity of the watermarking game.
This is partly because a decoder for communication with side information uses knowledge
about the channel's conditional distribution, while in the watermarking game, the attacker
can choose any feasible attack channel after the decoder has been deployed.
2.5.3 Arbitrarily Varying Channels
We now turn our attention to states that can be generated arbitrarily. That is, there is
no probability distribution on the state sequences, and any performance guarantees have
to be valid for any possible state sequence. In the watermarking game, the attacker (under
the a.s. distortion constraint) can produce an arbitrary sequence (subject to the distortion
constraint) in its attempt to confuse the encoder and decoder.
The basic arbitrarily varying channel (AVC) was introduced in [BBT60] and has a
single arbitrarily generated state sequence s that determines the conditional distribution
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Figure 2-5: Gaussian arbitrarily varying channel: U is an IID Gaussian sequence and s is
an arbitrary power constrained sequence.
of the channel as in (2.27). Unlike the usual communication scenario (e.g., a memoryless
channel), the capacity depends on whether average or maximum probability of error is
used and on whether there is a common source of randomness available to the encoder
and decoder. Many variations of the AVC have been studied, see e.g., [CK81, LN98] for
extensive references. Unlike the watermarking game, the state sequence and the input to the
channel are usually assumed to be chosen independently. However, see [Ahl86] for analysis
of the AVC when the state sequence is known to the encoder and [AW69] for analysis of
the AVC when the input sequence is known to the state selector. Csiszar and Narayan
[CN88a, CN88b] considered an instance of the AVC that has particular relevance to the
watermarking game in which the input sequence x and the state sequence s must satisfy
respective constraints. The capacity results depend on whether the constraints are enforced
almost surely or in expectation, as is also the case for the watermarking game (compare
Theorems 2.1 and 2.3).
The Gaussian Arbitrarily Varying Channel
The Gaussian arbitrarily varying channel (GAVC), introduced by Hughes and Narayan
[HN87], is a particular AVC with constrained inputs and states that is related to the Gaus-
sian watermarking game. In the GAVC (illustrated in Figure 2-5), the input and state
sequences must both satisfy power constraints, and the channel is given by Y =X+s+Z,
where Z is an IID sequence ofN (0; 
2
) random variables, s is an arbitrary sequence (subject
to n
 1
ksk
2
 D
2
), and the input X is similarly power limited to D
1
.
Hughes and Narayan [HN87] found that the capacity of the GAVC (when a source of
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common randomness is available to the encoder and decoder) is given by
C
GAVC
(D
1
; D
2
; 
2
) =
1
2
log

1 +
D
1
D
2
+ 
2

: (2.33)
Note that this is the same capacity that would result if s were replaced by an IID sequence of
N (0;D
2
) random variables. Further note that if the a.s. power constraints are replaced by
expected power constraints then the capacity of the GAVC is zero, although the -capacity
8
is positive and increasing with .
Let us now consider an alternate description of the GAVC in order to highlight the
similarities with the watermarking game with an IID Gaussian covertext. The GAVC can
be obtained from the watermarking game by slightly modifying the capabilities of both
the encoder and the attacker, as we now outline. First, the encoder must be of the form
X = U +
~
X, where
~
X is independent of U (but not independent of the watermark W ).
Second, the attacker must form the attack sequence s independently ofX. Thus, the overall
channel is given by Y =
~
X + s + U , where
~
X is a power limited sequence depending on
the message, s is a power limited arbitrary sequence, and U is an IID sequence of Gaussian
random variables independent of
~
X and s. Although both the encoder and attacker are
less powerful in the GAVC than in the watermarking game, the eect does not cancel out.
Indeed, the capacity of the GAVC decreases with the variance of U while the watermarking
capacity increases; compare (2.6) and (2.33).
Finally, note that the additive attack watermarking game of Section 2.2.2 with an IID
Gaussian covertext is a combination of the GAVC and the scalar Gaussian watermarking
game. In particular, this game uses the encoder from the watermarking game and the
attacker from the GAVC. In this compromise between the two models, the capacity does
not depend on the variance of U ; see Theorem 2.2.
2.5.4 Extended Writing on Dirty Paper
A special case of communication with side information (see Section 2.5.2) is Costa's writing
on dirty paper [Cos83], which is depicted in Figure 2-6. In this model, all of the the sets
X , Y, U and Z are the real line. Further, the encoder knows the state sequence U non-
causally and its output X = x(W;U ) must satisfy a power constraint, i.e., n
 1
kXk
2
 D
1
8
The -capacity is the supremum of all rates such that the probability of error is at most .
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Figure 2-6: Writing on dirty paper. U and Z are independent IID Gaussian sequences.
a.s.. Finally, the output of the channel is given by
Y =X +U +Z (2.34)
where bothU andZ are independent IID sequences of zero-mean Gaussian random variables
of variances 
2
u
and D
2
, respectively. We will call U the covertext and Z the jamming
sequence. Costa's main result is that the capacity is the same whether or not the covertext
U is known to the decoder. WhenU is known to the decoder, the channel eectively become
Y =X +Z, i.e. the classical power limited Gaussian channel. Thus, the capacity is given
by
1
2
log(1 +
D
1
D
2
), which does not depend on 
2
u
. Others [Che00, YSJ
+
01] have extended
this result to when U and Z are independent non-white (i.e., colored) Gaussian processes.
In this section, we describe two further extensions of Costa's result. First, when U has any
(power limited) distribution and Z is an independent colored Gaussian process, we show
that the capacity with non-causal side information (the random vector U ) at the encoder is
the same as the capacity with side information at both the encoder and decoder. A similar
result was given simultaneously by Erez, Shamai, and Zamir [ESZ00]. Second, we show
that the additive attack watermarking game with Gaussian covertext (see Section 2.2.2) is
an extension of Costa's result to arbitrarily varying noise.
Extension 1 : Any Distribution on Covertext, Colored Gaussian Jamming Se-
quence
We rst generalize Costa's result to where the side information U is an IID sequence of
random variables with some arbitrary (but known) distribution, while the noise sequence
Z is still an IID sequence of mean-zero, variance-D
2
Gaussian random variables. We will
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then be able to further generalize to the above assumptions.
Recall that the maximum over I(V ;Y )   I(U ;V ) (see (2.32)) is the capacity for a
channel with non-causal side information at the encoder only. Although this result was only
proved for nite alphabets, it is straightforward to extend the achievability part to innite
alphabets, which is all that we will need. Indeed, we will specify the joint distribution
of an auxiliary random variable V , the input X and the side information U such that
I(V ;Y )   I(U ;V ) equals the capacity when U is not present at all, which also acts as an
upper bound on the capacity for writing on dirty paper.
We now specify the necessary joint distribution. Let X be a zero-mean Gaussian random
variable of varianceD
1
, which is independent of U , which clearly satises E[X
2
]  D
1
. Also,
let the auxiliary random variable V = U +X, where  =
D
1
D
1
+D
2
. (As in (2.32), we could
have rst generated V conditioned on U and then generated X as a function of V and
U .) The preceding steps replicates Costa's original proof. At this point, he calculated
I(V ;Y )  I(U ;V ) to be
1
2
log

1 +
D
1
D
2

, assuming that both U and Z are Gaussian random
variables. This is suÆcient to prove the original result since all rates less than this are
achievable and the capacity cannot exceed the capacity without U , which is also given by
this expression. We shall assume that only Z is Gaussian, but we shall obtain the same
result.
With our choice of the auxiliary random variable V ,
V   (X + U + Z) = X   (X + Z); (2.35)
and with our choice of  the random variables X   (X + Z) and X + Z are uncorrelated
and hence, being zero-mean jointly Gaussian, also independent
9
. Furthermore, the random
variables X   (X +Z) and X +U +Z are independent since U is independent of (X;Z).
9
Another way to view the choice of  is that (X + Z) is the minimum mean squared error (MMSE)
estimate of X given X + Z.
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Consequently,
h(V jX + U + Z) = h
 
V   (X + U + Z)jX + U + Z

= h
 
X   (X + Z)

= h
 
X   (X + Z)jX + Z

= h(XjX + Z); (2.36)
where all of the dierential entropies exist since X and Z are independent Gaussian random
variables, and the second and third equalities follow by (2.35) and the above discussed
independence. Also, the independence of U and X implies that
h(V jU) = h(U +XjU)
= h(XjU)
= h(X): (2.37)
We can now compute that
I(V ;X + U + Z)  I(V ;U) = h(V )  h(V jX + U + Z)  h(V ) + h(V jU)
= I(X;X + Z)
=
1
2
log

1 +
D
1
D
2

;
where the rst equality follows by the denition of mutual information; the second equality
follows from (2.36) and (2.37); and the last equality because X and Z are independent
Gaussian random variables of variance D
1
and D
2
, respectively.
Let us now consider general independent random processes U and Z as the known
and unknown, respectively, additive noise components in the writing on dirty paper model.
Also, let the random processX

have the capacity achieving distribution for a channel with
additive noise Z (i.e., P
X

= argmax
P
X
I(X ;X + Z), where the maximum is over distri-
butions that satisfy any required constraints). The preceding arguments can be repeated
as long as there exists a linear
10
function () such that X

 (X

+Z) is independent of
Z. (We also need U to be power limited so that all of the dierential entropies are nite.)
10
The linearity of () is needed in (2.35).
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That is, for this random process X

and this linear function (), if V = (U ) +X

, then
I(V ;Y )   I(U ;V ) = I(X

;X

+ Z), which is the capacity without U by our choice of
X

.
We can thus show that for that Costa's result can be extended to any (power-limited)
distribution on U and a colored Gaussian distribution on Z. This follows since the capacity
achieving X

associated with Z is also Gaussian (with variances given by the waterlling
algorithm) [CT91]. Furthermore, for any two independent Gaussian (and hence jointly
Gaussian) processes, we can nd a linear function () that satises the above independence
property.
We can also use an interleaving argument to show that if Costa's result holds for any
power-limited IID law on U , then it should also hold for any power-limited ergodic law.
Furthermore, by diagonalizing the problem and reducing it to a set of parallel scalar channels
whose noise component (the component that is known to neither encoder nor decoder) is
IID [HM88, Lap96] it should be clear that it suÆces to prove (as we have done above) this
result for the case where Z is IID.
Extension 2 : IID Gaussian Covertext, Arbitrary Jamming Sequence
For the additive attack watermarking game with IID Gaussian covertext, we have shown
that the capacity is the same for both the private and public versions; see Section 2.2.2. This
provides an extension of Costa's writing on dirty paper result to when the jamming is an
arbitrarily varying power-limited sequence. Note that the stegotext X in the watermarking
game corresponds to U +X here.
When the covertext U is IID Gaussian, then the additive attack watermarking game
is similar to Costa's writing on dirty paper. In particular, the former model diers from
the latter only in two respects. First, the jamming sequence distribution is arbitrary (sub-
ject to (2.11)) instead of being an IID Gaussian sequence. Second, the jamming sequence
distribution is unknown to the encoder and decoder. Nevertheless, the two models give
the same capacity, thus demonstrating that the most malevolent additive attack for the
watermarking game is an IID Gaussian one.
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Chapter 3
Mutual Information Games
In this chapter, we consider two mutual information games that are motivated by the
capacity results of Wolfowitz [Wol78] and Gel'fand and Pinsker [GP80] on communication
with side information discussed in Section 2.5.2. We dene the private mutual information
game based on the capacity of a communication channel with side information non-causally
available to both the encoder and decoder; see (2.28). Similarly, we dene the public
mutual information game based on the capacity of a communication channel with side
information non-causally available to only the encoder; see (2.29). Mutual information
games have been considered in the context of watermarking previously by Moulin and
O'Sullivan [OME98, MO99, MO00]. We focus on squared error distortion and IID Gaussian
sources, and the resulting solution provides insight into how to approach the scalar Gaussian
watermarking (SGWM) game.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.1, we precisely dene
our mutual information games and give our main result on the value of the games. In
Section 3.2, we sketch the proof of the main result using three main lemmas; the proofs
of these lemmas can be found in Appendix B. In Section 3.3, we give a game theoretic
interpretation of the mutual information games. In Section 3.4, we discuss some other
mutual information games that have been previously considered
3.1 Denition and Main Result
Given a covertext distribution P
U
, a conditional law P
XjU
(\watermarking channel") and
a conditional law P
Y jX
(\attack channel") we can compute the conditional mutual infor-
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mation
I
P
U
P
XjU
P
Y jX
(X ;Y jU) = D(P
U ;X;Y
jjP
U
P
XjU
P
Y jU
);
where D(jj) is the Kullback-Leibler distance, which is dened for any probability measures
P and Q as
D(P jjQ) =
8
>
<
>
:
R
log
dP
dQ
dP if P  Q
1 otherwise
:
Here,
dP
dQ
is the Radon-Nikodym derivative of P with respect to Q, and P  Q means that
P is absolutely continuous with respect to Q. If P and Q have densities f
P
and f
Q
, then
D(P jjQ) = E
P
[log
f
P
f
Q
]. We can similarly compute other mutual information quantities.
Like the watermarking game, themutual information game is a game played between two
players in which the second player (attacker) has full knowledge of the strategy of the rst
player (encoder). The main dierence between the two games is that the strategies in the
mutual information game are conditional distributions instead of mappings, and the payo
function is mutual information, which may or may not have an operational signicance in
terms of achievable rates.
We rst describe the private mutual information game. For every n, the encoder chooses
a watermarking channel P
XjU
that satises the average distortion constraint (2.14), and the
attacker then chooses an attack channel P
Y jX
that satises the average distortion constraint
(2.15). The quantity that the encoder wishes to maximize and that the attacker wishes to
minimize is
I
priv
(P
U
; P
X jU
; P
Y jX
) =
1
n
I
P
U
P
XjU
P
Y jX
(X ;Y jU); (3.1)
which is the mutual information term in (2.28). The value of the private mutual information
game is thus
C
MI
priv
(D
1
;D
2
; fP
U
g) =
lim inf
n!1
sup
P
XjU
2D
1
(D
1
;P
U
)
inf
P
Y jX
2D
2
(D
2
;P
U
;P
XjU
)
I
priv
(P
U
; P
X jU
; P
Y jX
); (3.2)
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where
D
1
(D
1
; P
U
) =
n
P
XjU
: E
P
U
P
XjU
[d
1
(U ;X)]  D
1
o
; (3.3)
and
D
2
(D
2
; P
U
; P
XjU
) =
n
P
Y jX
: E
P
U
P
XjU
P
Y jX
[d
2
(X ;Y )]  D
2
o
: (3.4)
Note that the choice of P
XjU
inuences the set of distributions from which P
Y jX
can be
chosen. Thus, this is not a standard static zero-sum game; it is better described as a
dynamic two-stage zero-sum game of complete and perfect information.
We next describe the public mutual information game. We rst dene an auxiliary
random vector V that depends on the random vectors U andX . The watermarking channel
is expanded to include not only the conditional distribution P
XjU
but also the conditional
distribution P
V jU ;X
. Given the random vector X, the random vector Y is independent of
both U and V , so that the joint distribution of the random vectors U , X, V and Y is
the product of the laws P
U
, P
XjU
, P
V jU ;X
, and P
Y jU ;X;V
= P
Y jX
. In the public version,
the mutual information term from (2.29) is n
 1
(I(V ;Y )  I(V ;U)), which is written more
explicitly as
I
pub
(P
U
; P
XjU
; P
V jU ;X
; P
Y jX
) =
1
n

I
P
U
P
XjU
P
V jU;X
P
Y jX
(V ;Y )  I
P
U
P
XjU
P
V jU;X
(V ;U )

; (3.5)
The value of the public mutual information game is thus
C
MI
pub
(D
1
;D
2
; fP
U
g) =
lim inf
n!1
sup
P
XjU
2D
1
(D
1
;P
U
)
P
V jU;X
inf
P
Y jX
2D
2
(D
2
;P
U
;P
XjU
)
I
pub
(P
U
; P
XjU
; P
V jU ;X
; P
Y jX
): (3.6)
Note that the supremum is over a slightly more general set than (2.32), since we have not
shown (as we did for nite alphabets in Lemma 2.1) that the maximizing joint distribution
on the random vectors U , X and V makes X a deterministic function of U and V .
In the following theorem, which is proved in Section 3.2, we show that the capacity of
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the SGWM game C

(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
) is an upper bound on the values of the mutual informa-
tion games for real alphabets and squared error distortions. Moreover, for IID Gaussian
covertexts, this upper bound is tight.
Theorem 3.1. For real alphabets and squared error distortions
C
MI
pub
(D
1
;D
2
; fP
U
g)  C
MI
priv
(D
1
; D
2
; fP
U
g) (3.7)
 C

(D
1
; D
2
; 
2
u
); (3.8)
where 
2
u
is dened by

2
u
= lim inf
n!1
1
n
n
X
i=1
E
P
U
[U
2
i
] (3.9)
and is assumed nite.
Equality is achieved in both (3.7) and (3.8) if the covertext is zero-mean IID Gaussian.
Recall the denition of C

(D
1
; D
2
; 
2
u
) given in (2.6). This denition and some other
relevant denitions used in this chapter are summarized in Appendix A.
3.2 Proof of Mutual Information Game Result
In this section, we sketch a proof of Theorem 3.1. The upper bound on the values of the
games is based on a family of attack channels that will be described in Section 3.2.1. The
equality for IID zero-mean Gaussian covertexts is based on the watermarking channels that
will be described in Section 3.2.2. In Section 3.2.3, we will show that the proposed attack
channels prove the upper bound (3.8) and that for IID zero-mean Gaussian covertexts, the
proposed watermarking channels guarantee the claimed equality.
3.2.1 Optimal Attack Channel
The attack channel we propose does not depend on the version of the game, and is described
next. Since the attacker is assumed to be cognizant of the covertext distribution P
U
and of
the watermarking channel P
XjU
, it can compute
A
n
=
1
n
E
P
U
P
XjU
[kXk
2
]: (3.10)
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It then bases its attack channel on A
n
and on its allowed distortion D
2
as follows.
If A
n
 D
2
then the attacker can guarantee zero mutual information by setting the
forgery Y deterministically to zero without violating the distortion constraint. We shall
thus focus on the case A
n
> D
2
.
For this case the proposed attack channel is memoryless, and we proceed to describe its
marginal. For any A > D
2
, let the conditional distribution P
A
Y jX
have the density
1
f
A
Y jX
(yjx) = N
 
y ; c(A;D
2
)  x ; c(A;D
2
) D
2

;
where c(A;D
2
) = 1  
D
2
A
(also dened in (A.4)). Equivalently, under P
A
Y jX
the random
variable Y is distributed as c(A;D
2
)X + S
2
, where S
2
is a zero-mean variance-c(A;D
2
)D
2
Gaussian random variable independent of X. The conditional distribution P
A
Y jX
is thus
equivalent to the Gaussian rate distortion forward channel [CT91] for a variance-A Gaussian
source and an allowable distortion D
2
.
For blocklength n and A
n
> D
2
, the proposed attacker P
Y jX
is
P
Y jX
=

P
A
n
Y jX

n
;
that is, P
Y jX
has a product form with marginal P
A
n
Y jX
, where A
n
is given in (3.10).
Notice that by (3.10) and the structure of the attack channel
E
P
U
P
XjU
(P
A
n
Y jX
)
n

1
n
kY  Xk
2

=
 
c(A
n
;D
2
)  1

2
A
n
+ c(A
n
;D
2
)D
2
= D
2
:
Thus the attack channel (P
A
n
Y jX
)
n
satises the distortion constraint. Compare this attack
channel with the attacker (dened in Section 4.5.1) used in the proof of the converse of the
SGWM game.
3.2.2 Optimal Watermarking Channel
In this section we focus on IID zero-mean variance-
2
u
Gaussian covertexts and describe
watermarking channels that will demonstrate that for such covertexts (3.7) and (3.8) both
1
We use N (x;; 
2
) to denote the density at x of a Gaussian distribution of mean  and variance 
2
.
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hold with equality. The watermarking channels are memoryless, and it thus suÆces to
describe their marginals. The proposed watermarking channels depend on the version of
the game, on (
2
u
, D
1
, D
2
), and on a parameter A 2 A(D
1
; D
2
; 
2
u
), where A(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
) is
dened in (A.7). The choice of A is at the watermarker's discretion. Later, of course, we
shall optimize over this choice.
Private Version: For any A 2 A(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
), let the conditional distribution P
A
XjU
be
Gaussian with mean b
1
(A;D
1
; 
2
u
)U and variance b
2
(A;D
1
; 
2
u
), i.e., have the density
f
A
XjU
(xju) = N (x; b
1
(A;D
1
; 
2
u
)u; b
2
(A;D
1
; 
2
u
));
where b
1
(A;D
1
; 
2
u
) =
A+
2
u
 D
1
2
2
u
and b
2
(A;D
1
; 
2
u
) = D
1
 
(A 
2
u
 D
1
)
2
4
2
u
(also dened in
(A.2) and (A.3)). Equivalently, under P
A
XjU
the random variable X is distributed as
b
1
(A;D
1
; 
2
u
)U +S
1
, where S
1
is a zero-mean variance-b
2
(A;D
1
; 
2
u
) Gaussian random vari-
able that is independent of U .
For IID zero-mean variance-
2
u
Gaussian covertexts we have
E
P
U
(P
A
XjU
)
n

1
n
kX  Uk
2

=
 
b
1
(A;D
1
; 
2
u
)  1

2

2
u
+ b
2
(A;D
1
; 
2
u
)
= D
1
:
Thus for this covertext distribution (and, in fact, for any covertext distribution with variance

2
u
), the watermarking channel (P
A
XjU
)
n
satises the distortion constraint. Furthermore,
E
P
U
(P
A
XjU
)
n

1
n
kXk
2

= A;
which gives an interpretation of the parameter A as the power in the stegotext induced by
the covertext and the watermarking channel. Compare this watermarking channel with the
achievability scheme for the private SGWM game given in Section 4.2.1.
Public Version: For the public game, the conditional distribution of the random vector
V given the random vectors U and X is also needed. The optimal such distribution turns
out to be deterministic and memoryless. In particular, for A as above, let the distribution
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PA
V jU;X
be described by
V =
 
(A;D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
)  1

U +X;
where (A;D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
) = 1 
b
1
(A;D
1
;
2
u
)
1+s(A;D
1
;D
2
;
2
u
)
and s(A;D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
) =
c(A;D
2
)b
2
(A;D
1
;
2
u
)
D
2
(also
dened in (A.6) and (A.5)). Finally, let
P
A
V jU ;X
= (P
A
V jU;X
)
n
:
Compare this expanded watermarking channel with the achievability scheme for the public
SGWM game given in Section 4.3.1.
3.2.3 Analysis
In this section, we state three lemmas, which together prove Theorem 2.4. Lemma 3.1
(proved in Appendix B.3) demonstrates the intuitive fact that the value of the public version
of the mutual information game cannot exceed the value of the private version. Lemma 3.2
(proved in Appendix B.4) shows that, by using the attack channel proposed in Section 3.2.1,
the attacker can guarantee that the value of the private mutual information game not exceed
C

(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
), where 
2
u
is dened in (3.9). Lemma 3.3 (proved in Appendix B.5) shows
that by watermarking an IID zero-mean variance-
2
u
Gaussian source using the channel
proposed in Section 3.2.2 with the appropriate choice of A, the encoder can guarantee a
value for the public mutual information game of at least C

(D
1
; D
2
; 
2
u
).
Lemma 3.1. For any n > 0 and any covertext distribution P
U
,
sup
P
XjU
2D
1
(D
1
;P
U
)
P
V jU ;X
inf
P
Y jX
2D
2
(D
2
;P
U
;P
XjU
)
I
pub
(P
U
; P
X jU
; P
V jU ;X
; P
Y jX
) 
sup
P
XjU
2D
1
(D
1
;P
U
)
inf
P
Y jX
2D
2
(D
2
;P
U
;P
XjU
)
I
priv
(P
U
; P
X jU
; P
Y jX
):
Since this lemma holds for every n, it implies (3.7).
Lemma 3.2. For any n > 0, any covertext distribution P
U
, any watermarking channel
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PXjU
, and any xed distortion D
2
> A
n
I
priv

P
U
; P
X jU
; (P
A
n
Y jX
)
n

 I
priv

(P
G
U
)
n
; (P
A
n
XjU
)
n
; (P
A
n
Y jX
)
n

=
1
2
log
 
1 + s(A
n
;D
1;n
;D
2
; 
2
u;n
)

; (3.11)
where

2
u;n
= E
P
U

n
 1
kUk
2

; (3.12)
D
1;n
= E
P
U
P
XjU
[n
 1
kX  Uk
2
]; (3.13)
A
n
= E
P
U
P
XjU

n
 1
kXk
2

; (3.14)
P
G
U
denotes a zero-mean Gaussian distribution of variance 
2
u;n
; P
A
n
XjU
is the watermarking
channel described in Section 3.2.2 for the parameters 
2
u;n
, D
1;n
and A
n
; and P
A
n
Y jX
is the
attack channel described in Section 3.2.1 for the parameters D
2
and A
n
.
This lemma proves (3.8). To see this note that for any  > 0 and any integer n
0
there
exists some n > n
0
such that

2
u;n
< 
2
u
+ ; (3.15)
where 
2
u
is dened in (3.9) and 
2
u;n
is dened in (3.12). Also, since the watermarking
channel must satisfy the distortion constraint (i.e. P
XjU
2 D
1
(D
1
; P
U
)),
D
1;n
 D
1
; (3.16)
where D
1;n
is dened in (3.13).
If A
n
dened in (3.14) is less than D
2
, then the attack channel that sets the forgery
deterministically to zero is allowable and the resulting mutual information is zero. Thus,
(3.8) is satised in this case. We thus focus on the case when A
n
> D
2
. We also note that


2
u;n
 
p
D
1;n

2
 A
n



2
u;n
+
p
D
1;n

2
by the triangle inequality so that A
n
2 A(D
1;n
; D
2
; 
2
u;n
). By the denition of C

(; ; )
(A.8), it follows that the right hand side (RHS) of (3.11) is at most C

(D
1;n
;D
2
; 
2
u;n
).
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This in turn is upper bounded by C

(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
+ ) in view of (3.15) and (3.16), because
C

(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
) is non-decreasing in D
1
and 
2
u
(see Appendix A). Finally, since  > 0 is
arbitrary and C

(; ; ) is continuous in its arguments, it follows that the attacker P
A
n
Y jX
guarantees that C
MI
priv
(D
1
;D
2
; fP
U
g) is upper bounded by C

(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
).
This lemma also shows that for an IID Gaussian covertext, if the memoryless attack
channel (P
A
Y jX
)
n
is used, then, of all watermarking channels that satisfy E

n
 1
kXk
2

= A,
mutual information is maximized by the memoryless watermarking channel (P
A
XjU
)
n
of
Section 3.2.2.
Lemma 3.3. Consider an IID zero-mean variance-
2
u
Gaussian covertext (denoted (P
G
U
)
n
)
and xed distortions D
1
and D
2
. If the attack channel P
Y jX
satises
E
(P
G
U
P
A
XjU
)
n
P
Y jX

n
 1
kY  Xk

 D
2
;
then for all A 2 A(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
),
I
pub

(P
G
U
)
n
; (P
A
XjU
)
n
; (P
A
V jU;X
)
n
; P
Y jX

 I
pub

(P
G
U
)
n
; (P
A
XjU
)
n
; (P
A
V jU;X
)
n
; (P
A
Y jX
)
n

=
1
2
log
 
1 + s(A;D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
)

:
Here, P
A
XjU
and P
A
V jU;X
are the watermarking channels described in Section 3.2.2 for the
parameters 
2
u
, D
1
and A and P
A
Y jX
is the attack channel described in Section 3.2.1 for the
parameters D
2
and A.
This lemma implies that for a zero-mean variance-
2
u
IID Gaussian covertext, the value
of the public mutual information game is lower bounded by C

(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
). Indeed, the
encoder can use the watermarking channels dened by (P
A

XjU
)
n
and (P
A

V jU;X
)
n
where A

achieves the maximum in the denition of C

. Since for any covertext distribution (and in
particular for an IID Gaussian covertext) the value of the private version is at least as high
as the value of the public version (Lemma 3.1), it follows from the above that, for an IID
Gaussian covertext, C

is also a lower bound on the value of the private Gaussian mutual
information game.
The combination of Lemmas 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 shows that for a zero-mean IID Gaus-
sian covertext of variance 
2
u
, the value of both the private and public Gaussian mutual
information games is exactly C

(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
).
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Lemma 3.3 also shows that when the covertext is zero-mean IID Gaussian and the
memoryless watermarking channels (P
A
XjU
)
n
and (P
A
V jU;X
)
n
are used, then to minimize the
mutual information the attacker should use the memoryless attack channel (P
A
Y jX
)
n
.
3.3 Game Theoretic Interpretation
In this section, we look at the the private mutual information game, dened in (3.2), with
IID zero-mean variance-
2
u
Gaussian covertext from game theoretic perspective. Recall that
the encoder is trying to maximize I
priv
and the attacker is trying to minimize I
priv
. In game
theoretic terminology (see e.g. [Gib92]), this is a zero-sum game with I
priv
as the pay-
o to the rst player (encoder) and  I
priv
as the pay-o to the second player (attacker).
Specically, this mutual information game is a dynamic zero-sum game of complete and
perfect information. In particular, the game is not static, and thus we need to consider
an attacker strategy of lists of responses to every possible watermarking channel. We will
show that a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium gives the value of the game, where we use
the term \value of the game" to denote the highest possible pay-o to the rst player. We
will also illustrate a mistake that could be made when computing the value of the game.
We rst rederive the value of the game using this game theoretic interpretation. For
a dynamic game, a strategy space for each player is specied by listing a feasible action
for each possible contingency in the game. Since the encoder plays rst, his strategy space
is simply the set of feasible watermarking channels, i.e., D
1
 
D
1
; (P
G
U
)
n

dened in (3.3).
However, the attacker plays second and thus his strategy space consists of all mappings of
the form
 : P
XjU
7! P
Y jX
2 D
2
 
D
2
; (P
G
U
)
n
; P
XjU

; 8P
XjU
2 D
1
 
D
1
; (P
G
U
)
n

; (3.17)
where D
2
 
D
2
; (P
G
U
)
n
; P
XjU

is dened in (3.4). That is, for every possible strategy P
XjU
the encoder might use, the attacker must choose a feasible response  (P
X jU
).
An encoder strategy P

XjU
and an attacker strategy  

() form a Nash equilibrium if
I
priv
 
(P
G
U
)
n
; P
XjU
;  

(P
XjU
)

 I
priv

(P
G
U
)
n
; P

XjU
;  

(P

XjU
)

; (3.18)
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for every P
XjU
2 D
1
(D
1
; (P
G
U
)
n
), and
I
priv

(P
G
U
)
n
; P

X jU
;  

(P

XjU
)

 I
priv

(P
G
U
)
n
; P

X jU
;  (P

X jU
)

; (3.19)
for every mapping  () of the form (3.17). That is, given that the attacker will use  

(),
the encoder maximizes its pay-o by using P

XjU
. Conversely, given that the encoder will
use P

XjU
, the attacker maximizes its pay-o (minimizes the encoder's pay-o) by using
 

().
An encoder strategy P

XjU
and an attacker strategy  

() form a subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium if they form a Nash equilibrium and if additionally
I
priv
 
(P
G
U
)
n
; P
XjU
;  

(P
XjU
)

 I
priv
 
(P
G
U
)
n
; P
XjU
; P
Y jX

for all P
XjU
2 D
1
(D
1
; (P
G
U
)
n
) and for all P
Y jX
2 D
2
(D
2
; (P
G
U
)
n
; P
XjU
). That is, the at-
tacker must choose the best response to any possible encoder strategy, and not just one
encoder strategy as in the regular Nash equilibrium. The value of the game is given by eval-
uating the mutual information at any subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (there is not neces-
sarily a unique equilibrium). The value of the game is thus I
priv

(P
G
U
)
n
; P

XjU
;  

(P

XjU
)

.
Using this terminology we see that Lemma 3.2 and Lemma 3.3 imply that there exists
a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the form

 
P
A

XjU

n
;  

()

where P
A
XjU
is dened above in Section 3.2.2, A

achieves the maximum in (A.8), and
 

 
(P
A
XjU
)
n

= (P
A
Y jX
)
n
for every A 2 A(D
1
; D
2
; 
2
u
), where P
A
Y jX
is dened in Section 3.2.1.
The value of the game is thus C

(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
).
Using the above concepts, we now discuss the value of this game that was given in
[MO99, MO00]. For A
0
= 
2
u
+D
1
,
I
priv

(P
G
U
)
n
; P
X jU
; (P
A
0
Y jX
)
n

 I
priv

(P
G
U
)
n
; (P
A
0
XjU
)
n
; (P
A
0
Y jX
)
n

; (3.20)
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for every P
XjU
2 D
1
(D
1
; (P
G
U
)
n
), and
I
priv

(P
G
U
)
n
; (P
A
0
XjU
)
n
; (P
A
0
Y jX
)
n

 I
priv

(P
G
U
)
n
; (P
A
0
XjU
)
n
; P
Y jX

; (3.21)
for every P
Y jX
2 D
2
 
D
2
; (P
G
U
)
n
; (P
A
0
XjU
)
n

. Thus, it would seem that if  
0
(P
X jU
) = (P
A
0
Y jX
)
n
for all P
XjU
, then the pair
 
(P
A
0
XjU
)
n
;  
0
()

form a Nash equilibrium according to the de-
nitions (3.18) and (3.19). The value of the game given in [MO99, MO00] is the mutual
information evaluated with this pair. However, this attack strategy is not valid since
(P
A
0
Y jX
)
n
=2 D
2
(D
2
; (P
G
U
)
n
; P
XjU
) for some P
XjU
, and in particular for any P
XjU
with
n
 1
E

kXk
2

> A
0
. Indeed, the optimal encoder strategy (P
A

XjU
)
n
has n
 1
E

kXk
2

= A

and A

> A
0
(see Lemma A.1). Thus, the expression on the RHS of (3.20) is strictly less
than C

(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
); see Figure 2-1 for a comparison of the two expressions.
3.4 Other Mutual Information Games
Zero-sum games in which one player tries to maximize some mutual information expression
while the other player tries to minimize the same mutual information have also been inves-
tigated in [BMM85, SM88, Yan93]. As in the watermarking game, typically the rst player
is a communicator and the second player is a jammer. Assuming maximum-likelihood de-
coding, the mutual information between the input and output of a channel gives the rate
at which reliable communication can take place. However, the decoder in the watermark-
ing game is not necessarily performing maximum-likelihood decoding, and thus the mutual
information games do not necessarily describe the capacity.
Most of the research in this area has focused on the channel Y = X + Z, where X is
the input specied by the rst player, Z is the noise specied by the second player, and
X and Z are independent. For this game, the mutual information expression of interest
is I(X;Y ). If X and Z are both power-constrained in expectation (i.e., E[X
2
]  P and
E[Z
2
]  N), then zero-mean Gaussian distributions for both X and Z form a saddlepoint
in mutual information [Bla57]. That is, if X

 N (0; P ) and Z

 N (0; N), then
I(X;X + Z

)  I(X

;X

+ Z

)  I(X

;X

+ Z); (3.22)
for any feasible random variables X and Z. In our mutual information game with Gaussian
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covertext and power-constraints, the optimal strategies are also (conditionally) Gaussian.
However, the one-dimensional solution to our mutual information game does not form a
saddlepoint. Another result that is reected in our mutual information game is that even
if a player is allowed to choose random vectors instead of random variables, then he will
choose the random vector to consist of independent and identically distributed (IID) random
variables [SM88]. Thus, it is suÆcient to consider the one-dimensional mutual information
game for the additive channel discussed above.
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Chapter 4
The Scalar Gaussian
Watermarking Game
This chapter is devoted to proving Theorem 2.1, which describes the capacity of the scalar
Gaussian watermarking (SGWM) game and gives an upper bound on the capacity for
a general ergodic covertext. In the SGWM game, the covertext is an IID sequence of
zero-mean variance-
2
u
random variables and the distortion is measured using the squared
dierence. The proof of this theorem is divided into two main parts, achievability and
converse.
The achievability part of the proof (Sections 4.2 and 4.3) consists of showing that all
rates less than C

(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
) are achievable for the SGWM game for the private and public
versions, respectively. In Section 4.3, we also show that all rates less than
1
2
log

1 +
D
1
D
2

are
achievable for the public version of the additive attack watermarking game with Gaussian
covertext, which completes the proof of Theorem 2.2. To assist in these arguments, we
describe the allowable attacks in Section 4.1. We also show in Section 4.4 that it is suÆcient
to consider covertexts that are uniformly distribution on the n-sphere S
n
(0;
p
n
2
u
).
In the converse part in Section 4.5, we show that no rates higher than C

(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
)
are achievable in the SGWM game. In fact, we show that no such rates are achievable for
any ergodic covertext distribution with second moment at most 
2
u
.
In this chapter, we will use uniform distributions on the n-dimensional sphere as an ap-
proximation for an IID Gaussian distribution. We denote the n-dimensional sphere centered
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at  2 R
n
with radius r  0 by S
n
(; r), i.e.,
S
n
(; r) = f 2 R
n
: k   k = rg:
For any vector  2 S
n
(0; 1) and any angle 0    , we let C(; )  S
n
(0; 1) denote the
spherical cap centered at  with half-angle ,
C(; ) = f 2 S
n
(0; 1) : h; i > cos g:
The surface area of this spherical cap in R
n
depends only on the angle , and is denoted by
C
n
(). Note that C
n
() is the surface area of the unit n-sphere.
Note that many of the other denitions used in this chapter are summarized in Ap-
pendix A. Most importantly, recall that if A(D
1
; D
2
; 
2
u
) is non-empty, then
C

(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
) = max
A2A(D
1
;D
2
;
2
u
)
1
2
log
 
1 + s(A;D
1
; D
2
; 
2
u
)

; (4.1)
where A(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
) and s(A;D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
) are dened in Appendix A.
4.1 Deterministic Attacks
In Section 2.4.3, we argued that deterministic attacks are suÆcient to analyze achievability
for the watermarking game. In this section, we describe in more detail a deterministic
additive attack (Section 4.1.1) and a deterministic general attack (Section 4.1.2).
4.1.1 Deterministic Additive Attack
For the additive attack watermarking game with real alphabets and squared error distortion,
a deterministic attacker takes on a particularly simple form. Indeed, combining the forms
(2.26) and (2.9), we see that the attacker can be written as
g
n
(x) = x+
~
y (4.2)
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for some sequence
~
y that satises
1
n
k
~
yk
2
 D
2
: (4.3)
4.1.2 Deterministic General Attack
For the general watermarking game with real alphabets and squared error distortions, a
deterministic attack g
n
(x) can be decomposed into its projection onto the stegotext x and
its projection onto x
?
. That is, we can write
g
n
(x) = 
1
(x)x+ 
2
(x); (4.4)
for some 
1
: R
n
7! R and some 
2
: R
n
7! R
n
, where h
2
(x);xi = 0.
Dening

3
(x) = n
 1
k
2
(x)k
2
; (4.5)
we can rewrite the attacker's distortion constraint (2.3) in terms of 
1
(X), X , and 
3
(X)
as
 

1
(X)  1

2
n
 1
kXk
2
+ 
3
(X)  D
2
; a.s.;
and consequently,

3
(x)

2
1
(x)

D
2
c(n
 1
kxk
2
;D
2
)
; (4.6)
for almost all x such that n
 1
kxk
2
> D
2
, where c(A;D
2
) = 1   D
2
=A (also dened in
(A.4)).
4.2 Achievability for Private Version
In this section, we show that for the private version of the watermarking game all rates
up to C

(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
) are achievable when the covertext U is uniformly distributed on the
n-sphere S
n
(0;
p
n
2
u
). This result is extended to IID Gaussian covertexts in Section 4.4.
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4.2.1 Coding Strategy
The coding strategy for the private version of the watermarking game is motivated by the
solution to the corresponding mutual information game; see Theorem 3.1 and its proof in
Section 3.2.
Constants
The encoder and decoder choose some Æ > 0 and a value of A 2 A(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
), where the
interval A(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
) is dened in (A.7). We assume throughout that the above interval
is non-empty, because otherwise the claimed coding capacity is zero, and there is no need
for a coding theorem.
Let the rate R of the coding strategy be
R =
1
2
log
 
1 + s(A;D
1
; D
2
; 
2
u
)

  Æ; (4.7)
where s(A;D
1
; D
2
; 
2
u
) is dened in (A.5). Note that if the chosen A achieves the maximum
in (4.1), then the RHS of (4.7) is R = C

(D
1
; D
2
; 
2
u
)   Æ; we show in Lemma A.1 that
such an A can be chosen. We will show that for any Æ > 0, and for U that is uniformly
distributed over the n-sphere S
n
(0;
p
n
2
u
), the rate R is achievable.
The encoder and decoder also compute the constants  = (A;D
1
; 
2
u
), b
1
= b
1
(A;D
1
; 
2
u
)
and b
2
(A;D
1
; 
2
u
), which are all dened in Appendix A. Recall that  = (A   
2
u
 D
1
)=2,
b
1
= 1 + =
2
u
and b
2
= D
1
  
2
=
2
u
.
Encoder and Decoder
The encoder and decoder use their common randomness 
1
to generate 2
nR
independent
random vectors fC
1
; : : : ;C
2
nR
g, where each random vector C
i
is uniformly distributed on
the n-sphere S
n
(0; 1).
Given a covertext U = u, a message W = w, and the vector C
w
= c
w
, let c
w
(u) be the
projection of c
w
onto the subspace orthogonal to u, but scaled so that
n
 1
kc
w
(u)k
2
= b
2
: (4.8)
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That is,
c
w
(u) =
p
nb
2
c
w
j
u
?


c
w
j
u
?


: (4.9)
Note that
hc
w
(u);ui = 0: (4.10)
Encoder: Using the covertext u, the message w, and the source of common randomness

1
the encoder creates the stegotext x as
x = f
n
(u; w; 
1
) = b
1
u+ c
w
(u): (4.11)
By (4.10) and the denitions of the constants b
1
and b
2
(A.2), (A.3), it follows that
n
 1
kx  uk
2
= (b
1
  1)
2

2
u
+ b
2
= D
1
;
thus demonstrating that the encoder satises the distortion constraint (2.1). We can further
calculate that
n
 1
kxk
2
= A; (4.12)
which demonstrates the operational signicance of the constant A as the power of the
stegotext.
Decoder: The decoder uses a modied nearest-neighbor decoding rule. It projects the
forgery y onto u
?
to create yj
u
?
and produces the message w^ that, among all messages ~w,
minimizes the distance between yj
u
?
and c
~w
(u). The decoder's output w^ = 
n
(y;u; 
1
) is
thus given as
w^ = 
n
(y;u; 
1
) = argmin
1 ~w2
nR


yj
u
?
  c
~w
(u)


2
(4.13)
= argmax
1 ~w2
nR
hyj
u
?
; c
~w
(u)i; (4.14)
where the last equality follows by noting that n
 1
kc
~w
(u)k
2
= b
2
irrespective of ~w; see (4.8).
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If more than one message achieves the minimum in (4.13), then an error is declared. Note
that w^ of (4.13) is with probability one unique.
4.2.2 Analysis of Probability of Error
We now proceed to analyze our proposed encoding and decoding scheme. To this end we
shall nd it convenient to dene the random variables,
Z
1
=
1
n


Y j
U
?


2
; (4.15)
Z
2
=
1
n


Y j
U
?
;C
W
(U)

; (4.16)
and the mapping

1
(z
1
; z
2
) =
z
2
p
b
2
z
1
;
which will be shown to capture the eect of the attacker on the decoder's performance. Note
that j
1
(Z
1
; Z
2
)j  1, which follows from (4.8), (4.15), and (4.16) using the Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality.
By the denition of the decoder (4.14) and of the random variable Z
2
(4.16) it follows
that a decoding error occurs if, and only if, there exists a message w
0
6=W such that
1
n


Y j
U
?
;C
w
0
(U )


1
n


Y j
U
?
;C
W
(U )

= Z
2
:
Equivalently, an error occurs if, and only if, there exists some w
0
6=W such that

Y j
U
?
p
nZ
1
;
C
w
0
(U )
p
nb
2


Z
2
p
b
2
Z
1
(4.17)
= 
1
(Z
1
; Z
2
):
If a random vector S is uniformly distributed on an n-dimensional sphere, and if another
vector T is independent of it and also takes value in that n-sphere, then, by symmetry, the
inner product hS;T i has a distribution that does not depend on the distribution of T . We
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next use this observation to analyze the left hand side (LHS) of (4.17).
Conditional on the covertext U = u and for any message w
0
6= W , the random vector
C
w
0
(u)=
p
nb
2
is uniformly distributed over S
n
(0; 1) \ u
?
(i.e., all unit vectors that are
orthogonal to u) and is independent of the random vector Y j
u
?
=
p
nZ
1
, which also takes
value on S
n
(0; 1) \ u
?
. Since S
n
(0; 1) \ u
?
is isometric to S
n 1
(0; 1),
1
it follows from the
above observation that the distribution of the random variable on the LHS of (4.17) does
not depend on the distribution of Y j
u
?
=
p
nZ
1
. Consequently, for any w
0
6=W ,
Pr

Y j
U
?
p
nZ
1
;
C
w
0
(U)
p
nb
2

 
1
(z
1
; z
2
)



Z
1
= z
1
; Z
2
= z
2
;U = u

=
C
n 1
 
arccos 
1
(z
1
; z
2
)

C
n 1
()
; (4.18)
where recall that C
n 1
() is the surface area of a spherical cap of half-angle  on an (n 1)-
dimensional unit sphere.
To continue the analysis of the probability of a decoding error, we note that conditional
on U = u, the random vectors fC
w
0
(u) : w
0
6= Wg are independent of each other. Thus,
the probability of correct decoding is given by the product of the probabilities that each
of these 2
nR
  1 vectors did not cause an error. Since the probability of error for each
individual vector is given in (4.18), we can write the conditional probability of error for this
coding strategy as
Pr(errorjZ
1
= z
1
; Z
2
= z
2
;U = u) = Pr(errorjZ
1
= z
1
; Z
2
= z
2
) =
1 
 
1 
C
n 1
 
arccos 
1
(z
1
; z
2

C
n 1
()
!
2
nR
 1
: (4.19)
We now nd an upper bound on the average of the RHS of (4.19) over the random variables
Z
1
and Z
2
. The function Pr(errorjZ
1
= z
1
; Z
2
= z
2
) is a monotonically non-increasing
function of 
1
(z
1
; z
2
) and is upper bounded by one. Consequently, for any real number 
we have
Pr(error)  Pr(errorj
1
(Z
1
; Z
2
) = ) + Pr
 

1
(Z
1
; Z
2
) < 

: (4.20)
1
To see this, it is suÆcient to consider u = (1; 0; : : : ; 0). In this case, u
0
2 S
n
(0; 1) \ u
?
if u
0
1
= 0 and
P
n
i=2
u
0
i
= 1.
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We will show that the RHS of (4.20) is small when  = 

1
  
1
, where


1
=
r
cb
2
cb
2
+D
2
; (4.21)
c = c(A;D
2
) = 1  
D
2
A
(see (A.4)) and 
1
is a small positive number to be specied later.
We analyze the rst term on the RHS of (4.20) in Lemma 4.2 and the second term in
Lemma 4.3. In order to do so, we recall that Shannon [Sha59] derived bounds on the ratio
of the surface areas of spherical caps that asymptotically yield
lim
n!1
1
n
log
C
n
(arccos )
C
n
()
= log
 
sin(arccos )

= log(1  
2
); (4.22)
for every 0 <  < 1; see also [Wyn67]. We shall also need the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1. Let f : R 7! (0; 1] be such that the limit
 
1
= lim
t!1
1
t
log f(t) (4.23)
exists and is negative so that 
1
> 0. Then
lim
t!1
 
1  f(t)

2
t
2
=
8
>
<
>
:
1 if 
1
> 
2
0 if 
1
< 
2
:
Proof. First, recall the well known fact that
lim
t!1
 
1  2
 t
1

2
t
2
=
8
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
1 if 
1
> 
2
e
 1
if 
1
= 
2
0 if 
1
< 
2
: (4.24)
Fix  > 0. Let us consider the case where 
1
> 
2
. There exists a t
1
such that
t
 1
log(f(t))  ( 
1
) >

2
 
1
2
for all t > t
1
since 
1
> 
2
and by (4.23). There also exists a
t
2
such that

1  2
 t(
1
+
2
)=2

2
t
2
> 1  
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for all t > t
2
since (
1
+
2
)=2 > 
2
and by (4.24). Thus, we can write that (1 f(t))
2
t
2
> 1 
for all t > maxft
1
; t
2
g. The claim follows in this case since (1  f(t))
2
t
2
 1.
The claim follows in the case 
1
< 
2
by similar logic.
Lemma 4.2. For any  > 0, there exists some 
1
> 0 and some integer n
1
> 0, such that
for all n > n
1
1 
 
1 
C
n 1
 
arccos(

1
  
1
)

C
n 1
()
!
2
nR
 1
< :
Proof. With the denitions of 

1
(4.21) and R (4.7) we have
1
2
log

1
1  (

1
)
2

= R+ Æ;
and consequently there must exist some 
1
> 0 such that
R <
1
2
log

1
1  (

1
  
1
)
2

: (4.25)
By the result on the asymptotic area of spherical caps (4.22) and by the inequality
(4.25), it follows from Lemma 4.1 that there exists a positive integer n
1
such that for all
n > n
1
 
1 
C
n 1
 
arccos(

1
  
1
)

C
n 1
()
!
2
nR
> 1  ;
and the claim follows by noting that the LHS cannot decrease when the exponent 2
nR
is
replaced by 2
nR
  1.
Our achievability proof will thus be complete once we demonstrate that the second term
on the RHS of (4.20) converges to zero for  = 

1
 
1
. This is demonstrated in the following
lemma, which is proved in Appendix B.6 and which concludes the achievability proof for
the private version of the SGWM game.
Lemma 4.3. For any  > 0 and 
1
> 0, there exists an integer n
2
> 0 such that for all
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n > n
2
Pr
 

1
(Z
1
; Z
2
) < 

1
  
1

< :
4.3 Achievability for Public Version
In this section, we show that all rates up to C

(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
) and
1
2
log(1+
D
1
D
2
) are achievable
for the public version of the general watermarking game and for the additive attack water-
marking game, respectively, when the covertext U is uniformly distributed on the n-sphere
S
n
(0;
p
n
2
u
). We extend these results to IID Gaussian covertexts in Section 4.4.
4.3.1 Coding Strategy
The coding strategies for the public versions of both the additive attack and the general
watermarking games are motivated by the works of Marton [Mar79], Gel'fand and Pinsker
[GP80], Heegard and El Gamal [HEG83], and Costa [Cos83].
For both models, we x a Æ > 0. In the following subsections, we dene the set of con-
stants f; 
2
v
; R
0
; R
1
; Rg separately for each model. Using these constants we then describe
the encoder and decoder used for both models. Thus, while the constants have dierent
values for the two models, in terms of these constants the proposed coding schemes are
identical.
Constants for the Additive Attack Watermarking Game
For the additive attack watermarking game, we dene the set of constants as
 =
D
1
D
1
+D
2
; (4.26)

2
v
= D
1
+ 
2

2
u
; (4.27)
R
0
=
1
2
log

1 +
D
1

2
u
(D
1
+D
2
)
2

+ Æ; (4.28)
R
1
=
1
2
log

1 +
D
1
D
2
+
D
1

2
u
D
2
(D
1
+D
2
)

  Æ; (4.29)
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and
R = R
1
 R
0
=
1
2
log

1 +
D
1
D
2

  2Æ: (4.30)
Constants for the General Watermarking Game
The choice of the constants for the general watermarking game is inspired by the solution
to the public Gaussian mutual information game; see Theorem 3.1 and its derivation in
Section 3.2. The encoder and decoder choose a free parameter A 2 A(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
), where
the intervalA(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
) is dened in (A.7). We assume throughout that the above interval
is non-empty, because otherwise the coding capacity is zero, and there is no need for a coding
theorem.
First, let  = (A;D
1
; 
2
u
), b
1
= b
1
(A;D
1
; 
2
u
), b
2
= b
2
(A;D
1
; 
2
u
), c = c(A;D
2
) and
 = (A;D
1
; D
2
; 
2
u
) as dened in Appendix A. In particular, recall that  = 1  
b
1
D
2
D
2
+cb
2
.
We can then dene the other constants as

2
v
= 
2

2
u
+ 2+D
1
; (4.31)
R
0
=
1
2
log

1 +
(
2
u
+ )
2
D
1

2
u
  
2

+ Æ; (4.32)
R
1
=
1
2
log

1 +
Acb
2
D
2
(D
2
+ cb
2
)

  Æ; (4.33)
and
R = R
1
 R
0
=
1
2
log
 
1 + s(A;D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
)

  2Æ; (4.34)
where s(A;D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
) is dened in (A.5). If A is chosen to maximize (4.34) as in (4.1),
then R = C

(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
)  2Æ; we show in Lemma A.1 that such an A can be chosen.
Encoder and Decoder
The encoder and decoder use their source of common randomness 
1
to create a codebook of
auxiliary codewords as follows. They generate 2
nR
1
= 2
n(R+R
0
)
IID random vectors fV
j;k
g,
where 1  j  2
nR
, 1  k  2
nR
0
, and each random vector V
j;k
is uniformly distributed on
the n-sphere S
n
(0;
p
n
2
v
). Thus, the codebook consists of 2
nR
bins (indexed by j), each
containing 2
nR
0
auxiliary codewords. In Figure 4-1, we give an example codebook with
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  
 
 
v
2;1
@
@
@
@I
v
2;4
@
@
@
@Rv
2;2
 
 
 
 	v
2;3
v
1;1
-v
1;3
?
v
1;4
6
v
1;2
Figure 4-1: Example codebook for public version. Dashed vectors are in bin 1 and dotted
vectors are in bin 2.
n = 2, R
0
= 1 and R = 1=2. Instead of being selected randomly, the codewords in this
example have been placed regularly in the 2-sphere (i.e., circle).
Encoder: Given the message w and the covertext u, the encoder looks in bin w and chooses
the auxiliary codeword closest (in Euclidean distance) to the covertext. The output of the
encoder x is then created as a linear combination of the covertext and the chosen auxiliary
codeword.
Mathematically, the encoder behaves as follows. Given the message w, the covertext u,
and the codebook fv
j;k
g, let the chosen index for message w be
k

(u; w) = argmax
1k2
nR
0
hu;v
w;k
i; (4.35)
which is unique with probability one. Further, let the chosen auxiliary codeword for message
w be
v
w
(u) = v
w;k

(u;w)
: (4.36)
The encoder creates its output x as
x = v
w
(u) + (1  )u: (4.37)
The example of Figure 4-1 is continued in Figure 4-2, where the encoding procedure is
illustrated.
Decoder: The decoder nds the auxiliary codeword that, among all the 2
nR
1
sequences in
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Figure 4-2: Example encoding for public version with w = 1 (bin with dashed vectors).
 
 
 
 
@
@
@
@I
@
@
@
@R
 
 
 
 	
 -
?
6
v
w^;k









1
y
Figure 4-3: Example decoding for public version.
the codebook, is closest to the received sequence y. He then declares the estimate of the
message to be the bin to which this auxiliary codeword belongs. Mathematically, given the
received sequence y and the codebook fv
j;k
g, the estimate is given by
w^ = argmin
1 ~w2
nR

min
1k2
nR
0
ky   v
~w;k
k
2

(4.38)
= argmax
1 ~w2
nR

max
1k2
nR
0
hy;v
~w;k
i

; (4.39)
where the last equality follows by noting that n
 1
kv
~w;k
k
2
= 
2
v
irrespective of ~w and k. Note
that w^ of (4.38) is with probability one unique. The example is completed in Figure 4-3 with
an illustration of the decoding process. In this example, the decoder successfully recovered
the value of the watermark.
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4.3.2 Probability of Error
In this section, we derive the conditional probability of error in the above coding strategy.
We rst dene the random variables on which we will condition. Let the random variable
Z be the maximum (normalized) inner product achieved in (4.35),
Z =
1
n
hU ;V
W
(U )i: (4.40)
Next, let the random variable Z
3
be the normalized power in the sequence Y ,
Z
3
=
1
n
kY k
2
: (4.41)
Next, let the random variable Z
4
be the normalized inner product between the sequence
~
Y ,
which is dened by
~
Y = Y  X; (4.42)
and the auxiliary codeword V
W
(U ),
Z
4
=
1
n
h
~
Y ;V
W
(U )i: (4.43)
Finally, let us dene a mapping 
2
(z; z
3
; z
4
) as

2
(z; z
3
; z
4
) =

2
v
+ (1  )z + z
4
p
z
3

2
v
: (4.44)
By the denition of the decoder (4.39), it follows that a decoding error occurs if, and
only if, there exists a message w
0
6=W and an index k
0
such that
1
n
hY ;V
w
0
;k
0
i 
1
n
hY ;V
W
(U)i
=
1
n
hX;V
W
(U )i+
1
n
h
~
Y ;V
W
(U)i
= 
2
v
+ (1  )Z + Z
4
;
where the rst equality follows by the denition of
~
Y (4.42) and the second equality follows
by the denitions of the encoder (4.37) and the random variables Z and Z
4
. Note that we
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do not need to consider the case where the decoder makes a mistake in the same bin since
this does not result in an error. Equivalently, an error occurs if, and only if, there exists a
message w
0
6=W and an index k
0
such that
*
Y
p
nZ
3
;
V
w
0
;k
0
p
n
2
v
+


2
v
+ (1  )Z + Z
4
p
Z
3

2
v
(4.45)
= 
2
(Z;Z
3
; Z
4
):
The random vector V
w
0
;k
0
=
p
n
2
v
is uniformly distributed on the unit n-sphere S
n
(0; 1)
and is independent of Y , Z, Z
3
, and Z
4
. Indeed, the encoder does not examine the auxiliary
codewords in bins other than in the one corresponding to the message W . The random
vector Y =
p
nZ
3
also takes value on the unit n-sphere S
n
(0; 1), and thus, by symmetry (see
Section 4.2.2), the distribution of the LHS of (4.45) does not depend on the distribution of
Y . In particular, for any w
0
6=W ,
Pr
 *
Y
p
nz
3
;
V
w
0
;k
0
p
n
2
v
+
 
2
(z; z
3
; z
4
)



Z = z; Z
3
= z
3
; Z
4
= z
4
!
=
C
n
 
arccos 
2
(z; z
3
; z
4
)

C
n
()
: (4.46)
Furthermore, the random vectors fV
w
0
;k
0
: w
0
6= W; 1  k
0
 2
nR
0
g are independent of
each other. Thus, the probability that there was not an error is given by the product of
the probabilities that each of these 2
nR
1
  2
nR
0
vectors did not cause an error. Since the
probability of error for each individual vector is given in (4.46), we can write the conditional
probability of error for this coding strategy as
Pr(errorjZ = z; Z
3
= z
3
; Z
4
= z
4
) = 1 
 
1 
C
n
 
arccos 
2
(z; z
3
; z
4
)

C
n
()
!
2
nR
1
 2
nR
0
: (4.47)
The expression Pr(errorjZ = z; Z
3
= z
3
; Z
4
= z
4
) is a monotonically non-increasing function
of 
2
(z; z
3
; z
4
) and is upper-bounded by 1. Consequently, as in Section 4.2.2,
Pr(error)  Pr
 
errorj
2
(Z;Z
3
; Z
4
) = 

+ Pr
 

2
(Z;Z
3
; Z
4
) < 

; (4.48)
for any real number . For both games under consideration, we will show that, by choosing
a suÆciently large blocklength n, the RHS of (4.48) can be made arbitrarily small when
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 = 

(R
1
+ Æ)   
2
. Here


(R
1
+ Æ) =

1  2
 2(R
1
+Æ)

1=2
; (4.49)

2
is a small number to be specied later, and the constant R
1
is dened in (4.29) and (4.33)
for the additive attack and general watermarking games, respectively.
We now analyze the rst term on the RHS of (4.48) for both games simultaneously. The
analysis of the second term is performed separately for the additive attack watermarking
game in Lemma 4.8 and for the general watermarking game in Lemma 4.10.
Lemma 4.4. For any  > 0, there exists some 
2
> 0 and some integer n
1
> 0 such that
for all n > n
1
1 
0
@
1 
C
n

arccos
 


(R
1
+ Æ)  
2


C
n
()
1
A
2
nR
1
 2
nR
0
< ;
where R
1
is dened according to either (4.29) or (4.33).
Proof. Rewriting (4.49) as
1
2
log
 
1
1 
 


(R
1
+ Æ)

2
!
= R
1
+ Æ;
demonstrates the existence of some 
2
> 0 such that
1
2
log
 
1
1 
 


(R
1
+ Æ)  
2

2
!
> R
1
; (4.50)
because in both (4.29) and (4.33) the rate R
1
satises 0 < 

(R
1
+ Æ) < 1. By the result
on the asymptotic area of spherical caps (4.22) and by the inequality (4.50), it follows by
Lemma 4.1 that there exists a positive integer n
1
such that for all n > n
1
0
@
1 
C
n

arccos
 


(R
1
+ Æ)  
2


C
n
()
1
A
2
nR
1
> 1  ;
and the claim follows by noting that the LHS cannot decrease when the exponent 2
nR
1
is
replaced by 2
nR
1
  2
nR
0
.
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4.3.3 Distribution of Chosen Auxiliary Codeword
To continue with the performance analysis, we shall need the distribution of the chosen
auxiliary codeword V
W
(U ) (dened in (4.36)), both unconditionally and conditioned on
the random vectorX and the random variable Z (dened in (4.37) and (4.40), respectively).
Lemma 4.5. The random vector V
W
(U ) dened in (4.36) is uniformly distributed over
the n-sphere S
n
(0;
p
n
2
v
).
Proof. By the symmetry of the encoding process it is apparent that V
W
(U) is independent
of the message W . Assume then without loss of generality that W = 1.
Since all the auxiliary random vectors fV
1;k
g in bin 1 take value in the n-sphere
S
n
(0;
p
n
2
v
), it follows that the chosen auxiliary codeword must take value in the same
n-sphere.
Finally, since the joint distribution of fV
1;k
g is invariant under any unitary transfor-
mation as is the distribution of U , and since U and fV
1;k
g are independent, it follows that
the unconditional distribution of V
W
(U) is as stated above. In other words, the fact that
V
W
(U ) achieves the maximum inner product with U does not tell us anything about the
direction of V
W
(U).
Lemma 4.6. Given X = x and Z = z, the random vector V
W
(U) is uniformly distributed
over the set
V(x; z) =
n
a
1
x+ v : v 2 S
n
(0;
p
na
2
) \ x
?
o
; (4.51)
where
a
1
=

2
v
+ (1  )z
n
 1
kxk
2
;
and
a
2
=
(1  )
2
(
2
u

2
v
  z
2
)
n
 1
kxk
2
: (4.52)
The proof of this lemma can be found in Appendix B.7.
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4.3.4 Analysis for Additive Attack Watermarking Game
Using the encoder and decoder described above, we now show that for any positive Æ the
rate R dened in (4.30) is achievable for the additive attack watermarking game (when the
covertext U is uniformly distributed on the n-sphere S
n
(0;
p
n
2
u
)). That is, the proba-
bilities that the encoder does not meet the distortion constraint and that a decoding error
occur can both be made arbitrarily small by choosing some nite blocklength n. In order
to prove these facts, we rst show in the following subsection that the random variable Z
takes value close to 
2
u
with high probability.
A Law of Large Numbers for Z
In this section, we state and prove a claim that describes the behavior of the random
variable Z dened in (4.40). This claim will be used to show that encoder and decoder
behave properly (i.e., meeting the distortion constraint and recovering the correct message)
with arbitrarily high probability.
Lemma 4.7. If the constants dened for the additive attack watermarking game are used
to design the sequence of encoders of Section 4.3.1, then
lim
n!1
Pr
 
Z  
2
u
) = 1:
Proof. Let V be uniformly distributed on S
n
(0;
p
n
2
v
) independent of U . Then
Pr(Z  
2
u
) = 1  Pr

max
1k2
nR
0
n
 1
hU ;V
W;k
i < 
2
u

= 1 

1  Pr
 
n
 1
hU ;V i  
2
u


2
nR
0
; (4.53)
where the rst equality follows by the denition of Z (4.40) and of V
W;k
, and the second
equality follows because fV
W;k
g
2
nR
0
k=1
are IID and also independent of U . The RHS of (4.53)
can be further simplied using
Pr

1
n
hU ;V i  
2
u

= Pr
 *
U
p
n
2
u
;
V
p
n
2
v
+


u

v
!
=
C
n

arccos


u

v

C
n
()
; (4.54)
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which follows since both normalized random vectors are uniformly distributed on S
n
(0; 1)
and they are independent of each other. By (4.22) we obtain
lim
n!1
1
n
log
C
n

arccos


u

v

C
n
()
=
1
2
log

1 

2

2
u

2
v

(4.55)
=  (R
0
  Æ); (4.56)
where the second equality follows by the denitions of  (4.26), 
2
v
(4.27), and R
0
(4.28).
Combining Lemma 4.1 with (4.53), (4.54), and (4.56) concludes the proof.
The Encoding Distortion Constraint
We now show that the encoder's distortion constraint is met with arbitrarily high proba-
bility. By Lemma 4.7, it is suÆcient to show that Z  
2
u
implies n
 1
kX   Uk
2
 D
1
,
which we proceed to prove. By the denitions of X and Z (see (4.37) and (4.40)),
n
 1
kX  Uk
2
= 
2
v
  2Z + 
2

2
u
: (4.57)
Since  is positive (4.26), the RHS of (4.57) is decreasing in Z. Consequently, the condition
Z  
2
u
implies
n
 1
kX  Uk
2
 
2
v
  
2

2
u
= D
1
;
where the last equality follows from (4.27).
The Decoding Error
We now show that the second term on the RHS of (4.48) is vanishing in n when  =


(R
1
+ Æ)  
2
. Here R
1
and 

(R
1
+ Æ) are dened in (4.29) and (4.49) respectively, and

2
> 0 is specied in Lemma 4.4. The combination of this fact with Lemma 4.4 will show
that, as the blocklength n tends to innity, the probability of decoding error approaches
zero. The following lemma is proved in Appendix B.8.
Lemma 4.8. If the constants dened for the additive attack watermarking game are used
to design the sequence of encoders of Section 4.3.1, then for any  > 0 and 
2
> 0, there
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exists an integer n
2
> 0 such that for all n > n
2
and for all the deterministic attacks of
Section 4.1.1
Pr
 

2
(Z;Z
3
; Z
4
) < 

(R
1
+ Æ)  
2

< :
4.3.5 Analysis for General Watermarking Game
We return to the public version of the general watermarking game to demonstrate that
the encoder and decoder for the general watermarking game (dened in Section 4.3.1)
guarantee that the rate R of (4.34) is achievable, for any Æ > 0. That is, we show that both
the probability that the encoding distortion constraint is not met and the probability of a
decoding error are vanishing in the blocklength n. We rst show in the following subsection
that the random variable Z concentrates around 
2
u
+ .
A Law of Large Numbers for Z
In this section, we prove a law of large numbers for the random variable Z =
1
n
hU ;V
W
(U)i,
which is dened in (4.40), and which corresponds to the normalized inner product between
the source sequence U and the chosen auxiliary codeword V
W
(U). This law will be useful
for the later analysis of the probability of exceeding the allowed encoder distortion and the
probability of a decoding error.
Lemma 4.9. For every Æ > 0 used to dene the encoder for the general watermarking game
(see equations (4.32), (4.33), (4.34) and Section 4.3.1), there exists (Æ) > 0 such that
lim
n!1
Pr
 

2
u
+   Z  
2
u
+ + (Æ)

= 1;
and
lim
Æ#0
(Æ) = 0:
Proof. The proof that Pr(Z  
2
u
+ )! 1 is almost identical to the proof of Lemma 4.7.
One need only replace 
2
u
with 
2
u
+  and use the denitions of the constants that are
for the general watermarking game as opposed to the constants for the additive attack
watermarking game; see Section 4.3.1.
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To complete the proof of the present claim, we now choose (Æ) > 0 such that
log
 
1 


2
u
+ + (Æ)

u

v

2
!
<  R
0
: (4.58)
This can be done because the LHS of (4.58) equates to  (R
0
+Æ) when (Æ) is set to zero (in
analogy to the equality between (4.55) and (4.56)), and because log(1   x
2
) is continuous
and decreasing in x, for 0 < x < 1. Using Lemma 4.1, we see that Pr(Z > 
2
u
+ (Æ))! 0.
Finally, we can choose (Æ)! 0 as Æ ! 0 by the continuity of log(1  x
2
).
The Encoding Distortion Constraint
We now show that for an appropriate choice of n and Æ, the distortion constraint is met
with arbitrarily high probability. As in Section 4.3.4, if   0, then (4.57) demonstrates
that whenever Z  
2
u
+ holds we also have n
 1
kX Uk
2
 D
1
. Thus, our claim follows
from Lemma 4.9 if   0.
However, contrary to the additive attack game, in the general watermarking game the
constant  need not be non-negative. To address this case we note that for  < 0, whenever
the inequality 
2
u
+  Z  
2
u
++(Æ) holds we also have n
 1
kX Uk
2
 D
1
 2(Æ).
Thus, if we design our system for some
~
D
1
< D
1
instead of D
1
as the encoder's distortion
constraint, then by choosing Æ suÆciently enough and n suÆciently large, Lemma 4.9 will
guarantee that the encoder will meet the D
1
distortion constraint with arbitrarily high
probability. The desired achievability result can be demonstrated by letting
~
D
1
approach
D
1
, because C

(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
) is continuous in D
1
.
The Decoding Error
In this section, we show that the second term on the RHS of (4.48) is vanishing in n when
 = 

(R
1
+ Æ)   
2
. Here R
1
and 

(R
1
+ Æ) are dened in (4.33) and (4.49) and 
2
is
specied in Lemma 4.4. The combination of this fact with Lemma 4.4 will show that the
probability of decoding error approaches zero, as the blocklength n tends to innity. We
state the desired result in the following lemma, which is proved in Appendix B.9.
Lemma 4.10. If the constants dened for the general watermarking game are used to de-
sign the sequence of encoders of Section 4.3.1, then for any  > 0 and 
2
> 0, there exists
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an integer n
2
> 0 such that for all n > n
2
and for all attackers of Section 4.1.2
Pr
 

2
(Z;Z
3
; Z
4
) < 

(R
1
+ Æ)  
2

< :
4.4 Spherically Uniform Covertext is SuÆcient
We have shown in the early sections of this chapter that if the covertext U is uniformly
distributed on the n-sphere S
n
(0;
p
n
2
u
), then the coding capacity of both the private and
public versions of the watermarking games are lower bounded by C

(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
). We have
also shown that for such covertexts, the coding capacity of the additive attack watermarking
game is at least
1
2
log(1+
D
1
D
2
). In this section, we extend these results to zero-mean variance-

2
u
IID Gaussian covertexts.
We rst transform the IID Gaussian sequence U into a random vector U
0
that is uni-
formly distributed on the n-sphere S
n
(0;
p
n
2
u
). To this end we set
S
U
= n
 1
kUk
2
;
which converges to 
2
u
in probability, and let
U
0
=
s

2
u
S
U
U ;
which is well dened with probability 1, and which is uniformly distributed on S
n
(0;
p
n
2
u
).
We will consider all the models simultaneously, but we will state our assumptions on
the rate of each of the models separately:
General watermarking Assume that 0 < R < C

(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
). By the denition of C

(2.6), there exists some A
0
2 A(D
1
; D
2
; 
2
u
) such that R <
1
2
log(1+s(A
0
;D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
)).
Since s(A
0
;D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
) is continuous in D
1
, there exists some D
0
1
< D
1
such that
R <
1
2
log(1 + s(A
0
;D
0
1
; D
2
; 
2
u
)).
Additive attack watermarking Assume that 0 < R <
1
2
log(1+
D
1
D
2
). Then, there exists
a D
0
1
< D
1
such that R <
1
2
log(1 +
D
0
1
D
2
).
LetX
0
be the output of the encoders as designed for the covertext U
0
and the parameters
A
0
and D
0
1
in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.3.1. Let 
0
be the corresponding decoder. Consider now
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an encoder for the covertext U that produces the stegotext X according to the rule
x =
8
>
<
>
:
x
0
if n
 1
kx
0
  uk
2
 D
1
u otherwise
:
With this choice of x, the distortion between u and x is less than D
1
almost surely, so that
the encoding distortion constraint (2.1) is met.
We next claim that for a suÆciently large blocklength, X = X
0
with arbitrarily high
probability. Indeed, the distortion between the random vectors X
0
and U is given by
1
n
kX
0
 Uk
2
=
1
n
kX
0
 U
0
+U
0
 Uk
2

1
n
kX
0
 U
0
k
2
+
1
n
kU
0
 Uk
2
+
2
n
kX
0
 U
0
k  kU
0
 Uk
 D
0
1
+
1
n
kU
0
 Uk
2
+
q
D
0
1
2
n
kU
0
 Uk;
and
1
n
kU
0
 Uk
2
=

p
S
U
 
p

2
u

2
approaches, by the weak law of large numbers, zero in probability. In the above, the
rst inequality follows from the triangle inequality, and the second because the encoders
of Sections 4.2.1 and 4.3.1 satisfy the encoder distortion constraint n
 1
kX
0
  U
0
k
2
 D
0
1
almost surely. Since D
0
1
< D
1
, our claim that
lim
n!1
Pr(X =X
0
) = 1 (4.59)
is proved.
Let
^
W be the output of the decoder 
0
, and consider now any xed deterministic attack.
The probability of error can be written as
Pr(
^
W 6=W ) = Pr(
^
W 6=W;X =X
0
) + Pr(
^
W 6=W;X 6=X
0
)
 Pr(
^
W 6=W;X =X
0
) + Pr(X 6=X
0
);
where the second term on the RHS of the above converges to zero (uniformly over all the
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deterministic attackers) by (4.59), and the rst term approaches zero by the achievability
results for covertexts that are uniformly distributed over the n-sphere.
To clarify the latter argument consider, for example, the public watermarking game
with an additive attacker as in (4.2). We would then argue that
Pr(
^
W 6=W;X =X
0
) = Pr
 

0
(X +
~
y;
1
) 6=W;X =X
0

= Pr
 

0
(X
0
+
~
y;
1
) 6=W;X =X
0

 Pr
 

0
(X
0
+
~
y;
1
) 6=W

;
which converges to zero by the achievability result on covertexts that are uniformly dis-
tributed on the n-sphere.
4.5 Converse for Squared Error Distortion
In this section, we prove the converse part of Theorem 2.1 for the watermarking game
with real alphabets and squared error distortions. That is, we show that if the covertext
distribution fP
U
g is ergodic with nite fourth moment and E

U
2
k

 
2
u
, then the capacity
of the private version of the watermarking game is at most C

(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
). In particular,
for any xed R > C

(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
) and any sequence of rate-R encoders that satisfy the
distortion constraint (2.1), we will propose a sequence of attackers fg
n
g that satisfy the
distortion constraint (2.3) and that guarantee that, irrespective of the decoding rule, the
probability of error will be bounded away from zero. Thus, even if the sequence of decoders
were designed with full knowledge of this sequence of attackers, no rate above C

(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
)
would be achievable.
The remainder of this section is organized as follows. In Section 4.5.1, we describe the
proposed sequence of attackers. In Section 4.5.2, we study the distortion they introduce, and
in Section 4.5.3 we show that, for the appropriate rates, these attack strategies guarantee a
probability of error that is bounded away from zero. We conclude with a discussion of the
necessity of the ergodicity assumption in Section 4.5.4.
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4.5.1 Attacker
Intuitive Denition
We seek to provide some motivation for the proposed attack strategy by rst describing
two simple attacks that fail to give the desired converse. We then combine aspects of these
simple strategies to form the attack strategy that we will use to prove the converse.
The upcoming discussion will utilize the correspondence between the encoder and at-
tacker (mappings) (f
n
, g
n
) and the watermarking and attack channels (conditional laws)
(P
XjU
, P
Y jX
) that they induce for given xed laws on W , fP
U
g, 
1
, and 
2
. One way to
prove the converse is to show using a Fano-type inequality that in order for the probability
of error to tend to zero, a mutual information term similar to I
priv
of (3.1) | evaluated with
respect to the induced channels | must be greater than the watermarking rate. Thus, one
would expect that the optimal attack channels of Section 3.2.1 for the mutual information
games could be used to design good attacker mappings for the watermarking game.
The rst simple attack strategy corresponds to the optimal attack channel (P
A
Y jX
)
n
of
Section 3.2.1, where A is the average power in the stegotext based on the encoder, i.e.,
A = E

n
 1
kXk
2

. Since the encoder must satisfy the distortion constraint (2.1) (and
thus the corresponding watermarking channel P
XjU
must be in D
1
(D
1
; P
U
)), the results
of Section 3.2.3 show that this attacker guarantees that the mutual information is at most
C

(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
). The problem with this attack strategy is that since it is based on the average
power in the stegotext, there is no guarantee that the attacker's distortion constraint (2.3)
will be met with probability one.
The second simple attack strategy corresponds to the optimal attack channel (P
a
Y jX
)
n
,
where a is the power in the realization (sample-path) of the stegotext, i.e., a = n
 1
kxk
2
. The
results of Section 3.2.3 again give the appropriate upper bound on the mutual information
conditioned on the value of a. Furthermore, if a distortion level
~
D
2
slightly smaller than the
actual distortion level D
2
is used to design this attacker, then the distortion constraint will
be met with high probability. The problem with this attack strategy is that the decoder can
fairly accurately determine the value of a from the forgery. Thus, the encoder and decoder
could potentially use the power of the stegotext to send extra information, so that the total
rate might be higher than C

(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
).
The attack strategy that we use to prove the converse combines aspects of the two
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simple strategies described above. To form this attacker, we partition the possible values of
a = n
 1
kxk
2
into a nite number of intervals, A
1
; : : : ;A
m
, and compute the average power
in the stegotext conditioned on each interval, i.e., a
k
= E

n
 1
kXk
2


n
 1
kXk
2
2 A
k

. We
then use the optimal attack channel (P
a
k
Y jX
)
n
whenever the actual power of the stegotext
lies in the interval A
k
. Unlike the rst simple strategy, the distortion constraint can be
guaranteed by making the intervals small enough. Unlike the second simple strategy, the
encoder and decoder cannot use the power of the stegotext to transmit extra information
because there are only nitely many intervals. These arguments will be made more precise
in the upcoming sections.
Precise Denition
Let R be a xed rate that is strictly larger than C

(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
). For any rate-R sequence
of encoders and decoders, the attacker described below will guarantee some non-vanishing
probability of error.
By the continuity of C

(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
) in D
2
, it follows that there exists some 0 <
~
Æ < D
2
such that R > C

(D
1
;D
2
 
~
Æ; 
2
u
). Let
~
D
2
= D
2
 
~
Æ; (4.60)
for some such
~
Æ. The attacker partitions the interval

~
D
2
; (2
u
+
p
D
1
)
2

suÆciently nely
into m sub-intervals A
1
; : : : ;A
m
, so that for each sub-interval A
k
,
~
D
2
 
1 +
~
D
2
A

A
0
A
  1

!
<
~
D
2
+
~
Æ
2
; 8A;A
0
2 A
k
: (4.61)
Such a partition exists because this interval is nite, it does not include zero (
~
D
2
> 0), and
because the constant
~
Æ is positive.
We dene the mapping k from R
n
to f0; : : : ;mg as
k(x) =
8
>
<
>
:
l if n
 1
kxk
2
2 A
l
0 if no such l exists
: (4.62)
This mapping will determine how the stegotext x will be attacked. Notice that it takes on
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a nite number of values. We also dene the random variable
K = k(X):
Using his knowledge of the distribution of the covertext and the encoder mapping, the
attacker computes
a
k
= E

1
n
kXk
2



K = k

; 8 0  k  m: (4.63)
Note that a
k
2 A
k
for k 6= 0 since A
k
is an interval (and hence convex) and since the event
K = k corresponds to the event n
 1
kXk
2
2 A
k
. The attacker also computes

k
= E

1
n
kUk
2



K = k

; 8 0  k  m: (4.64)
Using only the source of randomness 
2
, the attacker generates a random vector V
as a sequence of IID zero-mean variance-
~
D
2
Gaussian random variables. Recall that we
assume that the random variable 
2
and the random vector X are independent, and thus
the random vectors V and X are also independent.
We now describe an attacker g

n
that does not necessarily meet the distortion constraint.
For this attacker, the stegotext is computed as
g

n
(x; 
2
) =
8
>
<
>
:
c(a
k(x)
;
~
D
2
)x+ c
1=2
(a
k(x)
;
~
D
2
)v(
2
) if k(x) > 0

p
nD
2
 
p
n
~
D
2

v(
2
)=kv(
2
)k otherwise
; (4.65)
where c(A;D
2
) = 1  D
2
=A (also see (A.4)). Conditionally on X = x satisfying k(x)  1,
the random vector Y = g

n
(x;
2
) under this attacker is thus distributed as c(a
k(x)
;
~
D
2
)x+
c
1=2
(a
k(x)
;
~
D
2
)V . Note that if K = k > 0, the resulting conditional distribution P
Y jX
is
the same as the optimal attack channel of the mutual information game corresponding to
a
k
and
~
D
2
; see Section 3.2.1.
Finally, our proposed attacker uses g

n
if the distortion constraint is met and sets y = x
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if the distortion constraint is not met. That is,
g
n
(x; 
2
) =
8
>
<
>
:
g

n
(x; 
2
) if n
 1
kg

n
(x; 
2
)  xk
2
 D
2
x otherwise
: (4.66)
The attacker g
n
thus satises the distortion constraint with probability one. Note that
if instead of a
k
being calculated as in (4.66) it was chosen arbitrarily from A
k
, then the
upcoming proof would still be valid (provided that each A
k
is small enough). The resulting
attacker is independent of the encoder and decoder and guarantees that no rates greater
than C

(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
) are achievable.
4.5.2 Analysis of Distortion
The attackers fg

n
g do not, in general, satisfy the distortion constraint (2.3). But in this
section we show that, as the blocklength tends to innity, the probability that the distortion
they introduce exceeds D
2
tends to zero. In the terminology of (4.66) we shall thus show
that
lim
n!1
Pr
 
g
n
(X ;
2
) = g

n
(X ;
2
)

= 1: (4.67)
Once this is shown, for the purposes of proving the converse, it will suÆce to show
that, for the appropriate rates, the attackers fg

n
g guarantee a non-vanishing probability
of error. To see this, x any R > C

(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
) and x some encoder sequence ff
n
g
and a corresponding decoder sequence f
n
g. Let
~
D
2
be chosen as in (4.60) so that R >
C

(D
1
;
~
D
2
; 
2
u
) and consider the attacker (4.65). Assume that we have managed to prove
that the attackers fg

n
g of (4.65) guarantees a non-vanishing probability of error. In this
case (4.67) will guarantee that the probability of error must also be bounded away from
zero in the presence of the attacker g
n
. Since fg
n
g do satisfy the distortion constraint, this
will conclude the proof of the converse.
We now turn to the proof of (4.67). In order to summarize the distortion introduced by
the attacker, we dene the following random variables,

1
(k) = c(a
k
;
~
D
2
)

n
 1
kV k
2
 
~
D
2

; k = 1; : : : ;m; (4.68)
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and

2
(k) =

c(a
k
;
~
D
2
)  1

c
1=2
(a
k
;
~
D
2
)n
 1
hX;V i; k = 1; : : : ;m: (4.69)
Note that for any 1  k  m, the random variables 
1
(k) and 
2
(k) converge to zero in
probability, because V is a sequence of IID N (0;
~
D
2
) random variables independent of X,
and because 0 < c(a
k
;
~
D
2
) < 1 for all 1  k  m.
The probability of exceeding the allowed distortion can be written as
Pr

1
n
kg

n
(X ;
2
) Xk
2
> D
2

=
m
X
l=0
Pr

1
n
kg

n
(X ;
2
) Xk
2
> D
2
;K = l

:
We shall next show that each of the terms in the above sum converges to zero in probability.
We begin with the rst term, namely l = 0. The event K = 0 corresponds to either
n
 1
kXk
2

~
D
2
or n
 1
kXk
2
> (2
u
+
p
D
1
)
2
. In the former case,
1
n
kY  Xk
2
=
1
n





p
nD
2
 
q
n
~
D
2

V =kV k  X




2


p
D
2
 
q
~
D
2

2
+ 2

p
D
2
 
q
~
D
2

q
~
D
2
+
~
D
2
= D
2
;
where the inequality follows by the triangle inequality and since n
 1
kXk
2

~
D
2
here. Thus,
Pr

1
n
kg

n
(X ;
2
) Xk
2
> D
2
;K = 0

= Pr

n
 1
kXk
2
> (2
u
+
p
D
1
)
2

 Pr
 
n
 1
kUk
2
> 4
2
u

;
which converges to zero by the ergodicity of the covertext.
To study the limiting behavior of the rest of the terms, x some 1  l  m. If k(x) = l
then
1
n
kg

n
(x; 
2
)  xk
2
=
1
n




c(a
l
;
~
D
2
)  1

x+ c
1=2
(a
l
;
~
D
2
)V



2
=
~
D
2
 
1 +
~
D
2
a
l

n
 1
kxk
2
a
l
  1

!
+
1
(l) + 
2
(l)
 D
2
 
~
Æ
2
+
1
(l) + 
2
(l);
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where the second equality follows by the denitions of c, 
1
(l), and 
2
(l) (see (A.4), (4.68)
and (4.69)), and the inequality follows by (4.61) since both n
 1
kxk
2
and a
l
are in the set
A
l
. Thus,
Pr

1
n
kg

n
(X ;
2
) Xk
2
> D
2
; K = l

 Pr


1
(l) + 
2
(l) 
~
Æ=2; K = l

 Pr


1
(l) + 
2
(l) 
~
Æ=2

;
which converges to zero because both 
1
(l) and 
2
(l) converge to zero in probability.
4.5.3 Analysis of Probability of Error
In this section, we show that whenever the watermarking rate R exceeds C

(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
),
the sequence of attackers fg

n
g dened in (4.65) prevents the probability of error from
decaying to zero. In the previous section, we have shown that for blocklength n large
enough g
n
(X;
2
) = g

n
(X;
2
) with arbitrarily high probability. The combination of these
two facts will show that the probability of error is also prevented from decaying to zero by
the sequence of attackers fg
n
g dened in (4.66).
This analysis is carried out in a series of claims. In Lemma 4.11 we use a Fano-type
inequality to show that an achievable rate cannot exceed some limit of mutual informa-
tions. In Lemma 4.12, we upper bound these mutual informations by simpler expectations,
and in Lemma 4.13 we nally show that, in the limit, these expectations do not exceed
C

(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
).
Lemma 4.11. For any sequence of encoders, attackers, and decoders f(f
n
; g
n
; 
n
)g with
corresponding sequence of conditional distributions f(P
XjU ;
1
; P
Y jX
)g, if

P
e
(f
n
; g
n
; 
n
)! 0
as n!1, then
R  lim inf
n!1
1
n
I
P
U
P

1
P
XjU ;
1
P
Y jX
(X ;Y jU ;
1
): (4.70)
Proof. Utilizing Fano's inequality and the data processing theorem,
nR = H(W j U ;
1
)
= H(W j U ;
1
;Y ) + I(W ;Y j U ;
1
)
 1 + nR

P
e
(f
n
; g
n
; 
n
) + I(X ;Y j U ;
1
);
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where the rst equality follows sinceW is independent of (U ;
1
) and uniformly distributed
over f1; : : : ; 2
nR
g, and the inequality follows by the data processing theorem and by Fano's
inequality. Dividing by n and taking the lim inf, yields the desired result.
The mutual information term in the RHS of (4.70) is a little cumbersome to manipulate,
and we next exploit the fact that K takes on at most m + 1 possible values to prove that
n
 1
I(X ;Y jU ;
1
) has the same limiting behavior as n
 1
I(X ;Y jK;U ;
1
), i.e., that
lim
n!1
1
n

I(X ;Y jU ;
1
)  I(X;Y jK;U ;
1
)

= 0: (4.71)
To prove (4.71) write
I(X;Y jK;U ;
1
) = h(Y jK;U ;
1
)  h(Y jX ;K;U ;
1
)
= h(Y jK;U ;
1
)  h(Y jX ;U ;
1
)
= I(X ;Y jU ;
1
)  I(K;Y jU ;
1
);
where all dierential entropies exist for the attacker g

n
, and the second equality follows
since K is a function of X (4.62). Thus, the mutual information on the RHS of (4.70) can
be written as
I(X ;Y jU ;
1
) = I(X ;Y jK;U ;
1
) + I(K;Y jU ;
1
): (4.72)
Since K takes on at most m+ 1 dierent values, it follows that
0  I(K;Y jU ;
1
)  H(K)  log(m+ 1);
and thus, since m is xed and does not grow with the blocklength,
lim
n!1
1
n
I(K;Y jU ;
1
) = 0: (4.73)
Equation (4.71) now follows from (4.73) and (4.72).
It now follows from Lemma 4.11 and from (4.71) that in order to prove that the rate R
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is not achievable, it suÆces to show that
R > lim inf
n!1
1
n
I(X;Y jK;U ;
1
):
We upper bound in the following Lemma, which is proved in Appendix B.10.
Lemma 4.12. For any encoder with corresponding watermarking channel P
XjU
satisfying
(2.1), if the attacker g

n
of (4.65) with corresponding attack channel P

Y jX
is used, then
1
n
I
P
U
P

1
P
XjU ;
1
P

Y jX
(X ;Y jK;U ;
1
) 
m
X
k=1
Pr(K = k) 
1
2
log
 
1 + s(a
k
;D
1
;
~
D
2
; 
k
)

 E
K
h
C

(D
1
;
~
D
2
; 
K
)
i
: (4.74)
To proceed with the proof of the converse we would now like to upper bound the RHS
of (4.74). Since the function C

(D
1
; D
2
; 
2
u
) is not necessarily concave in 
2
u
, we cannot use
Jensen's inequality. However, C

(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
) is increasing in 
2
u
and is upper bounded by
1=2 log(1+D
1
=D
2
) for all 
2
u
. Thus, we will complete the proof by showing in the following
lemma that if 
k
is larger than 
2
u
, albeit by a small constant, then Pr(K = k) must be
vanishing. The proof of this lemma can be found in Appendix B.11.
Lemma 4.13. For any ergodic covertext distribution P
U
with E

U
4
k

< 1 and E

U
2
k



2
u
, there exists mappings Æ(; n) and n
0
() such that both the properties P1 and P2 stated
below hold, where
P1. For every  > 0, lim
n!1
Æ(; n) = 0.
P2. For every  > 0, n > n
0
(), and event E, if E

n
 1
kUk
2
jE

> 
2
u
+ 5, then Pr(E) <
Æ(; n).
With the aid of Lemma 4.13 we can now upper bound the RHS of (4.74). Specically,
we next show that for any ergodic stegotext fP
U
g of nite fourth moment and of second
moment 
2
u
, if R > C

(D
1
;
~
D
2
; 
2
u
) and the attacker g

n
of (4.65) is used, then
lim sup
n!1
E
K
h
C

(D
1
;
~
D
2
; 
K
)
i
 C

(D
1
;
~
D
2
; 
2
u
): (4.75)
To see this, let Æ(; n) and n
0
() be the mappings of Lemma 4.13 corresponding to the
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stegotext fP
U
g. For any  > 0, let us dene the set
K

() = fk : 
k
> 
2
u
+ 5g:
By the denition of 
k
(4.64), it is clear that E

n
 1
kUk
2
jK 2 K

()

> 
2
u
+ 5. Thus,
by the Lemma 4.13, Pr(K 2 K

()) < Æ(; n). Since C

(D
1
; D
2
; 
2
u
) is non-decreasing in 
2
u
and is upper bounded by
1
2
log(1 +
D
1
D
2
),
E
K
h
C

(D
1
;
~
D
2
; 
K
)
i
= Pr (K =2 K

())E

C

K


K =2 K

()

+ Pr (K 2 K

())E

C

K


K 2 K

()

 C

(D
1
;
~
D
2
; 
2
u
+ 5) + Æ(; n) 
1
2
log

1 +
D
1
~
D
2

;
where C

K
= C

(D
1
;
~
D
2
; 
K
). Since this is true for every suÆciently large n and since Æ(; n)
approaches zero as n tends to innity,
lim sup
n!1
E
K
h
C

(D
1
;
~
D
2
; 
K
)
i
 C

(D
1
;
~
D
2
; 
2
u
+ 5):
Furthermore, since this is true for every  > 0 and since C

(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
) is continuous in 
2
u
,
(4.75) follows.
We now have all of the necessary ingredients to prove that if the rate R exceeds
C

(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
), then the sequence of attackers fg

n
g prevents the probability of error from
decaying to zero. Indeed, let
~
D
2
be chosen as in (4.60) so that R > C

(D
1
;
~
D
2
; 
2
u
) and
consider the attacker g

n
of (4.65). Then
R > C

(D
1
;
~
D
2
; 
2
u
)
 lim sup
n!1
E
K
h
C

(D
1
;
~
D
2
; 
K
)
i
 lim sup
n!1
1
n
I(X ;Y jK;U ;
1
)
= lim sup
n!1
1
n
I(X ;Y jU ;
1
);
and the probability of error must be bounded away from zero by Lemma 4.11. Here the
rst inequality is justied by the choice of
~
D
2
(4.60), the second inequality by (4.75), the
third inequality by (4.74), and the nal equality by (4.71).
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4.5.4 Discussion: The Ergodicity Assumption
We have proved that the IID zero-mean Gaussian covertext is easiest to watermark among all
ergodic covertexts of nite fourth moment and of a given second moment. That is, we have
shown that for any covertext satisfying these conditions, no rate above C

 
D
1
;D
2
; E

U
2
i

is achievable.
An inspection of the proof, however, reveals that full ergodicity is not required, and it
suÆces that the covertext law fP
U
g be stationary and satisfy a second-moment ergodicity
assumption, i.e., that the variance of n
 1
P
n
i=1
U
2
i
approach zero, as n tends to innity; see
Appendix B.11.
This condition can sometimes be further relaxed if the process has an ergodic decompo-
sition (see e.g. [Gra88]). We illustrate this point with a simple example of a covertext that
has two ergodic modes.
Let Z take on the values zero and one equiprobably, and assume that conditional on
Z the covertext fU
i
g is IID zero-mean Gaussian with variance 
2
u;0
, if Z = 0, and with
variance 
2
u;1
, if Z = 1. Assume that 
2
u;0
< 
2
u;1
. The covertext is thus not ergodic, but it
is stationary with E

U
2
k

= (
2
u;0
+ 
2
u;1
)=2.
Even though the covertext described here is non-ergodic, it is still true that no rate above
C

 
D
1
; D
2
; E

U
2
i

is achievable. In fact, no rate above C

(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u;0
) can be achieved,
as an attacker of the form (4.66) designed for the parameters (D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u;0
) demonstrates.
This type of argument naturally extends to any covertext with a nite number of ergodic
modes, and in fact, with the proper modications, to more general covertexts too.
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Chapter 5
The Vector Gaussian
Watermarking Game
In this chapter, we prove Theorem 2.4 on the capacity of the vector Gaussian watermarking
(VGWM) game. Recall that in the VGWM game, the covertext is a sequence of IID
Gaussian random vectors with common m  m covariance matrix S
u
. Both distortion
measures are squared Euclidean distance so that the distortion between the mncovertext
matrix u and the m n stegotext matrix x is given by
d
1
(u;x) =
1
n
n
X
i=1
m
X
j=1
(x
ji
  u
ji
)
2
;
and similarly for the distortion between the stegotext and the forgery.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.1, we show that it
is suÆcient to consider covariance matrices that are diagonal. In Section 5.2, we introduce
some notation used throughout the rest of the chapter. In Section 5.3, we outline the proof
of the theorem using several main lemmas. Sections 5.4-5.6 are devoted to proving these
lemmas. Finally, in Section 5.7, we compare the optimal attack to optimal lossy compression
of the stegotext.
5.1 Diagonal Covariance is SuÆcient
Let us consider the eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition of the m m covariance matrix
S
u
, which can be a general non-negative denite symmetric matrix. We can write this
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matrix as
S
u
= 
t
; (5.1)
where  is diagonal with the eigenvalues 
2
= (
2
1
; : : : ; 
2
m
) on the diagonal and  is a
orthogonal matrix (i.e., 
t
= I) comprised of normalized eigenvectors. We will see that
the capacity of the watermarking game depends only on the eigenvalues 
2
, and thus we
will make the simplifying assumption that S
u
is diagonal.
Given amn covertext matrix u, let u
0
= u and let x
0
be a stegotext that satises the
distortion constraint (2.1) with respect to u
0
. Then, since  is an orthogonal transformation,
x = 
t
x
0
satises the distortion constraint with respect to u. Similarly, if y satises the
distortion constraint (2.3) with respect to x, then y
0
= y satises the distortion constraint
with respect to x
0
. Thus, a codebook for a general covariance covertext can be created from
a codebook for a diagonal covariance covertext while retaining the same probability of error.
Thus, it is suÆcient to consider diagonal covariance covertexts.
Let U
0
= U = (U
1
; : : : ;U
n
). While the columns of U are independent N (0; S
u
)
random vectors, the rows of U
0
are independent with row j containing a sequence of IID
N (0; 
2
j
) random variables.
Throughout the sequel we will assume that the covariance matrix S
u
is diagonal with
diagonal elements 
2
. Furthermore, we will write the covertext as a nm random matrix
U = (U
1
; : : : ;U
m
); (5.2)
where the columns U
1
; : : : ;U
m
are independent and column j contains a length-n IID
sequence of N (0; 
2
j
) random variables. We will also write the stegotext x and the forgery
y as n m matrices. We will refer to the columns of U , X and Y as the components of
the covertext, stegotext and forgery, respectively.
5.2 Denitions
In this section, we give some denitions that will be used throughout the rest of the chapter.
Also see Appendix A where many denitions used here and other chapters are summarized.
In order to dierentiate between distortion in a component and total distortion, we will
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use 
1
and 
2
for the total allowed distortion for the encoder and attacker, respectively.
We use vectors D
1
and D
2
to describe the amount of distortion placed in each component
by the encoder and attacker respectively. In order for encoder and attacker to meet their
respective distortion constraints, D
1
2 D
m
(
1
) and D
2
2 D
m
(
2
), where
D
m
() =
8
<
:
D 2 R
m
+
:
m
X
j=1
D
j
 
9
=
;
: (5.3)
We also use a vector A to describe the variance of each stegotext component. Given the
vector of stegotext variances 
2
and the vector of encoder distortion levels D
1
, the vector
A must belong to (by the triangle inequality)
A(D
1
;) =
n
A : (
j
 
p
D
1j
)
2
 A
j
 (
j
+
p
D
1j
)
2
; 1  j  m
o
: (5.4)
Conversely, given A and , the vector D
1
must belong to
D(A;) =
n
D
1
: (
j
 
p
A
j
)
2
 D
1j
 (
j
+
p
A
j
)
2
; 1  j  m
o
: (5.5)
Given , D
1
2 D
m
(
1
), D
2
2 D
m
(
2
), and A 2 A(D
1
;), let us dene
r(A;D
1
;D
2
;) =
m
X
j=1
1
2
log

1 +


s(A
j
;D
1j
;D
2j
; 
2
j
)


+

; (5.6)
where s(A;D
1
; D
2
; 
2
) is dened in (A.5). For the scalar Gaussian watermarking (SGWM),
we proved in Chapter 4 that
1
2
log(1+ s(A;D
1
; D
2
; 
2
)) is the maximum guaranteed achiev-
able rate when the distortion levels are D
1
and D
2
and the covertext and stegotext variance
are 
2
and A, respectively. We will see here that r(A;D
1
;D
2
;) describes the maximum
guaranteed achievable rate for VGWM when the distortion levels in the components are
D
1
and D
2
and the variances of the covertext and stegotext components are 
2
and A,
respectively.
The denitions we have introduced so far are suÆcient to analyze the private version of
the VGWM game. However, the public version requires some additional denitions since we
will describe an encoder that explicitly estimates the amount of distortion that the attacker
will use in each component. We will denote this estimate by the non-negative m-vector
~
D
2
.
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Let us further dene
v(A;D
1
;
~
D
2
; 
2
) = 
2
(A;D
1
;
~
D
2
; 
2
)
2
+ 2(A;D
1
;
~
D
2
; 
2
)(A;D
1
; 
2
) +D
1
; (5.7)
where  and  are dened in Appendix A. The function v will be used to describe the
variances of entries in the codebook; compare v with 
2
v
of (4.31). Let us next dene
r
0
(A;D
1
;
~
D
2
;) =
m
X
j=1
1
2
log
 
v(A
j
; D
1j
;
~
D
2j
; 
2
j
)
b
2
(A
j
;D
1j
; 
2
j
)
!
; (5.8)
where b
2
(; ; ) is dened in (A.3) and each summand is non-negative as long as 0 
~
D
2j

A
j
. Next, let
r
1
(A;D
1
;
~
D
2
;D
2
;) =
m
X
j=1
1
2
log
+
 
A
j
+ (
~
D
2j
)
2
G(A
j
; D
1j
; 
2
j
)
D
2j
+ (
~
D
2j
)
2
G(A
j
;D
1j
; 
2
j
)
!
; (5.9)
where
G(A;D
1
; 
2
) =
1
b
2
(A;D
1
; 
2
)
 
1
A
: (5.10)
Here, 2
nr
0
will represent the minimum number of codewords needed in each bin and 2
nr
1
will
represent the maximum number of total codewords; compare to R
0
and R
1
of Section 4.3.
The nal denition necessary for the public version is
~r(A;D
1
;
~
D
2
;D
2
;) = r
1
(A;D
1
;
~
D
2
;D
2
;)  r
0
(A;D
1
;
~
D
2
;); (5.11)
which will describe the maximum guaranteed achievable rate when the component variances
and distortions are given by the arguments of ~r.
If
~
D
2
=D
2
< A, then we can relate (5.6) and (5.11) by
~r(A;D
1
;D
2
;D
2
;) = r(A;D
1
;D
2
;): (5.12)
Thus, if the encoder's estimate of the attacker's distortion distribution is accurate, then the
achievable rates should be the same for both private and public versions. Indeed, we will
see that this is the case.
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5.3 Outline of Proof
We recall that our objective in this chapter is to show that the capacity for both versions
of the VGWM game is given by
max
D
1
2D
m
(
1
)
min
D
2
2D
m
(
2
)
m
X
j=1
C

(D
1j
;D
2j
; 
2
j
); (5.13)
where C

(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
), dened in (A.8), is the capacity of both versions of the SGWM game.
We show that (5.13) is the capacity for the VGWM game in the following steps. We give
lower and upper bounds on the capacity for the private version in Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2,
respectively. We then show that these bounds coincide and are equal to the right hand
side (RHS) of (5.13) in Lemma 5.3. Finally, in Lemma 5.4, we give a lower bound on
the capacity for the public version that is also an upper bound on the capacity of the for
the private version. Since the capacity of the public version cannot exceed the capacity of
the private version, this line of argument completes the proof of Theorem 2.4. Several of
the proof techniques are borrowed from [HN88] on the vector Gaussian arbitrarily varying
channel, which is to the Gaussian arbitrarily varying channel (see Section 2.5.3) what the
VGWM game is to the SGWM game.
Lemma 5.1.
C
VGWM
priv
(
1
;
2
;)  max
A
max
D
1
2D
m
(
1
)\D(A;)
min
D
2
2D
m
(
2
)
r(A;D
1
;D
2
;): (5.14)
We prove this lemma in Section 5.4. The basic idea is that given any feasible A and
D
1
, an encoder/decoder pair can be designed so that the message can be reliably recovered
regardless of the attacker strategy (which can be described by some feasible D
2
) for any
rate less than min
D
2
2D
m
(
2
)
r(A;D
1
;D
2
;). The encoder/decoder pair that we use is
essentially a parallel concatenation of encoder/decoder pairs for the private version of the
SGWM game. Note that the choice of A is constrained in that D
m
(
1
)\D(A;) must be
non-empty.
Our second lemma of this section gives an upper bound on the capacity of the private
version.
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Lemma 5.2.
C
VGWM
priv
(
1
;
2
;)  max
A
min
D
2
2D
m
(
2
)
max
D
1
2D
m
(
1
)\D(A;)
r(A;D
1
;D
2
;): (5.15)
In order to prove this lemma, we consider an attacker that chooses its distortion distri-
bution D
2
based on the empirical variances of the stegotext components A. This choice
of D
2
will correspond to the minimum (as a function of A and 
1
) on the RHS of (5.15).
Note that although the attacker knows the total distortion 
1
that the encoder can use,
the attacker cannot calculate the distortion distributionD
1
that has been used to produce
the stegotext. The attacker implements an optimal attack for the SGWM game for each
component based on the vector D
2
. Thus, even if the encoder knows how the attacker will
choose D
2
based on A, the maximum achievable rate is described by the RHS of (5.15). A
more detailed proof of this lemma is similar to the lengthy converse of the SGWM game in
Section 4.5 and is omitted.
Our next lemma shows that the lower and upper bounds of Lemma 5.1 and Lemma 5.2
coincide and are equal to the proposed capacity.
Lemma 5.3. The following expressions are equal:
1. (5.13)
2. The RHS of (5.14)
3. The RHS of (5.15)
We prove this lemma in Section 5.6. The key steps in proving the equality of the three
expressions are two applications of the Sion-Kakutani Minimax theorem. The combination
of these three lemmas implies that the capacity of the private version is given by any of the
three expressions, and in particular (5.13).
Our nal lemma gives a lower bound on the capacity for the public version that is in
turn an upper bound on the capacity of the private version.
Lemma 5.4.
C
VGWM
pub
(
1
;
2
;)
 max
A
max
D
1
2D
m
(
1
)\D(A;)
max
0
~
D
2
A
min
D
2
2D
m
(
2
)
~r(A;D
1
;
~
D
2
;D
2
;) (5.16)
 C
VGWM
priv
(
1
;
2
;): (5.17)
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We prove (5.16) in Section 5.5 and (5.17) in Section 5.6.2. We now briey discuss the
proof of the two inequalities. To prove the rst inequality, an encoder/decoder pair is de-
signed using any feasible D
1
, A and
~
D
2
so that the message can be reliably recovered
regardless of the attacker strategy (which can be described by some feasible D
2
) for any
rate less that min
D
2
2D
m
(
2
)
~r(A;D
1
;
~
D
2
;D
2
;). As in the proof of Lemma 5.1, we essen-
tially use a parallel concatenation of encoder/decoder pairs from the SGWM game. The
encoder for each component is designed using an estimate of the attacker's distortion in
that component. The vector
~
D
2
contains these estimates for all of the components. This
estimate is necessary because although the encoder knows the total distortion allowed to
the attacker, the encoder does not know how the attacker will distribute that distortion to
the components. In order to prove the second inequality (5.17), we choose
~
D
2
depending
on A, D
1
and  to be the minimizing D
2
on the RHS of (5.14). The resulting minimizing
D
2
in (5.17) is equal to our
~
D
2
, and we can use (5.12) to prove the desired inequality.
Since the capacity of the public version cannot exceed the capacity of the private version,
this lemma implies that the capacities of the two versions are equal, and, combined with
the earlier lemmas, completes the proof of Theorem 2.4.
5.4 Achievability for the Private Version
In this section, we will prove Lemma 5.1. That is, we will show that any rate less the RHS
of (5.14) is achievable in the private version of the vector Gaussian watermarking game.
Codebook generation: The encoder and decoder rst choose a vector of stegotext powers
A. Second, they choose a distortion distribution vector D
1
that is in the interior
1
of
D
m
(
1
) \ D(A;) so that
P
m
j=1
D
1j
< 
1
. They then choose a rate R and a positive
constant . They next use their shared secret key 
1
to generate an IID sequence of
codewords (S(1); : : : ;S(2
nR
)), where for each w, S(w) is a n  m random matrix with
independent elements so that S
ij
(w) is a zero-mean variance-b
2j
Gaussian random variable,
where b
2j
= b
2
(A
j
;D
1j
; 
2
j
) as dened in (A.3).
1
The interior of a set S is the union of all open sets contained in S and will be denoted by Int(S).
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Encoding: Given the covertext u, the message w, and the codebook, the encoder creates
the stegotext x as
x
j
(w) = b
1j
u
j
+ s
j
(w); (5.18)
for all 1  j  m, where b
1j
= b
1
(A
j
;D
1j
; 
2
j
) as dened in (A.2). This is essentially
a parallel concatenation of the encoders for the scalar Gaussian watermarking game. We
show below that this encoder yields a small probability of error. Furthermore, the expected
distortion induced by this encoding rule is given by
P
m
j=1
D
1j
, and we have chosen D
1
so that this quantity is strictly less than 
1
. Thus, by choosing the blocklength n large
enough, we can make the probability of excess distortion as small as desired. Thus, since
we will show below that this encoder yields a small probability of error, we can create a
modied encoder that both meets the almost sure distortion constraint (2.1) and ensures
reliable decoding of the message.
Decoding: The decoder uses the scoring function
(u;x;y;D
2
) = r(A;D
1
;D
2
;) +
1
n
n
X
i=1
X
j:A
j
>D
2j

(y
ij
  c
j
b
1j
u
ij
)
2
2c
j
(c
j
b
2j
+D
2j
)
 
(y
ij
  c
j
x
ij
)
2
2c
j
D
2j

;
(5.19)
where c
j
= c(A
j
;D
2j
) as dened in (A.4), and only considers attacker distortion vectors
D
2
in the set
D
(n)
m
(
2
) =
8
<
:
D
2
2 R
m
:D
2
> 0;
m
X
j=1
D
2j
< 
2

1 +
m
n

;
nD
2

2
2 Z
m
9
=
;
: (5.20)
Note that the cardinality of D
(n)
m
(
2
) is at most (n + m)
m
. Given the covertext u, the
forgery y, and the codebook, the decoder declares message w was sent if
(u;x(w);y;D
2
) > r(A;D
1
;D
2
;)  ; for some D
2
2 D
(n)
m
(
2
): (5.21)
If no w or more than one w satises (5.21), then an error is declared.
Probability of error: Let E
1
be the event that some incorrect w
0
satises (5.21), and
let E
2
be the event where the correct w does not satisfy (5.21). An error occurs if and
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only if E
1
[ E
2
occurs, and thus the overall probability of error is at most the sum of the
probabilities of the events E
1
and E
2
. We analyze these probabilities using the following
series of lemmas.
In the following lemma, we establish an upper bound on the rate R such that Pr(E
1
)
can be made as small as desired with a proper choice of  and the blocklength n.
Lemma 5.5. For any n  m matrices u and y and length-m vector D
2
> 0, if X
j
=
b
1j
u
j
+ S
j
(w), for all j and any w, then Pr ((u;X ;y;D
2
) > )  2
 n
.
Proof. The proof follows as in [HN88]. For simplicity, we assume that all logarithms and
exponentials are with respect to e. Let 
ij
= y
ij
  c
j
b
1j
u
ij
. We shall need the following
expectation,
E

exp

 
(S
ij
  
ij
=c
j
)
2
2D
2j
=c
j

=
1
p
1 + b
2j
c
j
=D
2j
exp

 (c
j
=2D
j
)(
ij
=c
j
)
2
1 + b
2j
c
j
=D
2j

=
1
q
1 + s(A
j
;D
1j
;D
2j
; 
2
j
)
exp
 
 
2
ij
2c
j
(c
j
b
2j
+D
2j
)
!
;
which follows since if Z is a Gaussian with mean  and variance 
2
, then
E[exp(Z
2
)] =
exp
 

2
=(1  2
2
)

p
1  2
2
; (5.22)
for  < (2
2
)
 1
. Thus,
Pr
 
(u;X;y;D
2
) > 

 E [exp (n((u;X ;y;D
2
)  ))]
= e
(n(r(A;D
1
;D
2
;) ))
n
Y
i=1
Y
j:A
j
>D
2j
E
"
exp
 

2
ij
2c
j
(c
j
b
2j
+D
2j
)
 
(S
ij
  
ij
=c
j
)
2
2D
2j
=c
j
!#
= e
(n(r(A;D
1
;D
2
;) ))
n
Y
i=1
Y
j:A
j
>D
2j
1
q
1 + s(A
j
;D
1j
;D
2j
; 
2
j
)
= e
 n
;
where the inequality follows since the exponential is at least one when the condition is true
and at least zero when the condition is false. The equalities follow by the above computation
and by the denition of r(A;D
1
;D
2
;); see (5.6).
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We can now upper bound the probability of the rst error event. To do so, let B
1
be a
mm diagonal matrix with jth diagonal element equal to b
1j
. Then,
Pr(E
1
) 
X
w
0
6=W
X
D
2
2D
(n)
m
(
2
)
Pr


 
U ;UB
1
+ S(w
0
);Y ;D
2

> r(A;D
1
;D
2
;)  
	
 (n+m)
m
exp
 
n
 
R  min
D
2
2D
(n)
m
(
2
)
r(A;D
1
;D
2
;)  
!!
:
Here, the rst inequality follows by the denition of the decoder and by the union of events
bound. The second inequality follows by Lemma 5.5 since for any incorrect message w
0
,
the codeword S(w
0
) is independent of the covertext U and the forgery Y . Also, recall that
D
(n)
m
(
2
) has at most (n+m)
m
elements and that there are 2
nR
total messages. Since  can
be chosen arbitrarily by the encoder, the probability the some incorrect w
0
satises (5.21)
can be made to tend to zero as long as
R < lim sup
n!1
min
D
2
2D
(n)
m
(
2
)
r(A;D
1
;D
2
;) (5.23)
= min
D
2
2D
m
(
2
)
r(A;D
1
;D
2
;): (5.24)
To prove the equality, let the right-hand side (RHS) of (5.24) be denoted by r(
2
), which
is continuous in 
2
. First, the RHS of (5.23) is at most lim sup
n!1
r(
2
(n+m)=n), which
equals r(
2
) by the continuity of r. Second, let D

2
2 D
m
(
2
) denote the minimizing
vector in (5.24), i.e. r(A;D
1
;D

2
;) = r(
2
). There exists a sequence of vectors D
2;1
; : : :
such that D
2;n
2 D
(n)
m
(
2
) and D
2;n
! D

2
pointwise. The RHS of (5.23) is at least
lim sup
n!1
r(A;D
1
;D
2;n
;), which also equals r(
2
) by the continuity of r in D
2
.
We now show that the probability of the second error event, Pr(E
2
), tends to zero as the
blocklength n tends to innity regardless of the choice of  and R. To do so, we establish
conditions under which the scoring function is high (Lemma 5.6) and then show that these
conditions are met with high probability (Lemmas 5.7 and 5.8). Lemmas 5.6 is proved in
Appendix B.12, while we give a short proofs of Lemmas 5.7 and 5.8 below.
Lemma 5.6. There exists a positive function f(A;D
1
; 
2
) such that if the n-vectors u, x,
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and y, and the scalars D
2
and Æ satisfy


n
 1
kuk
2
  
2


< Æ; (5.25)


n
 1
hu;x  b
1
ui


< Æ; (5.26)


n
 1
kx  b
1
uk
2
  b
2


< Æ (5.27)


n
 1
hu;y   yj
x
i


< Æ; (5.28)
n
 1
ky   xk
2
 D
2
< A; (5.29)
Æ <
A
2(1 + b
1
)
2
; (5.30)
then
n
 1
ky   cb
1
uk
2
2c(cb
2
+D
2
)
 
n
 1
ky   cxk
2
2cD
2
>  Æf(A;D
1
; 
2
); (5.31)
where b
1
= b
1
(A;D
1
; 
2
), b
2
= b
2
(A;D
1
; 
2
) and c = c(A;D
2
).
Lemma 5.7. The random variables n
 1
hU
j
;Y
j
  Y
j
j
X
j
i converge to zero in probability
as n tends to innity, for all 1  j  m.
Proof. The jth component of the covertext U
j
is an IID sequence of mean-zero variance-
2
j
Gaussian random variables. The jth component of the stegotext is generated from the
covertext as
X
j
= b
1j
U
j
+ S
j
;
where S
j
is an IID sequence of mean-zero variance-b
2j
Gaussian random variables that is
further independent of U
j
. Since X
j
and U
j
are jointly Gaussian random vectors, we can
also write their relationship as
U
j
=
b
1j

2
j
A
j
X
j
+ T
j
;
where T
j
is an IID sequence of mean-zero variance-b
2j

2
j
=A
j
Gaussian random variables
that is further independent of X
j
. The random vector T
j
is also independent of Y
j
since
U  Æ X  Æ Y . For every realization of x
j
and y
j
, the vectors y
j
  y
j
j
x
j
and x
j
are
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perpendicular. Thus, in distribution,
n
 1
hU
j
;Y
j
  Y
j
j
X
j
i = n
 1
hT
j
;Y
j
  Y
j
j
X
j
i:
The proof is completed by recalling that T
j
is independent of X
j
and Y
j
and from the fact
that Y
j
  Y
j
j
X
j
has bounded norm.
Lemma 5.8. If nm matrices x and y satisfy
m
X
j=1
1
n
ky
j
  x
j
k
2
 
2
;
then there exists a D
0
2
2 D
(n)
m
(
2
) such that for all 1  j  m,
1
n
ky
j
  x
j
k
2
 D
0
2j
: (5.32)
Proof. For every j, let D
0
2j
be the smallest positive integer multiple of 
2
=n that is at least
n
 1
ky
j
 x
j
k
2
. ThisD
0
2
satises (5.32), and thus we only have to show thatD
0
2
2 D
(n)
m
(
2
),
which is dened in (5.20). Our choice of D
0
2
is positive and satises nD
0
2
=
2
2 Z
m
.
Furthermore, it satises D
0
2j
 
2
=n  n
 1
ky
j
  x
j
k
2
, and thus
m
X
j=1
D
0
2j

m
2
n
+
m
X
j=1
1
n
ky
j
  x
j
k
2
 
2

1 +
m
n

:
Thus, D
0
2
2 D
(n)
m
(
2
).
The above lemmas allow us to analyze Pr(E
2
). To do so, let
Æ
j
=

mf(A
j
;D
1j
; 
2
j
)
; (5.33)
where f(; ; ) is the function dened in Lemma 5.6. Given the covertext U = u and the
forgery Y = y, the correct message w will be selected by the decoder if (but not only if) there
exists a D
0
2
2 D
(n)
m
(
2
) such that u
j
, x
j
(w) and y
j
satisfy the requirements of Lemma 5.6
with D
2
= D
0
2j
and Æ = Æ
j
(along with A = A
j
, D
1
= D
1j
and 
2
= 
2
j
) for every j such
that D
0
2j
< A
j
. This follows since in this case, (u;x(w);y;D
0
2
) > r(A;D
1
;D
0
2
;)   ;
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compare (5.19), (5.31) and (5.33).
We now show that the above claim holds with probability tending to one as the block-
length n tends to innity. We rst note that by the denition of the encoder, all of
(5.25), (5.26) and (5.27) will be satised with high probability for each component. Next,
Lemma 5.7 demonstrates that (5.28) is also satised with high probability for each com-
ponent. Finally, Lemma 5.8 shows that if the attacker satises the distortion constraint
(2.3), which it is required to do with probability one, then there exists a D
0
2
2 D
(n)
m
(
2
)
that satises either (5.29) or D
0
2j
> A
j
for every component. Since the above condition
is suÆcient for reliable recovery of the message, we have shown that Pr(E
2
) can be made
arbitrarily small for any positive R and .
Combining the analysis of E
1
and E
2
, we see that the probability of error can be made
arbitrarily small as long as
R < max
A
sup
D
1
2Int(D
m
(
1
)\D(A;))
min
D
2
2D
m
(
2
)
r(A;D
1
;D
2
;): (5.34)
This follows from (5.24) since we can choose any A and any D
1
2 Int(D
m
(
1
) \D(A;))
to design the encoder and decoder. The proof of Lemma 5.1 is completed by noting that
the RHS of (5.24) is continuous in D
1
.
5.5 Achievability for the Public Version
In this section, we will prove the rst inequality (5.16) of Lemma 5.4. That is, we will show
that any rate less than the RHS of (5.16) is achievable in the public version of the vector
Gaussian watermarking game. This proof parallels the proof in Section 5.4 for the private
version. We denote with a tilde (~) many of the quantities used here that are dierent from
the private version but play an analogous role.
5.5.1 Codebook Generation
The encoder and decoder jointly choose the parameters they will use. Namely, they choose
a vector of stegotext powers A, a distortion distribution vector D
1
, an estimate of the
attacker's distortion distribution
~
D
2
, two rates R and R
0
, and two positive constants 
and 
0
. They next generate 2
n(R+R
0
)
independent random matrices as follows. For every
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message w 2 f1; : : : ; 2
nR
g and every index w
0
2 f1; : : : ; 2
nR
0
g, they generate a nm random
matrix S(w;w
0
) with independent elements such that S
ij
(w;w
0
) is a mean-zero variance-v
j
Gaussian random variable, where v
j
= v(A
j
; D
1j
;
~
D
2j
; 
2
j
); see (5.7). We can think of the
codebook of consisting of 2
nR
bins (indexed by w), where each bin contains 2
nR
0
codewords
(indexed by w
0
).
5.5.2 Encoding
Given the covertext u, the message w, and the codebook, the encoder searches for a code-
word in bin w that is \jointly typical" with u. That is, the encoder nds a w
0
such that


n
 1
ks
j
(w;w
0
)k
2
  v
j


< 
0
; (5.35)
and


n
 1
hs
j
(w;w
0
);u
j
i   (
j
  1 + b
1j
)
2
j


< 
0
; (5.36)
for all 1  j  m, where 
j
= (A
j
;D
1j
;
~
D
2j
; 
2
j
) and b
1j
= b
1
(A
j
;D
1j
; 
2
j
); see (A.6) and
(A.3). If no such w
0
is found, then an encoding failure is declared. If there was not an
encoding failure, then the encoder creates the stegotext as
x
j
= s
j
(w;w
0
) + (1  
j
)u
j
; (5.37)
for all 1  j  m. If there was an encoding failure, then the encoder simply sets the
stegotext equal to the covertext. Let us further require that


n
 1
ku
j
k
2
  
2
j


< 
0
; (5.38)
for all 1  j  m, which occurs with arbitrarily high probability for blocklength n large
enough. Then, all of


n
 1
kx
j
  u
j
k
2
 D
1j


< 
0
(1 + j
j
j)
2
; (5.39)


n
 1
kx
j
k
2
 A
j


< 
0
(2  
j
)
2
; (5.40)
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and


n
 1
hs
j
(w;w
0
);xi   (
j
  1)b
1j

2
j
 A
j


< 
0
(2  
j
) (5.41)
are true for all 1  j  m. Thus, from (5.39), we see that for any D
1
that lies in the
interior of D
m
(
1
), there exists an 
0
> 0 such that encoding success implies that the
distortion constraint (2.1) is met. Also, (5.40) demonstrates that A describes the power of
the covertext components.
5.5.3 Decoding
In order to describe the decoding procedure, we rst dene

1
(A;D
1
;
~
D
2
; D
2
; 
2
) =
A D
2
q
v(A;D
1
;
~
D
2
; 
2
)
 
A+
~
D
2
2
G(A;D
1
; 
2
)

; (5.42)
and

2
(A;D
1
;
~
D
2
;D
2
; 
2
) = (A D
2
)
D
2
+
~
D
2
2
G(A;D
1
; 
2
)
A+
~
D
2
2
G(A;D
1
; 
2
)
; (5.43)
where v and G are dened in (5.7) and (5.10), respectively.
Given the forgery y, the decoder evaluates a codeword matrix s and an attacker distor-
tion distribution D
2
using the scoring function
~(s;y;D
2
) = r
1
(A;D
1
;
~
D
2
;D
2
;) +
1
n
n
X
i=1
X
j:A
j
>D
2j
 
y
2
ij
2(A
j
 D
2j
)
 
(y
ij
  
1j
s
ij
)
2
2
2j
!
;
(5.44)
where 
1j
= 
1
(A
j
;D
1j
;
~
D
2j
;D
2j
; 
2
j
), 
2j
= 
2
(A
j
; D
1j
;
~
D
2j
; D
2j
; 
2
j
), and r
1
is dened in
(5.9). Given the forgery y and the codebook, the decoder declares message w was sent if
~
 
s(w;w
0
);y;D
2

> r
1
(A;D
1
;
~
D
2
;D
2
;)  ;
for some D
2
2 D
(n)
m
(
2
) and w
0
2 f1; : : : ; 2
nR
0
g; (5.45)
where D
(n)
m
(
2
) is dened in (5.20). If no w or more than one w satises (5.45), then a
decoding failure is declared.
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5.5.4 Probability of Error
Let E
e
be the event that an encoding failure occurs. Let E
d0
be the event that a decoding
failure occurs because no w satises (5.45). Let E
d2
be the event that a decoding failure
occurs because two or more w satisfy (5.45). The overall probability of error is at most the
sum of the probabilities of these three events. We show below that the probability of each
of these error events can be made to vanish as long as the rate R does not exceed the RHS
of (5.16).
Error E
e
: Encoding Failure
We now establish a lower bound on R
0
such that a proper choice of 
0
ensures that Pr(E
e
)
tends to zero as the blocklength n tends to innity.
Let A
(n)

0
be the set of all (s;u) pairs of nm matrices that satisfy (5.35), (5.36) and
(5.38) for all j, i.e., A
(n)

0
are the jointly typical pairs. Using the continuous joint AEP (see
e.g. [CT91, Thms 8.6.1 & 9.2.2]), we can upper bound (for any w and w
0
)
Pr
n
 
S(w;w
0
);U

2 A
(n)

0
o
 (1  
0
) exp

 n
 
r
0
(A;D
1
;
~
D
2
;)  3
0


; (5.46)
where r
0
is dened in (5.8). This follows since if S
ij
and U
ij
are zero-mean Gaussian random
variables with variances v
j
and 
2
j
, respectively, and with covariance (
j
  1 + b
1j
)
2
j
, then
I(S
i1
; : : : ; S
im
;U
i1
; : : : ; U
im
) = r
0
(A;D
1
;
~
D
2
;)
for all i. For any message w, the probability of an encoding failure can now be bounded as
Pr(E
e
) = Pr

 
S(w;w
0
);U

=2 A
(n)

0
; for all w
0
2 f1; : : : ; exp(nR
0
)g



1  (1  
0
) exp

 n
 
r
0
(A;D
1
;
~
D
2
;)  3
0



exp(nR
0
)
;
where the inequality follows by (5.46). By choosing 
0
small enough, the encoder can make
the probability of an encoding failure as small as desired as long as
R
0
> r
0
(A;D
1
;
~
D
2
;): (5.47)
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Error E
d2
: Incorrect Message Satisfying (5.45)
Using a similar argument to Lemma 5.5, we establish an upper bound on R+R
0
such that
a proper choice of  ensures that Pr(E
d2
) tends to zero as the blocklength n tends to innity.
Lemma 5.9. For any n m matrix y, any m-vector D
2
> 0, any message w, and any
index w
0
,
Pr

~
 
S(w;w
0
);y;D
2

> 
	
 2
 n
: (5.48)
Proof. The proof follows as in Lemma 5.5, and is thus omitted.
We can now upper bound the probability of E
d2
.
Pr(E
d2
) 
X
w
0
6=W
X
w
0
X
D
2
2D
(n)
m
(
2
)
Pr
n
~
 
S(w
0
; w
0
);Y ;D
2

> r
1
(A;D
1
;
~
D
2
;D
2
;)  
o
 (n+m)
m
exp
 
n
 
R+R
0
  min
D
2
2D
(n)
m
(
2
)
r
1
(A;D
1
;
~
D
2
;D
2
;)  
!!
;
where the two inequalities follow by a similar argument to the one following the inequalities
after Lemma 5.5. Since  can be chosen arbitrarily by the encoder, the probability of the
error event E
d2
can be made to tend to zero as long as
R+R
0
< lim sup
n!1
min
D
2
2D
(n)
m
(
2
)
r
1
(A;D
1
;
~
D
2
;D
2
;)
= min
D
2
2D
m
(
2
)
r
1
(A;D
1
;
~
D
2
;D
2
;); (5.49)
where the equality follows by a similar argument to the one following (5.24).
Error E
d0
: Correct Message not Satisfying (5.45)
Using similar arguments to Lemmas 5.6 and 5.7, we show that the correct message will
satisfy (5.45) with arbitrarily high probability as the blocklength tends to innity. The
following lemma is proved in Appendix B.13.
Lemma 5.10. There exists a positive function
~
f(A;D
1
;
~
D
2
; 
2
) such that if the n-vectors
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s, x, and y, and the scalars D
2
and Æ satisfy


n
 1
ksk
2
  v


< Æ; (5.50)


n
 1
kxk
2
 A


< Æ; (5.51)


n
 1
hs;xi   (  1)b
1

2
 A


< Æ; (5.52)


n
 1
hs;y   yj
x
i


< Æ; (5.53)
n
 1
ky   xk
2
 D
2
< A; (5.54)
Æ <
A
2
; (5.55)
then
n
 1
kyk
2
2(A D
2
)
 
n
 1
ky   
1
sk
2
2
2
>  Æ
~
f(A;D
1
;
~
D
2
; 
2
); (5.56)
where all of the parameters are computed with respect to A, D
1
,
~
D
2
, D
2
and 
2
, i.e.,
 = (A;D
1
;
~
D
2
; 
2
), b
1
= b
1
(A;D
1
; 
2
), v = v(A;D
1
;
~
D
2
; 
2
), 
1
= 
1
(A;D
1
;
~
D
2
;D
2
; 
2
),
and 
2
= 
2
(A;D
1
;
~
D
2
;D
2
; 
2
).
The above lemma allows us to analyze Pr(E
d0
). To do so, let
~
Æ
j
=

m
~
f(A
j
;D
1j
;
~
D
2j
; 
2
j
)
; (5.57)
where
~
f(; ; ; ) is the function dened in Lemma 5.10.
Given the forgery Y = y, the correct message w will be selected by the decoder if there
exists a D
0
2
2 D
(n)
m
(
2
), an index w
0
, and a n m matrix x such that s
j
(w;w
0
), x
j
, and
y
j
satisfy the requirements of Lemma 5.10 for all j (such that A
j
> D
2j
) with D
2
= D
0
2j
and Æ =
~
Æ
j
(along with A = A
j
, D
1
= D
1j
,
~
D
2
=
~
D
2j
and 
2
= 
2
j
). This follows since in
this case ~(s(w;w
0
);y;D
0
2
) > r
1
(A;D
1
;
~
D
2
;D
0
2
;)  ; compare (5.44), (5.56) and (5.57).
We now show that the above claim (with the actual stegotext x and the actual index
w
0
) holds with probability tending to one as the blocklength n tends to innity. We rst
note that if there was not an encoding failure, then all of (5.50), (5.51) and (5.52) will be
satised for all j for small enough 
0
; see (5.35), (5.39) and (5.41). Next, an analogous result
to Lemma 5.7 (which we do not prove here) demonstrates that (5.53) is satised with high
probability. Finally, Lemma 5.8 shows that if the attacker satises the distortion constraint
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(2.3), which it is required to do with probability one, then there exists a D
0
2
2 D
(n)
m
(
2
)
that satises either (5.54) or D
0
2j
> A
j
for every component. Since the above condition
is suÆcient for reliable recovery of the message, we have shown that Pr(E
2
) can be made
arbitrarily small for any positive R, R
0
and  and small enough 
0
.
Overall Rate Restriction
We thus nd that a rate is achievable if
R < min
0D
2
A : e
t
D
2
D
2
r
1
(A;D
1
;
~
D
2
;D
2
;)  r
0
(A;D
1
;
~
D
2
;) (5.58)
= min
0D
2
A : e
t
D
2
D
2
~r(A;D
1
;
~
D
2
;D
2
;); (5.59)
where the inequality follows by (5.47) and (5.49) and the equality follows by the denition
of ~r (5.11). Thus, the following rates are achievable,
R < max
A
sup
D
1
2Int(D
m
(
1
)\D(A;))
max
0
~
D
2
A
min
D
2
2D
m
(
2
)
~r(A;D
1
;
~
D
2
;D
2
;); (5.60)
since the encoder is free to choose any feasible A, D
1
and
~
D
2
. The proof of (5.16) is
completed by noting that the RHS of (5.60) after the supremum is continuous in D
1
.
5.6 Optimization Results
In this section, we will prove Lemma 5.3 and the second inequality (5.17) of Lemma 5.4.
5.6.1 Proof of Lemma 5.3
In this section, we will use the Sion-Kakutani Minimax Theorem (see e.g. [SW70, Theorem
6.3.7]) to show the equivalence of (5.13) and the RHSs of (5.14) and (5.15). Recall that the
Minimax Theorem states that if S
1
and S
2
are compact convex sets and  : S
1
S
2
7! R is
a continuous function such that (x
1
; x
2
) is concave in x
1
(for x
2
xed) and convex in x
2
(for x
1
xed), then
max
x
1
2S
1
min
x
2
2S
2
(x
1
; x
2
) = min
x
2
2S
2
max
x
1
2S
1
(x
1
; x
2
)
The equivalence of the RHSs of (5.14) and (5.15) follows directly from the Minimax
123
Theorem sinceD
m
(
1
)\D(A;) and D
m
(
2
) are compact convex sets and r(A;D
1
;D
2
;)
is concave in D
1
and convex in D
2
. The fact that r(A;D
1
;D
2
;) is concave in D
1
relies
critically on the fact that D
1
2 D(A;) since in this set
1
2
log(1 + s(A
j
;D
1j
;D
2j
; 
2
j
)) is
concave for every j.
We now show the equality of (5.13) and the RHS of (5.14). By the denitions of C

(A.8) and r (5.6), we can rewrite (5.13) as
max
D
1
2D
m
(
1
)
min
D
2
2D
m
(
2
)
max
A2A(D
1
;)
r(A;D
1
;D
2
;): (5.61)
We can also trivially rewrite the RHS of (5.14) as
max
D
1
2D
m
(
1
)
max
A2A(D
1
;)
min
D
2
2D
m
(
2
)
r(A;D
1
;D
2
;): (5.62)
Note that we cannot directly apply the Minimax Theorem to show the equivalence of (5.61)
and (5.62) since r(A;D
1
;D
2
;) is not concave in A. (It is not even quasi-concave in A
despite being quasi-concave in each A
j
.) We require some manipulations before we can
apply the Minimax Theorem. We can replace A(D
1
;) in both (5.61) and (5.62) with
A
0
(D
1
;), where
A
0
(D
1
;) =
n
A : 
2
j
+D
1j
 A
j
 (
j
+
p
D
1j
)
2
; 1  j  m
o
;
compare with (5.4). See the proof of Lemma A.1 for why this is true. Thus, the following
lemma demonstrates that (5.13) and the RHS of (5.14) are equal.
Lemma 5.11.
min
D
2
2D
m
(
2
)
max
A2A
0
(D
1
;)
r(A;D
1
;D
2
;) = max
A2A
0
(D
1
;)
min
D
2
2D
m
(
2
)
r(A;D
1
;D
2
;): (5.63)
Proof. Clearly, the left hand side (LHS) of (5.63) is at least as large as the RHS of (5.63).
Thus, we only need to show the opposite inequality. To do so, let us dene
r
0
(A;D
1
;D
2
;) =
m
X
j=1
1
2
log
 
1 + s(A
j
;D
1j
; D
2j
; 
2
j
)

; (5.64)
which diers from the denition of r(A;D
1
;D
2
;) (see (5.6)) only in that the positive part
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of s is not taken here. Note that r
0
(A;D
1
;D
2
;) is well-dened since s(A;D
1
;D
2
; 
2
) >  1
for 
2
+ D
1
 A  ( +
p
D
1
)
2
. Also note that, unlike r(A;D
1
;D
2
;), the function
r
0
(A;D
1
;D
2
;) is concave in A. We can thus compute that
min
D
2
2D
m
(
2
)
max
A2A
0
(D
1
;)
r(A;D
1
;D
2
;)
= min
D
2
2D
m
(
2
)
max
A2A
0
(D
1
;)
r
0
(A;D
1
;D
2
;) (5.65)
= max
A2A
0
(D
1
;)
min
D
2
2D
m
(
2
)
r
0
(A;D
1
;D
2
;) (5.66)
 max
A2A
0
(D
1
;)
min
D
2
2D
m
(
2
)
r(A;D
1
;D
2
;): (5.67)
Here, (5.65) follows since each A
j
is maximized separately and the contribution from com-
ponent j to r is at least as great as the contribution to r
0
with equality if the contributions
are positive; (5.66) follows from the Minimax Theorem since A
0
(D
1
;) and D
m
(
2
) are
compact convex sets and r
0
(A;D
1
;D
2
;) is a continuous function that is concave in A and
convex inD
1
; and (5.67) follows since r
0
 r, compare (5.6) and (5.64). This completes the
proof of the Lemma.
5.6.2 Proof of (5.17)
In this section, we prove the second inequality (5.17) of Lemma 5.4. To do so, we specify a
~
D
2
so that, with this choice of
~
D
2
, the RHS of (5.16) equals the RHS of (5.14), which by
Lemma 5.3 is the capacity of the private version. Since we are maximizing over
~
D
2
on the
RHS of (5.16), this demonstrates the desired inequality.
The following lemma, describes the vector D
2
that achieves the minimum on the RHS
of (5.14).
Lemma 5.12. For xed , A > 0 and D
1
2 D(A;),
min
D
2
2D
m
(
2
)
r(A;D
1
;D
2
;) = r(A;D
1
;D

2
;); (5.68)
where if 
2
<
P
j
A
j
, then
D

2j
=
8
>
<
>
:
 (G
j
; ) if  (G
j
; ) < A
j
A
j
otherwise
; (5.69)
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where
 (G;) =
 1 +
q
1 +
4G

2G
; (5.70)
and G
j
= G(A
j
;D
1j
; 
2
j
); see (5.10). Furthermore,  > 0 is chosen such that
P
j
D

2j
= 
2
.
If 
2

P
j
A
j
, then D

2
= A and the minimum in (5.68) is zero.
Proof. The case where 
2

P
j
A
j
is straightforward and thus we assume that 
2
<
P
j
A
j
. We can further restrict D
2
 A (pointwise) since the contribution to r from
component j is zero if D
2j
 A
j
. With this further restriction, the LHS of (5.68) is a
convex program with dierentiable objective function and constraints. Furthermore, the
Slater constraint qualication is met, i.e., there exists a D
2
such that 0 < D
2
< A and
P
m
j=1
D
2j
< 
2
. Thus, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are both necessary and suÆcient for a
vector to achieve the minimum (see e.g. [SW70, Theorem 6.6.5]). To that end, let
L(D
2
; 
0
;
1
;
2
) =
2r(A;D
1
;D
2
;)
log e
+ 
0
(e
t
D
2
 
2
) + 
t
1
(D
2
 A)  
t
2
D
2
; (5.71)
where e = (1; : : : ; 1). We will show that there exists a 

1
 0 with 

1j
> 0 only if D

2j
= A
j
such that
@
@D
2j
L(D

2
; ;

1
; 0) = 0; (5.72)
for 1  j  m. Since the Lagrange multipliers are positive only for the tight constraints, the
Kuhn-Tucker conditions are satised andD

2
is the unique minimum. Indeed, for D
2j
 A
j
,
@
@D
2j
L(D
2
; 
0
;
1
;
2
) =
@
@D
2j
s(A
j
;D
1j
; D
2j
; 
2
j
)
1 + s(A
j
;D
1j
; D
2j
; 
2
j
)
+ 
0
+ 
1j
  
2j
=
 
b
2j
D
2
2j
1 +
c
j
b
2j
D
2j
+ 
0
+ 
1j
  
2j
=
 1
D
2
2j
G
j
+D
2j
+ 
0
+ 
1j
  
2j
: (5.73)
Observe that ( (G
j
; ))
2
G
j
+  (G
j
; ) = 1=. Thus, when  (G
j
; ) < A
j
, setting 

1j
= 0
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satises (5.72). Further, if  (G
j
; ) > A
j
, set


1j
=
1
A
2
j
G
j
+A
j
   > 0; (5.74)
which satises (5.72) (the inequality follows since the rst term in (5.73) is decreasing in
D
2j
). We have thus veried (5.72), which completes the proof of the lemma.
Our next lemma, shows that if
~
D
2
is chosen to be D

2
of the previous lemma, then the
minimizing D
2
on the RHS of (5.17) is also D

2
.
Lemma 5.13. For xed , A > 0 and D
1
2 D(A;), let the vector D

2
be as described in
Lemma 5.12. Then,
min
D
2
2D
m
(
2
)
~r(A;D
1
;D

2
;D
2
;) = ~r(A;D
1
;D

2
;D

2
;): (5.75)
Proof. The case where 
2

P
j
A
j
is straightforward and thus we assume that 
2
<
P
j
A
j
. As in Lemma 5.12, this is a convex program where the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are
both necessary and suÆcient. Thus, let
~
L(D
2
; 
0
;
1
;
2
;
~
D
2
) =
2~r(A;D
1
;
~
D
2
;D
2
;)
log e
+ 
0
(e
t
D
2
 
2
) + 
t
1
(D
2
 A)  
t
2
D
2
:
(5.76)
We will show that for the  > 0 and 

1
 0 specied in Lemma 5.12,
@
@D
2j
~
L(D

2
; ;

1
; 0;D

2
) = 0; (5.77)
for all 1  j  m. This will complete the proof of the current lemma. Indeed, if D
2j
 A
j
,
then
@
@D
2j
~
L(D
2
; 
0
;
1
;
2
;
~
D
2
) =
 1
~
D
2
2j
G
j
+D
2j
+ 
0
+ 
1j
  
2j
; (5.78)
where G
j
= G(A
j
;D
1j
; 
2
j
) dened in (5.10). Compare (5.78) with (5.73). By substituting
D
2
=
~
D
2
=D

2
, 
0
= , 
1
= 

1
, and 
2
= 0 into (5.78) we verify that (5.77) is true.
127
The combination of these lemmas completes the proof of (5.17) as follows,
max
A
max
D
1
2D
m
(
1
)\D(A;)
max
0
~
D
2
A
min
D
2
2D
m
(
2
)
~r(A;D
1
;
~
D
2
;D
2
;)
 max
A
max
D
1
2D
m
(
1
)\D(A;)
min
D
2
2D
m
(
2
)
~r(A;D
1
;D

2
;D
2
;) (5.79)
= max
A
max
D
1
2D
m
(
1
)\D(A;)
~r(A;D
1
;D

2
;D

2
;) (5.80)
= max
A
max
D
1
2D
m
(
1
)\D(A;)
r(A;D
1
;D

2
;) (5.81)
= C
VGWM
priv
(
1
;
2
;): (5.82)
Here, (5.79) follows since we are using a particular choice of
~
D
2
(namely,D

2
), (5.80) follows
by Lemma 5.13, (5.81) follows by (5.12), and (5.82) follows by Lemmas 5.12 and 5.3.
5.7 The Optimal Attack and Lossy Compression
In this section, we compare the optimal attacker for the VGWM game to an attacker who
implements optimal lossy compression based only on the statistics of the stegotext
2
. This
comparison is of interest for two reasons. First, in the SGWM game (see Chapter 4.5), we
found the two attackers to be essentially the same. Second, many watermarking systems
are designed to be robust against compression attacks [FKK01]. Thus, we would like to see
if our intuition for the SGWM game carries over to the VGWM game and if watermarking
systems designed in the above manner are the best possible. We nd that the answer to
both of these questions is no.
5.7.1 Compression Attack
Optimal lossy compression with allowed distortion 
2
of a vector Gaussian stegotext with
component variances given by A can be described as follows (see also [CT91]). The distor-
tion is distributed to the components using the reverse waterlling vector D
wf
, where
D
wf
j
=
8
>
<
>
:

0
if 
0
< A
j
A
j
otherwise
; (5.83)
2
For the purposes of this discussion, we assume that the statistics of the stegotext are Gaussian, which
is approximately true for the optimal encoders described in Sections 5.5 and 5.4.
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and where 
0
is chosen such that
P
j
D
wf
j
= 
2
. Then, optimal lossy compression is
performed on each of the components using distortion D
wf
j
for component j. We will
optimal lossy compression of the stegotext the compression attack.
Similarly to the compression attack, the optimal attack in the VGWM game chooses a
distortion distribution vector D
2
and uses the optimal attack for the SGWM game on com-
ponent j with distortion D
2j
. Since the optimal attack for the SGWM game is essentially
optimal lossy compression, the dierence between the optimal attack and the compression
attack lies in their distribution of their allowable distortion, i.e., D

2
of (5.69) versus D
wf
of (5.83). We see that the vector are dierent for an arbitrary choice of A and D
1
by
the encoder. In fact, the following example will demonstrate that D

2
6= D
wf
even for the
optimal choice of A and D
1
.
We now consider an example where m = 5, 
2
= [10 8 6 4 2], 
1
= 5 and 
2
= 40.
For these parameters, the vectors for the optimal encoder and attack (i.e., the ones that
solve the RHS of (5.14)) are given by
D

1
 [1:50 1:38 1:03 0:70 0:39];
A

 [15:50 13:27 10:29 7:09 3:89];
D

2
 [11:44 10:36 8:48 6:11 3:61]:
For this example the capacity of the VGWM game, C
VGWM
(
1
;
2
;) = r(A

;D

1
;D

2
;),
is approximately 0:048 bits/vector. We see that
D
wf
(A

)  [9:673 9:673 9:673 7:09 3:89] 6=D

2
;
and indeed the compression attack is not the same as the optimal attack. The maximum
achievable rate for the encoder dened by D

1
and A

and the corresponding compression
attack dened by D
wf
is given by r(A

;D

1
;D
wf
;)  0:051 bits/vector. Given that the
encoder also has to be robust against a general attack, the eect of using the suboptimal
compression attack is signicant, but not very large. However, we will see in the next section
that if the watermarking system is designed for the compression attack, then the gain in
achievable rate is quite large.
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5.7.2 Designing for a Compression Attack
Since the compression attack is not optimal, the watermarking system can send more bits
if it knows it only has to protect against such an attack. In fact, when a system is only
required to be robust to compression, it can send many more bits using a qualitatively
dierent strategy. Before we return to the example of the previous section, note that all
rates less than
max
D
1
2D
m
(
1
)
max
A2A(D
1
;)
r(A;D
1
;D
wf
(A);) (5.84)
are achievable against a compression attack. This follows since such an attack uses distortion
D
wf
j
in component j and the encoder can thus reliably send at rates less than
1
2
log(1 +
s(A
j
;D
1j
;D
wf
j
; 
2
j
)) in component j alone. We denote the maximizing vectors in (5.84) by
D

1
and A

. For the example in the previous section
D

1
 [3:395 0:035 0:32 0:83 0:42];
A

 [17:28 9:09 9:09 8:47 4:25];
and the corresponding waterlling vector is given by
D
wf
 [9:10 9:09 9:09 8:47 4:25]:
The maximum achievable rate in this scenario, (5.84), is approximately 0:105 bits/vector,
which is more than double the capacity of the VGWM game. In Figure 5-1, we compare
the parameters for the optimal attack and for the compression attack.
We now consider some of the qualitative dierences between the two attacks. For the
optimal attack, the encoder uses all of the components to transmit information, although
the number of bits in a component is correlated with the variance of the components. The
encoder that is designed for the compression attack is very dierent. This encoder places
some distortion in components 2{5, but only to boost the variance of the stegotext and not
to send any information. The waterlling attacker is wasting distortion on these components
(in fact, almost 80%), and thus this attacker is far from optimal for this particular encoder.
Furthermore, the encoder designed for the compression attack only transmits information
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Figure 5-1: Comparison of watermarking system parameters for the optimal attack and the
compression attack.
in the component with the highest variance, but it is able to send at a relatively high rate in
this component since it devotes most of its power to this component and the attacker does
not have much distortion left for this component. A more clever attacker would put all of
its distortion into component 1, and no positive rates would be achievable. This example
is somewhat extreme in that the ratio of 
2
to 
1
is quite high. However, in almost
all regimes, the encoder designed for the compression attack will use some components as
decoys and the rest for actually transmitting information.
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Chapter 6
Watermarking with Discrete
Alphabets
In this chapter, we consider two examples of the watermarking game when the alphabets
(i.e., the sets U , X and Y) are nite. This contrasts with most of the rest of the thesis,
where we have been assuming that all the alphabets are the real line. With nite alphabets,
we are able to use combinatorial techniques that are not applicable in our other scenarios.
In Section 6.1, we consider a general watermarking game with the major exception that
there is no covertext in which to hide the message. In Section 6.2, we assume that all of the
alphabets are binary and that the covertext is an IID sequence of Bernoulli(1=2) random
variables. These simple examples should provide some insight into how to approach a more
general watermarking model with discrete alphabets.
Note that Somekh-Baruch and Merhav [SBM01a] have recently described the capacity
of the private version of the watermarking game for nite alphabets and a general discrete
memoryless source, which is more general than our proof in Section 6.1 on watermarking
with no covertext. Also, Barron, Chen and Wornell [BCW00] have recently shown that
our proposed capacity expressions for the binary watermarking game are also the capacity
expressions for related xed attack binary watermarking problems, which we could use as
a converse in Section 6.2. Nevertheless, we are including the full proofs of our results due
to their simplicity and their illustrative nature.
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6.1 No Covertext
In this section, we give a proof of Theorem 2.5. Recall that this theorem states that the
capacity of the watermarking game when there is no covertext is given by C
NoCov
(D
1
;D
2
),
which is dened in (2.19) and recalled below in (6.1). Further, recall that since there is no
covertext, the distortion constraint on the encoder (2.1) is replaced by n
 1
P
n
i=1
d
1
(X
i
) 
D
1
a.s. for some function d
1
: X 7! R
+
. Other than this exception, the watermarking game
with no covertext is exactly as described in Section 2.1. The remainder of this section is
organized as follows. We rst provide some relevant denitions in Section 6.1.1. We then
show achievability in Section 6.1.2 and nally show a converse in Section 6.1.3.
6.1.1 Denitions
Let P(X ) andW(YjX ) denote the set of all distributions on X and the set of all conditional
distributions on Y given X . For particular P 2 P(X ) and W 2 W(YjX ), let PW 2 P(Y)
denote the resulting marginal distribution on Y and let P ÆW denote the joint distribution
1
.
We write I(P;W ) to denote the mutual information between random variables X and Y
when they have joint distribution P ÆW . Similarly, we write H(P ), H(PW ) and (W jP )
to denote the entropy of X, the entropy of Y , and the conditional entropy of Y given
X, respectively. Thus, we can simplify the mutual information as I(P;W ) = H(PW )  
H(W jP ).
Let P
n
(X )  P(X ) denote the set of all distributions on X such that nP (a) is an
integer for all P 2 P
n
(X ) and a 2 X . A distribution P 2 P
n
(X ) is also referred to as
a type of length n. For any x 2 X
n
, let P
x
2 P
n
(X ) denote the empirical distribution
of x, i.e., P
x
(a) = N(ajx) for all a 2 X . Similarly, for x 2 X
n
and y 2 Y
n
, let P
yjx
denote the empirical conditional distribution of y given x. For a distribution P 2 P
n
(X),
the set of sequences of type P is written T
P
= fx : P
x
= Pg. Similarly, for x 2 X
n
and
W 2 W(YjX ), the W -shell of x is written T
W
(x) = fy : P
yjx
=Wg. The empirical mutual
information between two sequences x 2 X
n
and y 2 Y
n
is the mutual information given by
their empirical distributions. That is, I(x ^ y) = I(P
x
; P
yjx
) = I(P
y
; P
xjy
).
1
In this section, we use W to denote a conditional distribution instead of the message, as we do in the
rest of the thesis. Furthermore, we use M to denote the watermark message.
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Finally, we slightly rewrite the denition (2.19) as
C
NoCov
(D
1
;D
2
) = max
P2P(X ):E
P
[d
1
(X)]D
1
min
W2W(YjX ):E
PÆW
[d
2
(X;Y )]D
2
I(P;W ): (6.1)
6.1.2 Achievability
We now show that all rates less than C
NoCov
(D
1
;D
2
) are achievable. To do so, we use
a codebook of IID vectors with each vector chosen uniformly over a type along with a
maximum mutual information (MMI) decoder to yield the desired result.
First, x n and choose a Q
n
2 P
n
(X ) and Æ > 0. Let
R = I
 
Q
n
;W

(Q
n
;D
2
)

  Æ; (6.2)
where
W

(P;D
2
) = argmin
W2W(YjX ):E
PÆW
[d
2
(X;Y )]D
2
I(P;W ): (6.3)
The codebook consists of 2
nR
length-n IID vectors fX
1
; : : : ;X
2
nR
g, where each X
j
is
uniformly distributed on T
Q
n
. Note that X
m
2 T
Q
n
and hence d
1
(X
m
) = E
Q
n
[d
1
(X)]
almost surely for all m.
Given the codebook and the forgery y, an estimate of the message is found using an
MMI decoder. That is,
m^ = argmax
1m
0
2
nR
I(x
m
0
^ y);
with ties decided arbitrarily. Without loss of generality, we assume that the correct message
M = 1. Thus, an error occurs only if there exists a m 6= 1 such that I(x
m
^y)  I(x
1
^y).
Given the stegotext x
1
, the attacker can choose as a forgery any y such that d
2
(x
1
;y) 
D
2
. Note that I(x
1
^ y) = I(Q
n
; P
yjx
1
)  I(Q
n
;W

(Q
n
; D
2
)) since P
yjx
1
must satisfy the
condition in (6.3). Further note that it is suÆcient to choose a deterministic attacker to
prove the achievability of the proposed rate; see Section 2.4.3.
Given the stegotext x
1
and the forgery y, let E(x
1
;y) be the set of all x 2 T
Q
n
that
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could cause an error. That is,
E(x
1
;y) = fx 2 T
Q
n
: I(x ^ y)  I(x
1
^ y)g
=
[
V 2W(XjY):
T
Q
n
\T
V
(y)6=;;H(V jP
y
)H(P
x
1
jy
jP
y
)
T
V
(y); (6.4)
where the inequality in the union follows since if T
Q
n
\ T
V
(y) 6= ; implies that P
y
V = Q
n
and I(x^y) = H(P
y
V ) H(V jP
y
) for x 2 T
V
(y). There are at most (n+1)
jX jjYj
elements
in the above union and jT
V
(y)j  2
nH(V jP
y
)
for every such V ; see e.g. [CK81]. Thus,
jE(x
1
;y)j  (n+ 1)
jX jjYj
2
nH(P
x
1
jy
jP
y
)
= (n+ 1)
jX jjYj
2
n
 
H(Q
n
) I(Q
n
;P
yjx
1
)

; (6.5)
where the inequality follows by the above reasoning and (6.4) and the equality follows by
the denition of mutual information since P
x
1
= Q
n
.
Since each X
m
for m 6= 1 is uniformly distributed on T
Q
n
(and independent of X
1
and
Y ), the probability of error can be upper bounded using the union bound as
Pr(errorjX
1
= x
1
;Y = y)
 2
nR
jE(x
1
;y)j
jT
Q
n
j
 2
nR
(n+ 1)
jX jjYj
2
n
 
H(Q
n
) I(Q
n
;P
yjx
1
)

(n+ 1)
 jX j
2
nH(Q
n
)
= (n+ 1)
jX j(jYj+1)
2
n
 
R I(Q
n
;P
yjx
1
)

 (n+ 1)
jX j(jYj+1)
2
 nÆ
; (6.6)
where the second inequality follows by (6.5) and since T
Q
is non-empty then jT
Q
j 
(n+ 1)
 1
2
nH(Q)
[CK81, Lemma 1.2.3], and the last inequality follows since I(Q
n
; P
yjx
1
) 
I(Q
n
;W

(Q
n
;D
2
)) and by (6.2). Note that this bound does not depend on x
1
or y, and
thus the overall probability of error can also be bounded by the right hand side (RHS) of
(6.6), which tends to zero.
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The above reasoning demonstrates that if
R < lim sup
n!1
max
Q
n
2P
n
(X ):E
Q
n
[d
1
(X)]D
1
min
W2W(YjX ):E
Q
n
ÆW
[d
2
(X;Y )]D
2
I(Q
n
;W ); (6.7)
then a sequence of allowable encoder/decoder pairs can be constructed such that the proba-
bility of error goes to zero for all sequences of allowable attackers. The proof of achievability
will be complete once we demonstrate that the RHS of (6.7) is at least C
NoCov
(D
1
;D
2
);
see (6.1). To see that this is true, note that any distribution P 2 P(X ) can be approached
uniformly by a sequence of types, fQ
n
2 P
n
(X )g.
6.1.3 Converse
We now show that no rates larger than C
NoCov
(D
1
; D
2
) are achievable for discrete alphabets
when there is no covertext. To do so, we describe an attacker that satises this requirement,
even if the encoder and decoder are designed with full knowledge of this attacker.
The attacker's basic strategy can be described as follows. He rst chooses a constant
~
D
2
< D
2
. Given the stegotext x, the attacker computes the best response W

(P
x
;
~
D
2
),
where W

is dened in (6.3).
The attacker then creates the forgery by using the stegotext as an input to a memoryless
channel with the conditional distribution W

(P
x
;
~
D
2
). If the attacker does not satisfy
the distortion constraint (i.e., n
 1
d
2
(x;y) > D
2
) after the application of this memoryless
channel, then the attacker arbitrarily changes some components of the forgery so that the
distortion constraint is satised.
We rst note that the probability that the attacker must change the forgery tends to
zero as the blocklength n tends to innity. This follows since given the stegotext x, the
expected normalized distortion between the stegotext and the covertext Y is at most
~
D
2
that is in turn smaller than D
2
. We will thus analyze the probability assuming that that
the attacker never needs to change the forgery.
We now show that for constant composition codebooks the probability of error cannot
tend to zero unless the rate R is at most C
NoCov
(D
1
;
~
D
2
), where a constant composition
codebook is one in which all of the codewords are of the same type. It is well known that
if there are 2
nR
codewords of type P and a memoryless channel W , then the probability
of error is bounded away from zero for R > I(P;W ). The type P of the codewords must
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satisfy E
P
[d
1
(X)]  D
1
, and thus
I
 
P;W

(P;
~
D
2
)

 C(D
1
;
~
D
2
);
compare (6.3) and (6.1). Combining these two facts yields the preliminary result.
We can extend the above result on constant composition codebooks to general code-
books. To do so, we break up the codebook of 2
nR
codewords into types that are repre-
sented by fewer than (n+ 1)
 2jX j
2
nR
codewords and types that are represented by at least
(n + 1)
 2jX j
2
nR
codewords. For codewords in the former category, we can trivially lower
bound the probability of error by zero. Since there are at most (n+1)
jX j
types of length n,
the fraction of codewords in this category is at most (n+ 1)
 jX j
, which tends to zero. For
codewords in the latter category we will use the result on constant composition codebooks
to analyze the probability of error. In each of the constant composition sub-codebooks
under consideration, the number of codewords is at least
(n+ 1)
 2jX j
2
nR
= 2
n

R 
2jXj log(n+1)
n

:
Since the exponent on the RHS is asymptotically equal to R, even a decoder that knows the
type of the codeword will not be able to reliably decode the message if R > C
NoCov
(D
1
;
~
D
2
).
Finally, the fraction of codewords for which the probability of error is bounded away from
zero approaches one, and thus the average probability of error is also bounded away from
zero.
We nally note that C
NoCov
(; ) is continuous in its arguments. Thus, since
~
D
2
< D
2
is
chosen arbitrarily, no rate higher than C(D
1
; D
2
) is achievable.
6.2 Binary Covertext
In this section, we give a proof of Theorem 2.6. That is, we will describe the capacity for
the watermarking game when all of the alphabets are binary and the covertext is an IID
sequence of Bernoulli(1=2) random variables and the distortion is measured using Hamming
distance.
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6.2.1 Private Version
We rst show that all rates less than H
b
(D
1

D
2
) H
b
(D
2
) are achievable in the private
version. To do so, we show that any rate that is achievable using random coding for the
AVC with constrained inputs and states (see [CN88a] and Section 2.5.3) is also achievable
here. The fact that the covertext U is known to both the encoder and the decoder provides
perfect secrecy about the transmitted sequence. To see this, let the encoder generate a
\codeword"
~
X = f
n
(W;
1
) independently of U (but depending on the watermark W and
the secret key 
1
), where the codeword must satisfy n
 1
w
h
(
~
X)  D
1
a.s.
2
. The encoder
forms the stegotext as X =
~
X U , which is independent of the codeword
~
X, due to the
distribution of U . Since the forgery Y depends only on the stegotext, it follows that the
sequence
~
Y =X Y (which must satisfy n
 1
w
h
(
~
Y )  D
2
a.s.) is also independent of the
codeword
~
X. The decoder knows the covertext, and thus he can base his estimate of the
watermark on Y U =
~
X
~
Y , where again
~
X and
~
Y are independent. As in Section 2.4.3,
it is suÆcient to show that the probability of error tends to zero for every deterministic
sequence
~
y such that n
 1
w
h
(
~
y)  D
2
. That is, it is suÆcient to nd a sequence of feasible
rate-R encoders ff
n
g and decoders f
n
g such that

P
e
(
~
y) = Pr


n
 
f
n
(W;
1
)
~
y

6=W

(6.8)
vanishes for every feasible
~
y. Here, feasible means that n
 1
w
h
(f
n
(W;
1
))  D
1
a.s. and
n
 1
w
h
(
~
y)  D
2
. This is an instance of randomized coding on an AVC with constrained
inputs and states [CN88a, CN88b]. In [CN88b, Sect. IV], it was shown that this capacity
is given by H
b
(D
1

D
2
) H
b
(D
2
).
We now show the converse for the private version, i.e., that no rates higher thanH
b
(D
1


D
2
) H
b
(D
2
) are achievable. Let us x the attacker to be a binary symmetric channel with
crossover probability
~
D
2
< D
2
. By the weak law of large numbers, n
 1
w
h
(X  Y ) will be
smaller than D
2
with arbitrarily high probability for blocklength n large enough, and thus
a trivial modication of this attacker will satisfy the distortion constraint. With this xed
attack channel, it is straightforward to show that the capacity is given by H
b
(D
1


~
D
2
) 
H
b
(
~
D
2
). The converse follows since this expression is continuous in
~
D
2
and since we can
2
Recall that the Hamming weight of a vector x 2 f0; 1g
n
is the number of ones contained in x and is
written w
h
(x).
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make
~
D
2
arbitrarily close to D
2
.
6.2.2 Public Version
In this section, we show that the capacity of the public version of the binary watermarking
game is given by
C
BinWM
pub
(D
1
;D
2
) = max
2D
1
g1
g 

H
b

D
1
g

 H
b
(D
2
)

:
Achievability
We now prove that all rates less than C
BinWM
pub
(D
1
;D
2
) are achievable. To do so, we describe
a randomized encoding and decoding strategy. We then show that this strategy satises
the distortion constraint. We nally show that the probability of error tends to zero for any
attacker.
To describe the encoder and decoder, we x 2D
1
 g  1 and  > 0, and let
R
0
= g 

1 H
b

D
1
g

+ 

; (6.9)
and
R = g 

H
b

D
1
g

 H
b
(D
2
)  2

: (6.10)
The encoder/decoder pair generates 2
n(R+R
0
)
IID vectors, each a length-ng IID sequence of
Bernoulli(1=2) random variables. This codebook thus consists of 2
n(R+R
0
)
random vectors
fV (w; k); 1  w  2
nR
; 1  k  2
nR
0
g: The encoder/decoder pair also selects ng indices
uniformly out of all subsets of f1; : : : ; ng of size ng, say P = fP (1); : : : ; P (ng)g. For a
length-n vector u and a size-ng position set p, we write uj
p
to mean the length-ng vector
at the points p, i.e., uj
p
= (u
p(1)
; : : : ; u
p(ng)
). Given the covertext u, the watermark w, the
codebook fvg and the indices p, the encoder selects the value
k

= argmin
1k2
nR
0
w
h
(uj
p
 v(w; k)) : (6.11)
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The encoder then creates the stegotext as
x
i
=
8
>
<
>
:
v
j
(w; k

) if i 2 p and i = p(j)
u
i
otherwise
: (6.12)
In other words, the encoder nds the codeword that best matches the covertext at the
selected points and then replaces the covertext with the codeword at those points. At the
other end, the decoder nds the codeword closest to the forgery y at the selected points.
That is, he estimates the watermark as
w^ = argmin
1w
0
2
nR
min
1k2
nR
0
w
h
 
yj
p
 v(w
0
; k)

: (6.13)
The main fact that we will use for the remainder of the proof is the following. For 2
mR
0
IID random vectors fX
0
1
; : : : ;X
0
2
mR
0
g where eachX
0
i
is an IID sequence ofm Bernoulli(1=2)
random variables, let
P
bin
(m;D;R
0
) = Pr

min
1i2
mR
0
m
 1
w
h
(X
0
i
)  D

: (6.14)
Then, for any 0  D  1=2,
lim
m!1
P
bin
(m;D;R
0
) =
8
>
<
>
:
1 if R
0
> 1 H
b
(D)
0 if R
0
< 1 H
b
(D)
: (6.15)
To show that the encoder satises n
 1
w
h
(UX)  D
1
with arbitrarily high probability,
we apply (6.15) with m = ng, D = D
1
=g, and R
0
= R
0
=g. To see this, note that w
h
(U 
X) = w
h
(U j
P
 V (W;k)) since U and X can only dier at points in P . We can now
write that
Pr

min
1k2
nR
0
n
 1
w
h
(U j
P
 V (W;k))  D
1

= Pr

min
1k2
ng(R
0
=g)
(ng)
 1
w
h
(V (W;k)) 
D
1
g

= P
bin
(ng;D
1
=g;R
0
=g); (6.16)
where the rst equality follows since U j
P
 V (W;k) is independent of U and thus the
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distribution of the Hamming weight of U j
P
 V (W;k) does not depend on the realization
of u (in particular, it is the same when u = 0). Finally, the RHS of (6.16) goes to zero by
the denition R
0
(6.9) and by (6.15).
To analyze the probability of an incorrect decision being made by the decoder, we rst
note that the probability of error depends on the attack only in the amount of distortion
that is introduced. This follows from the randomized construction of the encoder and
decoder. Thus, it is suÆcient to analyze the probability of error caused by an attacker
of the form Y = X 
~
y for some deterministic sequence
~
y with w
h
(
~
y) = bnD
2
c. For
example, we could let
~
y
i
be 1 for 1  i  bnD
2
c and 0 otherwise. Thus, we can claim that
Pr

n
 1
w
h
(Y j
P
 V (W;k

))  g(D
2
+ Æ)
	
tends to one for any Æ > 0 and for the correct
watermark W . Conditioning on this event, the probability that an incorrect watermark will
be selected by the decoder is given by P
bin
(ng;D
2
+ Æ; (R + R
0
)=g), which tends to zero
for Æ suÆciently small by the denitions of R
0
(6.9) and R (6.10) and by (6.15). Thus,
the overall probability of error can be made as small as desired by choosing a large enough
blocklength.
To conclude the achievability proof, we note that 2D
1
 g  1 and  > 0 can be
arbitrarily chosen. Thus, any R < C
BinWM
pub
(D
1
;D
2
) is achievable.
Converse
In this section, we prove that no rates higher than C
BinWM
pub
(D
1
;D
2
) are achievable for the
binary watermarking game. We do so, as in the private version, by xing the attacker to
be a binary symmetric channel with crossover probability
~
D
2
< D
2
. For this attacker, the
distortion constraint will be met with arbitrarily high probability for blocklength n large
enough. We will further show, using the results of Lemma 2.29, that the capacity with this
xed attacker is given by C
BinWM
pub
(D
1
;
~
D
2
). The converse is completed by noting that this
expression is continuous in
~
D
2
.
The remainder of this section will be devoted to evaluating the capacity of the follow-
ing channel with side information. The side information vector U is a sequence of IID
Bernoulli(1=2) random variables. The channel is given by
P
Y jX;U
(yjx; u) =
8
>
<
>
:
1 
~
D
2
if y = x
~
D
2
if y 6= x
:
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Note that the channel does not depend on the side information. Instead, the side information
restricts the possible inputs since the input sequence must be within distance D
1
of the side
information, i.e., n
 1
w
h
(U ;x(W;U ))  D
1
a.s.. We have shown in Lemma 2.29 that the
capacity of this channel is given by
C(D
1
) = max
P
V jU
; f :VU7!X ;
E[w
h
(U;X)]D
1
I(V ;Y )  I(V ;U); (6.17)
where V is an auxiliary random variable with nite alphabet, and the mutual informations
are evaluated with respect to the joint distribution
P
U;V;X;Y
(u; v; x; y) =
8
>
<
>
:
P
U
(u)P
V jU
(vju)P
Y jX;U
(yjx; u) if x = f(v; u)
0 otherwise
:
In order to evaluate (6.17), let us set V = fv
0
; v
1
; v
2
g, which we will see to be suÆcient.
Recall that U = X = Y = f0; 1g. Without loss of generality, we can x the function f to be
f(v; u) =
8
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
0 if v = v
0
1 if v = v
1
u if v = v
2
:
The only other possibility for f would be to set f(v; u) = u 1 for some v, which turns out
to be suboptimal. We now only need to optimize over P
V jU
in order to evaluate C(D
1
).
The distortion constraint requires that (P
V jU
(v
0
j1) + P
V jU
(v
1
j0))=2 = D
1
, since these are
the only cases where u and x = f(u; v) dier. In order to simplify the optimization, we
also require that P
V
(v
2
) = 1   g for some 2D
1
 g  1. We later choose the best g as in
the denition of C
BinWM
pub
(D
1
;D
2
). We now claim that under these constraints, the optimal
distribution is given by
P

V jU
(vju) =
8
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
D
1
if (u; v) = (0; v
1
) or (1; v
0
)
g  D
1
if (u; v) = (0; v
0
) or (1; v
1
)
1  g if v = v
2
:
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Under this distribution, I(V ;Y )  I(V ;U) = g  (H
b
(D
1
=g) H
b
(
~
D
2
)). Thus, the establish-
ment of this claim will complete the proof of the converse.
In order to bound I(V ;Y )   I(V ;U) for a generic distribution that satises the above
constraints, we will use the following calculation
P
V
(v
0
)H(U jV = v
0
) + P
V
(v
1
)H(U jV = v
1
)
= g

P
V
(v
0
)
g
H
b
 
P
U jV
(1jv
0
)

+
P
V
(v
1
)
g
H
b
 
P
U jV
(0jv
1
)


 gH
b

P
V
(v
0
)P
U jV
(1jv
0
) + P
V
(v
1
)P
U jV
(0jv
1
)
g

= gH
b

D
1
g

; (6.18)
where recall that g = P
V
(v
0
)+P
V
(v
1
) and the inequality follows by the concavity of entropy.
We can thus bound
I(U ;V ) = H(U) H(U jV )
 1  gH
b

D
1
g

  (1  g)H
b
(); (6.19)
where  = P
U jV
(0jv
2
) and the inequality follows by (6.18). We can also bound
I(V ;Y ) = H(Y ) H(Y jV )
 1  gH
b
(D
2
)  (1  g)H
b
 
1 D
2
+ (2D
2
  1)

; (6.20)
where the inequality follows since Y is a binary random variable. Combining (6.19) and
(6.20), we see that
I(V ;Y )  I(U ;V )
 g 

H
b

D
1
g

 H
b
(D
2
)

+ (1  g) 

H
b
() H
b
 
1 D
2
+ (2D
2
  1)


 g 

H
b

D
1
g

 H
b
(D
2
)

; (6.21)
where the second inequality follows by maximizing over  (the maximum is achieved at
 = 1=2). The bound (6.21) is achieved with equality when P

V jU
is used. This establishes
that C(D
1
) = C
BinWM
pub
(D
1
;
~
D
2
), which completes the proof of the converse.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
In this thesis, we have dened the information theoretic capacity of a watermarking system,
and we have found this capacity in many scenarios. We now comment on some of their
interesting aspects of these ndings. We conclude in Section 7.1.1 with some ideas for
future research.
We have formalized a watermarking model in which a malicious attacker attempts to
prevent reliable transmission of the watermark. We assume that this attacker knows the
workings of both the encoder and decoder (but not a secret key shared by the encoder and
decoder). We also assume that any forgery created by the attacker is only useful to him if
the distortion between the forgery and stegotext is less than some threshold. Thus, we only
consider attackers that meet this distortion constraint with probability one; we show that
the capacity is zero when the constraint is enforced in expectation (see Section 2.2.3). These
assumptions require the watermarking system (both encoder and decoder) to be designed
rst so that they are robust against any feasible attacker.
When the covertext has a Gaussian distribution, we have shown that the capacity is the
same in the private and public versions; see Theorems 2.1 and 2.4. This surprising result
demonstrates that the capacity does not increase if the decoder can use the covertext.
Costa's \writing on dirty paper" [Cos83] has this same feature; we gave two extensions of
his result in Section 2.5.4. Although the capacity is the same for both versions, the capacity
achieving coding scheme for the public version is much more complex than the scheme for
the private version; compare Sections 4.2 and 4.3 for the SGWM game and Sections 5.4
and 5.5 for the VGWM game. As one might expect, the two versions of watermarking
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do not always yield the same capacity. For example, in the binary watermarking game of
Section 2.2.6, there is a dierence between the two versions.
When the covertext is an IID sequence of Gaussian random variables, we have shown
that an optimal lossy compression attack prevents rates greater than capacity from being
achievable. This property would allow designers to test the robustness of their watermarking
systems against existing technology. Unfortunately, this property does not hold in general.
Indeed, for an IID vector Gaussian, the compression attack is not optimal, and designing
for robustness against such an attack yields a qualitatively dierent watermarking system;
see Section 5.7 for more discussion.
We have seen that the watermarking capacity increases with the uncertainty in the
covertext. Indeed, for the SGWM game, the capacity is increasing in the variance of the
covertext; see Figure 2-1. Furthermore, with squared error distortion measures and a xed
covertext variance, the covertext distribution with the largest capacity is the Gaussian
distribution, which also yields the highest entropy for out of all distributions with the same
variance. Intuitively, if the uncertainty in the covertext is large, then the encoder can hide
more information in the stegotext since the attacker learns little about the covertext from
observing the stegotext. If the attacker does not take advantage of its knowledge of the
stegotext, then this property is not as strong. For example, if the attacker can only add
an arbitrary sequence (see Section 2.2.2 on the additive attack watermarking game) or an
independent random sequence (see Section 2.5.4 on extended writing on dirty paper), then
the amount of uncertainty in the covertext has little bearing on the capacity. In all cases,
the watermarking system's knowledge of the covertext should be used to its advantage. It
is suboptimal to ignore the encoder's knowledge of the covertext, as some systems do by
forming the stegotext by adding the covertext and a sequence that depends only on the
watermark.
One technical result that might be of general interest is Lemma B.7. There, we con-
sider the mutual information between a Gaussian random variable and some other random
variable, with the second order moments xed. We show that this mutual information is
maximized if the other random variable is jointly Gaussian with the rst one.
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7.1 Future Research
In this section, we oer some directions for future research that expand on the themes we
have presented in the thesis.
7.1.1 Gaussian Sources with Memory
We would like to nd the capacity of the watermarking game for squared error distortion
and a stationary Gaussian covertext. That is, let us assume that the covertext U is a
stationary Gaussian process with covariance E[U
j
U
k
] = t
jj kj
. We also assume that the
covertext has a nite memory m
0
so that t
m
= 0 for m > m
0
.
We believe that we can use the results on the vector Gaussian watermarking game (see
Section 2.2.4) to describe the capacity for this covertext distribution. Indeed, for any m,
the vectors U
0
j
= (U
j(m+m
0
)+1
; : : : ; U
j(m+m
0
)+m
), for j = 0; 1; : : : form an IID sequence of
Gaussian random vectors with covariance matrix T
(m)
. Here, T
(m)
is the m m matrix
with T
(m)
jk
= t
jj kj
. We will write the set of eigenvalues of T
(m)
as f
(m)
k
; 1  k  mg.
The encoder/decoder could use the coding strategy for the vector Gaussian source with the
additional restriction of making the stegotext independent of the covertext at the indices
not used in forming fU
0
g. For example, the encoder could set x
j(m+m
0
)+k
= 0 for m <
k  m+m
0
. This restriction is needed so that the attacker cannot gain any knowledge of
the covertext samples used for encoding the watermark. This restriction uses some of the
encoder's available distortion, but this extra distortion can be made negligible by taking
m large enough. Thus, we conjecture that any rate less than the following limit should be
achievable:
lim
m!1
max
D
1
2D
m
(m
1
)
min
D
2
2D
m
(m
2
)
C


D
1k
;D
2k
; 
(m)
k

; (7.1)
where the term inside the limit is the normalized capacity of the vector Gaussian water-
marking game with covariance T
(m)
, encoder distortion level mD
1
and attacker distortion
level mD
2
. Furthermore, we believe that there exist attackers that guarantee that no rates
larger than (7.1) are achievable. Such an attacker would assume that the covertext is a
blockwise IID sequence of Gaussian random vectors.
We would also like to simplify the limit (7.1) into a more meaningful expression. We
can use the fact that the covariance matrices T
(m)
are Toeplitz matrices, and thus we can
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describe the limiting behavior of their eigenvalues (see e.g., [Gra00, GS58]). This is similar
to the approach that Gallager [Gal68, Sec. 8.5] takes in describing the capacity of an additive
Gaussian noise channel.
7.1.2 Discrete Memoryless Covertext
We would like to study the capacity of the public version of a watermarking game with a
general discrete memoryless covertext and general distortion constraints. One conjecture is
that the general capacity is given by the related mutual information games. In the private
version, this is the solution that Moulin and O'Sullivan [MO99, OME98] derive with a
maximum-likelihood decoder and average distortion constraints. Furthermore, Somekh-
Baruch and Merhav [SBM01a] have recently shown that for the private version with nite
alphabets, the private mutual information game also gives the capacity for a xed decoder
and almost sure distortion constraints. In the public version, all of the watermarking
capacities that we described in Section 2.2 have coincided with values of the related mutual
information games. However, no one has yet given a proof for the general public version.
7.1.3 Deterministic Code Capacity for Public Version
We would like to nd the capacity when no secret key is available to the encoder and
decoder. We have addressed this for the private version (see Sections 2.4.2 and 6.2), where
we have found that the capacity without a secret key is typically the same as with a secret
key. However, this result hinges on the fact that the encoder and decoder both have access
to the covertext and they essentially use part its randomness as a secret key. Thus, these
arguments do not work in the public version, i.e., when the decoder does not know the
covertext. We call the capacity when no secret key is available | and thus the attacker
knows the exact encoding and decoding mappings | the deterministic code capacity.
We rst show that the deterministic code capacity is in general smaller than the random
code capacity. For squared error distortion, if D
2
> 4D
1
, then the attacker can make the
forgery into any possible output from the encoder. This implies that the attacker can make
the decoder have any possible output as well. Thus, no positive rate is achievable in this
regime. Recall, however, that the the capacity of the Gaussian watermarking game with
randomized codes is positive in this regime for 
2
u
large enough. Thus, the deterministic
code capacity does not equal the randomized code capacity for the public version.
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Additive Attack Watermarking
We now discuss the deterministic code capacity for the additive attack watermarking game
with IID Gaussian covertext and squared error distortions. This scenario is similar to
the Gaussian arbitrarily varying channel (GAVC), except here the encoder can base his
transmitted sequence on the entire Gaussian noise sequence. See Section 2.5.3 for more
on the GAVC. Csiszar and Narayan [CN91] studied the deterministic code capacity of the
GAVC and found that it is given by
C
DetGAVC
(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
) =
8
>
<
>
:
1
2
log

1 +
D
1
D
2
+
2

if D
1
> D
2
0 otherwise
: (7.2)
In other words, the capacity is either the random code capacity or zero, depending on the
allowed distortion levels. In particular, the capacity is not continuous in the parameters.
We believe that, unlike the GAVC, the deterministic code capacity for the additive attack
watermarking game is continuous in the parameters. Further, we believe that there exists
values of the parameters such that the deterministic code capacity is non-zero yet strictly
less than the random code capacity. While this is not possible for AVCs without constraints,
Csiszar and Narayan [CN88b] showed that this is possible for AVCs with input and state
constraints.
Our argument for the above claims is briey as follows. For D
2
small enough, we believe
that we can construct deterministic codes which achieve the random code capacity for the
additive attack watermarking game, namely
1
2
log

1 +
D
1
D
2

. Such a code would be similar
to the random code of Section 4.3.1, and could be analyzed using techniques from [CN91].
One dierence from [CN91] is that we would have to guarantee that each bin has a codeword
that has a small inner product with the covertext. For any coding strategy of this form, the
critical distortion level D
2
will be determined by the energy in the covertext which is in the
direction of the correct codeword. We believe that by increasing the number of codewords
in each bin, we can increase this energy at the expense of overall rate. Thus, the achievable
rates for this coding strategy should continuously decrease to zero as D
2
increases instead
of a non-continuously as in the GAVC. Besides analyzing such a coding strategy, we also
need a converse to show that no higher rates are achievable.
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7.1.4 Multiple Rate Requirements
We now consider a watermarking model where the amount of information that can be
recovered depends on the distortion introduced by the attacker. For example, let there be
two independent watermarks W
h
of R
h
bits and W
l
of R
l
bits and two attacker distortion
levels D
2;h
> D
2;l
. The encoder will produce the stegotext as a function of the covertext
and both watermarks such that the distortion between the stegotext and covertext is less
than D
1
. If the distortion between the forgery and stegotext is D
2;h
, then the decoder
should be able to recover W
h
. However, if the distortion between the forgery and stegotext
is D
2;l
, then the decoder should be able to recover both W
h
and W
l
. The main question
is what rates pairs are achievable for given values of D
2;h
and D
2;l
. (Or conversely, what
distortion pairs are allowable for given values of R
h
and R
l
.) This problem can be thought
of as a broadcast channel with degraded message set, see e.g., [Cov75, KM77]. However,
the broadcast channel is arbitrarily varying as in [Jah81].
Let us consider this example for an IID Gaussian covertext (zero-mean, variance-
2
) and
squared error distortion. Using the results of Theorem 2.1, we can say that both (R
h
; R
l
) =
(C

(D
1
;D
2;h
; 
2
); 0) and (R
h
; R
l
) = (0; C

(D
1
;D
2;l
; 
2
)) are achievable. However, it is not
immediately clear that any linear combination of these rate pairs are achievable using the
usual time-sharing argument. Indeed, it seems that in order to eectively time-share against
the attacker, both codes will have to use the same stegotext power (i.e., the same value of
A). The optimal value of A depends on the attacker's distortion level and hence for any
common value of A that the two codes choose, at least one of the codes will be transmitting
below capacity. On the positive side, for any value of A and any 0    1, the following
rate pairs are achievable
(R
h
; R
l
) =

 
1
2
log(1 + s(A;D
1
;D
2;h
; 
2
)); (1   ) 
1
2
log(1 + s(A;D
1
; D
2;l
; 
2
))

:
(7.3)
This follows since the encoder and decoder can randomly decide on n locations for the
high distortion code, with the remaining positions for the low distortion code. Since the
two codes are using the same stegotext power, the attacker cannot focus his distortion on
either code. The question remains as to how much better, if any, can we do than this simple
time sharing strategy.
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Appendix A
Denitions for Gaussian covertext
In this section, we present many of the denitions that are used with Gaussian covertexts
(i.e., Chapters 3, 4, and 5). We also discuss some of the basic properties of some of the
mappings.
We now summarize the denitions that are used for all of the chapters with Gaussian
covertexts. Recall that
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Figure A-1: Example plots of C

(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
) and A

(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
) for dierent parameter
values.
The function C

(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
) is the capacity of the scalar Gaussian watermarking game
(Theorem 2.1) and the value of the Gaussian mutual information game (Theorem 3.1);
it also plays a critical role in the capacity of the vector Gaussian watermarking game
(Theorem 2.4). In Figure A-1, we have plotted C

(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
) against each of its three
arguments. We have also plotted the maximizing A in (A.8) along with the lower and upper
limits in the denition of A(D
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In the following lemma, we describe the A
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that achieves the maximum in the denition
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Since log(x) is monotonically increasing in x, the maximizing A in (A.8) is also the
A 2 A(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
) that maximizes the product c(A;D
2
)b
2
(A;D
1
; 
2
). We can calculate
that
@
@A
c(A;D
2
)b
2
(A;D
1
; 
2
) =
 p(A;D
1
;D
2
; 
2
)
2A
2

2
;
and
@
2
@A
2
c(A;D
2
)b
2
(A;D
1
; 
2
) =
 1
2
2

1 
D
2
(
2
 D
1
)
2
A
3

: (A.9)
Since A  D
2
and A  
2
+ D
1
>
p
j
2
 D
1
j, the RHS of (A.9) is negative and hence
c(A;D
2
)b
2
(A;D
1
; 
2
) is strictly concave in A. Thus, there can be at most one local ex-
tremum in A(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
), which would also be the maximizing value. There is exactly one
local extremum since there exists an A

2 A(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
) such that p(A

;D
1
; D
2
; 
2
) = 0.
This follows since p(A;D
1
;D
2
; 
2
) is continuous in A; since
p(
2
+D
1
;D
1
;D
2
; 
2
) =  2D
1
D
2

2
< 0;
since if 
2
+D
1
< D
2
<
 
 +
p
D
1

2
, then
p(D
2
;D
1
; D
2
; 
2
) =
D
2
2

 
D
2
  (
2
+D
1
)

2
  4
2
D
1

< 0;
153
where the inequality follows by the above assumption; and since if D
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where the rst inequality follows from the above assumption.
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Appendix B
Technical Proofs
In this appendix, we prove many of the technical claims that have been given throughout
the thesis. In each section, we repeat the statement of the theorem or lemma to be proved
followed by the proof. A reference to the theorem or lemma being proved is given in the
title of each section as well as in parenthesis at the beginning of each restatement.
B.1 Proof of Theorem 2.3
Theorem B.1 (2.3). For the watermarking game with real alphabets and squared error
distortion, if the covertext U satises lim inf
n!1
E

1
n
kUk
2

< 1, and if the average dis-
tortion constraints (2.14), (2.15) are in eect instead of the a.s. distortion constraints (2.1),
(2.3), then no rate is achievable in either version of the game.
Proof. For a given covertext fUg and for a given encoder sequence ff
n
g, let the average
power in the stegotext be given by
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that with probability p produces the all-zero forgery, and with probability (1  p) does not
alter the stegotext at all. Irrespective of the rate (as long as b2
nR
c > 1) and of the version of
the game, this attacker guarantees a probability of error of at least p=2. It remains to check
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where the equality follows from (B.4), the subsequent inequality by (B.1) and (B.2), and
the last inequality by (B.3).
B.2 Proof of Lemma 2.1
Lemma B.1 (2.1). For the communication with side information model with nite alpha-
bets, if the side information is available non-causally to the encoder only and the encoder
is required to satisfy
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where V is an auxiliary random variable with nite alphabet, and the mutual informations
are evaluated with respect to the joint distribution (2.30).
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Proof. The achievability part follows directly from the proof of Gel'fand and Pinsker [GP80].
We simply choose a P
V jU
and a function f : V U 7! X such that E[d
1
(U;X)] 
~
D
1
< D
1
.
We then use the same coding strategy as in [GP80]. The distortion between the side
information and the transmitted sequence will be approximately
~
D
1
. By choosing n large
enough, we can ensure that this distortion exceed D
1
with arbitrarily small probability. The
achievability proof is completed by noting that C
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1
) is continuous inD
1
. Furthermore,
it is non-decreasing and convex in D
1
; see [BCW00]. Combining the converse of Gel'fand
and Pinsker [GP80] with the usual converse for channels with input constraints (see e.g.,
[CT91][Sect. 10.2]), we can show that no rates greater than
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are achievable. Thus, we only need to show that (B.6) is equal to the RHS of (B.5), the
proposed capacity expression. Gel'fand and Pinsker [GP80] showed this equivalence without
the distortion constraint. However, their proof does not carry through to this case. Their
basic idea is that I(V ;Y )   I(V ;U) is convex in P
XjV;U
for all other distributions xed.
Thus, a general P
XjV;U
, which can be written as a convex combination of deterministic
P
XjV;U
's, will always be dominated by a deterministic P
XjV;U
. However, a general P
XjV;U
that satises the distortion constraint might not be a convex combination of deterministic
P
XjV;U
's that also satisfy the distortion constraint.
We now prove that (B.6) is equal to the RHS of (B.5). We make the assumption that
X , U and Y are nite. We also assume that V is nite, which Gel'fand and Pinsker show
to be suÆcient (this does not change with the distortion constraint).
Without loss of generality, there exists v
0
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~
V
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We now compare the original joint distribution between V , U , X and Y with the new joint
distribution
~
V , U , X and Y . We claim that I(
~
V ;Y )   I(
~
V ;U)  I(V ;Y )   I(V ;U) and
the expected distortion is the same under both distributions, which will complete the proof
of the claim. This follows since we can repeat this process until there is no such v
0
.
We rst note that the joint distribution on U , X, and Y is the same under both distri-
butions. That is,
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In particular, both H(Y ) and E[d(U;X)] are unaected by the change in distribution.
Second, we consider a joint distribution between V ,
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ned by
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which is consistent with both joint distributions. Under this distribution, the random
variables U , V and
~
V form a Markov chain. Thus, by the data processing inequality,
I(V ;U)  I(
~
V ;U). We nally note that
P
Y jV
(yjv
0
) =
n
X
i=1
c
i
P
Y j
~
V
(yjv
0
i
);
which follows by the denitions (B.7), (B.8) and (B.9). We can thus show, using the
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concavity of entropy, that H(Y j
~
V )  H(Y jV ) and thus I(
~
V ;Y )  I(V ;Y ) (since H(Y ) is
the same for both distributions). These three observations nish the proof of the claim.
B.3 Proof of Lemma 3.1
Lemma B.2 (3.1). For any n > 0 and any covertext distribution P
U
,
sup
P
XjU
2D
1
(D
1
;P
U
)
P
V jU ;X
inf
P
Y jX
2D
2
(D
2
;P
U
;P
XjU
)
I
pub
(P
U
; P
X jU
; P
V jU ;X
; P
Y jX
) 
sup
P
XjU
2D
1
(D
1
;P
U
)
inf
P
Y jX
2D
2
(D
2
;P
U
;P
XjU
)
I
priv
(P
U
; P
X jU
; P
Y jX
):
Proof. We rst show following Chen [Che00] that for arbitrary distributions P
U
, P
XjU
,
P
V jU ;X
, and P
Y jX
the mutual information terms satisfy I
priv
 I
pub
. All of the below
mutual information terms are evaluated in terms of these distributions. We will assume
that I
priv
is nite, since otherwise the claim is trivial. We can write that
I
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I(V ;Y jU) (B.10)
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I(V ;U ;Y )  I(V ;U )
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)
where (B.10) follows by the data processing inequality (see e.g. [CT91]) because V and Y
are conditionally independent given (X;U ); and where (B.11) follows by the chain rule for
mutual informations.
We next show that the values of the mutual information games also behave as desired.
Fix n and  > 0 and let P

XjU
and P

V jU ;X
be distributions that are within  of the supremum
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in (3.6). Thus,
sup
P
XjU
inf
P
Y jX
I
priv
(P
U
; P
X jU
; P
Y jX
)  inf
P
Y jX
I
priv
(P
U
; P

XjU
; P
Y jX
)
 inf
P
Y jX
I
pub
(P
U
; P

XjU
; P

V jU ;X
; P
Y jX
)
 sup
P
XjU
;P
V jU;X
inf
P
Y jX
I
pub
(P
U
; P
XjU
; P
V jU ;X
; P
Y jX
)  ;
where the second inequality follows by the preceding paragraph and the nal inequality
follows by our choice of P

X jU
and P

V jU ;X
. The lemma follows since  > 0 can be chosen
as small as desired.
B.4 Proof of Lemma 3.2
Lemma B.3 (3.2). For any n > 0, any covertext distribution P
U
, any watermarking chan-
nel P
XjU
, and any xed distortion D
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denotes a zero-mean Gaussian distribution of variance 
2
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; P
A
n
XjU
is the watermarking
channel described in Section 3.2.2 for the parameters 
2
u;n
, D
1;n
and A
n
; and P
A
n
Y jX
is the
attack channel described in Section 3.2.1 for the parameters D
2
and A
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.
Proof. The proof is organized as follows. In Lemma B.4, we show that a Gaussian covertext
distribution and a jointly Gaussian watermarking channel maximize the mutual information
term of interest. Using this result and some basic mutual information manipulations, we
then complete the proof.
Lemma B.4. Let P
U;X
be an arbitrary distribution with covariance matrix K
UX
, and let
P

U;X
be a jointly Gaussian distribution of covariance matrix K

UX
= K
UX
. Then,
I
priv
(P
U
; P
XjU
; P
A
Y jX
)  I
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(P

U
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
XjU
; P
A
Y jX
);
where P
A
Y jX
is dened in Section 3.2.1 and A > D
2
is arbitrary.
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Proof. Recall that under the attack channel P
A
Y jX
, the random variables Y andX are related
by Y = cX + S
2
, where c = c(A;D
2
) (dened in (A.4)) and S
2
is mean-zero variance-cD
2
Gaussian random variable independent of X. Thus,
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where these and the below dierential entropies exist by the structure of the attack channel
under consideration. Let U be the linear minimum mean squared-error estimator of Y
given U . Note that  depends on second-order statistics only, so that its value under P

U;X
is the same as under P
U;X
. Thus,
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where the rst inequality follows since conditioning reduces entropy, the second inequality
follows since a Gaussian distribution maximizes entropy subject to a second moment con-
straint, and (B.13) follows since under P

U
, P

XjU
and P
A
Y jX
the random variables U and Y
are jointly Gaussian and hence Y   U is Gaussian and independent of U .
Combining (B.12) and (B.13) with the denition of I
priv
(see (3.1)) completes the proof
of Lemma B.4.
To continue with the proof of Lemma 3.2, if under P

U
and P

XjU
the random variables
U and X are zero-mean and jointly Gaussian, then
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where b
2
(; ; ) is dened in (A.3) and A > D
2
. Note that b
2
and hence the whole expres-
sion (B.14) is concave in the triple (E

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X
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
), as can be veried by
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checking that the Hessian is non-negative denite. We can now compute that
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where the rst inequality follows by the chain rule and since conditioning reduces entropy,
the second inequality follows by Lemma B.4 and by (B.14), the third inequality follows by
the above discussed concavity of (B.14), and the nal equality follows by the denition of
s(; ; ; ) (A.5). We obtain equality in each of the above inequalities when P
U
= (P
G
U
)
n
and
P
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= (P
A
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XjU
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n
. This completes the proof of Lemma 3.2.
B.5 Proof of Lemma 3.3
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2
u
Gaussian covertext (denoted
(P
G
U
)
n
) and xed distortions D
1
and D
2
. If P
Y jX
satises E
(P
G
U
P
A
XjU
)
n
P
Y jX

n
 1
kY  Xk


D
2
, then for all A 2 A(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
),
I
pub

(P
G
U
)
n
; (P
A
XjU
)
n
; (P
A
V jU;X
)
n
; P
Y jX

 I
pub

(P
G
U
)
n
; (P
A
XjU
)
n
; (P
A
V jU;X
)
n
; (P
A
Y jX
)
n

=
1
2
log
 
1 + s(A;D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
)

: (B.15)
Here, P
A
XjU
and P
A
V jU;X
are the watermarking channels described in Section 3.2.2 for the
parameters 
2
u
, D
1
and A and P
A
Y jX
is the attack channel described in Section 3.2.1 for the
parameters D
2
and A.
Proof. For every A 2 A(D
1
; D
2
; 
2
u
), consider the one-dimensional optimization based on
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the watermarking channel described in Section 3.2.2
M(D
2
; A) = inf
P
Y jX
2D
2
(D
2
;P
G
U
;P
A
XjU
)
I
pub

P
G
U
; P
A
XjU
; P
A
V jU;X
; P
Y jX

: (B.16)
In Lemma B.6, we derive some properties of M(D
2
; A), which we subsequently use to show
that M(D
2
; A) is a lower bound on the LHS of (B.15). In Lemma B.7, we show that
when computingM(D
2
; A) we only need to consider attack channels that make the random
variables Y and V jointly Gaussian. We nally use this claim to compute M(D
2
; A).
Lemma B.6. For a xed A, the function M(D
2
; A) dened in (B.16) is convex and non-
increasing in D
2
.
Proof. The functionM(D
2
; A) is non-increasing in D
2
since increasing D
2
only enlarges the
feasible set D
2
(D
2
; P
G
U
; P
A
XjU
).
To show that M(; A) is convex in D
2
, we rst note that
I
pub
 
P
U
; P
XjU
; P
V jU;X
; P
Y jX

= I(V ;Y )  I(V ;U)
is convex in P
Y jX
. Indeed, I(V ;U) does not depend on P
Y jX
and I(V ;Y ) is convex in P
Y jV
and hence also convex in P
Y jX
since the random variables V , X and Y form a Markov
chain.
Given the parameters A, D
r
, D
s
, and  > 0, let the watermarking channels P
r
Y jX
2
D
2
(D
r
; P
G
U
; P
A
XjU
) and P
s
Y jX
2 D
2
(D
s
; P
G
U
; P
A
XjU
) be such that
I
pub

P
G
U
; P
A
XjU
; P
A
V jU;X
; P
r
Y jX

M(D
r
; A) + ; (B.17)
and
I
pub

P
G
U
; P
A
XjU
; P
A
V jU;X
; P
s
Y jX

M(D
s
; A) + : (B.18)
For any 0    1, let P

Y jX
= P
r
Y jX
+

P
s
Y jX
, where

 = (1  ). We complete the proof
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with
M(D
r
+

D
s
; A)  I
pub

P
G
U
; P
A
XjU
; P
A
V jU;X
; P

Y jX

 I
pub

P
G
U
; P
A
XjU
; P
A
V jU;X
; P
r
Y jX

+

I
pub

P
G
U
; P
A
XjU
; P
A
V jU;X
; P
s
Y jX

 M(D
r
; A) +

M(D
s
; A) + ;
where the rst inequality follows since E
P
U
P
A
XjU
P

Y jX
[(X   Y )
2
]  D
r
+

D
s
, the second
inequality follows by the convexity of I
pub
(P
U
; P
XjU
; P
V jU;X
; ), and the nal inequality
follows by (B.17) and (B.18). The claim follows since  is an arbitrary positive number.
We continue with the proof of Lemma 3.3 by demonstrating that M(D
2
; A) is a lower
bound on the LHS of (B.15). Indeed, if
P
Y jX
2 D
2
(D
2
; (P
G
U
)
n
; (P
A
XjU
)
n
); (B.19)
then
I
pub

(P
G
U
)
n
; (P
A
XjU
)
n
; (P
A
V jU;X
)
n
; P
Y jX


1
n
n
X
i=1
I
pub

P
G
U
; P
A
XjU
; P
A
V jU;X
; P
Y
i
jX
i


1
n
n
X
i=1
M

E
P
G
U
P
A
XjU
P
Y
i
jX
i

(Y
i
 X
i
)
2

; A

 M

E
(P
G
U
P
A
XjU
)
n
P
Y jX

n
 1
kY  Xk
2

; A

 M(D
2
; A);
where the rst inequality follows since the watermarking channel is memoryless, by the
chain rule, and by the fact that conditioning reduces entropy; the second inequality follows
by the denition of M(; ); and the nal two inequalities follow by Lemma B.6 and by
(B.19) so that the expected distortion is less than D
2
.
To complete the proof of Lemma 3.3, we show that a minimum in the denition of
M(D
2
; A) is achieved by the distribution P
A
Y jX
of Section 3.2.1. To do so, we rst show in
Lemma B.7 that we only need to consider conditional distributions P
Y jX
under which V
and Y are jointly Gaussian. A similar lemma was given in a preliminary version of [SVZ98]
and in [MS01], but neither proof is as general as the one below.
Lemma B.7. Let V and Z be jointly Gaussian random variables with covariance matrix
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KV Z
. Let Y be another (not necessarily Gaussian) random variable related to V via the
covariance matrix K
V Y
. If K
V Y
= K
V Z
, then I(V ;Y )  I(V ;Z).
Proof. It suÆces to prove the claim when all random variables are zero mean. If I(V ;Y ) is
innite then there is nothing to prove. Thus, we only consider the case where
I(V ;Y ) <1: (B.20)
For the xed covariance matrix K = K
V Y
= K
V Z
, let the linear minimum mean squared-
error estimator of V given Y be Y . Note that the constant  is determined uniquely
by the correlation matrix K and thus Z is also the linear minimum mean squared-error
estimator of V given Z. Since the random variables V and Z are jointly Gaussian, this is
also the minimum mean squared-error estimator, and furthermore V   Z is independent
of Z. If the conditional density f
V jY
exists, then
I(V ;Y ) = h(V )  h(V jY ) (B.21)
 h(V )  h(V   Y ) (B.22)
 h(V ) 
1
2
log 2eE[(V   Y )
2
] (B.23)
= h(V ) 
1
2
log 2eE[(V   Z)
2
] (B.24)
= I(V ;Z) (B.25)
=
1
2
log

E[V
2
]E[Z
2
]
jK
V Z
j

(B.26)
and the claim is proved. Here, (B.21) follows since we have assumed that a conditional
density exists; (B.22) follows since conditioning reduces entropy; (B.23) follows since a
Gaussian maximizes dierential entropy subject to a second moment constraint; (B.24)
follows since K
V Y
= K
V Z
and hence all second order moments are the same; (B.25) follows
since V  Z is both Gaussian and independent of Z; and (B.26) follows since V and Z are
zero-mean jointly Gaussian random variables.
By (B.20) the conditional density f
V jY
exists if Y takes on a countable number of values.
This follows since (B.20) implies P
V;Y
 P
V
P
Y
, i.e., the joint distribution is absolutely
continuous with respect to the product of the marginals. In particular, P
V jY
(jy) P
V
for
every y such that P
Y
(y) > 0. Furthermore, V is Gaussian and hence P
V
 , where  is
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the Lebesgue measure. Thus, P
V jY
(jy)  for every y such that P
Y
(y) > 0 and hence the
conditional density exists.
To conclude the poof of the claim, we now consider the case where Y does not neces-
sarily take on a countable number of values and I(V ;Y ) < 1. This case follows using an
approximation argument. For any  > 0, let q

: R 7! f: : : ; 2; ; 0;; 2; : : : g be a
uniform quantizer with cell size , i.e., q

(x) maps x to the closest integer multiple of .
Let Y

= q

(Y ). By the data processing inequality,
I(V ;Y )  I(V ;Y

): (B.27)
The random variable Y

takes on a countable number of values and by (B.20) and (B.27),
I(V ;Y

) <1. Thus, the conditional density f
V jY

exists and
I(V ;Y

) 
1
2
log

E[V
2
]E[Y
2

]
jK
V Y

j

: (B.28)
Since jY  Y

j  =2, it follows that E[Y
2

]! E[Y
2
] and jK
V Y

j ! jK
V Y
j as  # 0. Since
(B.27) and (B.28) hold for all  > 0, the claim follows by letting  approach zero.
To continue with the evaluation ofM(D
2
; A), we note that since under the distributions
P
G
U
, P
A
XjU
, and P
A
V jU;X
, the random variable V has a Gaussian distribution, the above claim
allows us to assume throughout the rest of the proof that the attack channel P
Y jX
makes
the random variables V and Y jointly Gaussian. Recall that the random variables V , X,
and Y form a Markov chain. Thus, if we let Y = c
1
X + S
1
, where S
1
is Gaussian random
variable independent of X with variance c
2
 0, then we can generate all possible correlation
matrices K
V Y
by varying the parameters c
1
and c
2
. Since the mutual information I(V ;Y )
only depends on the correlation matrix K
V Y
, we can compute the quantity M(D
2
; A) by
only considering such attack channels.
Let P
c
1
;c
2
Y jX
be the attack channel such that the random variable Y is distributed as
c
1
X+S
1
, where S
1
is a random variable independent of X, which is Gaussian of zero mean
and variance c
2
. Under this distribution,
E
P
U
P
A
XjU
P
c
1
;c
2
Y jX
[(X   Y )
2
] = (1  c
1
)
2
A+ c
2
:
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We require that P
c
1
;c
2
Y jX
2 D
2
(D
2
; P
G
U
; P
A
XjU
), and thus
c
2
c
2
1

D
2
c(A;D
2
)
; (B.29)
where equality is achieved by c
1
= c(A;D
2
) and c
2
= c(A;D
2
)D
2
, and where c(; ) is
dened in (A.4). Thus, if  = (A;D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
),  = (A;D
1
; 
2
u
) and b
1
= b
1
(A;D
1
; 
2
u
)
(see Appendix A), then
I
pub

P
G
U
; P
A
XjU
; P
A
V jU;X
; P
c
1
;c
2
Y jX

=
1
2
log
 

2

2
u
+ 2+D
1
  (+ b
1
  1)
2

2
u

2

2
u
+ 2+D
1
  ((  1)b
1

2
u
+A)
2
=(A +
c
2
c
2
1
)
!

1
2
log
 
1 + s(A;D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
)

;
where the equality follows by evaluating I
pub
with the given distributions and the inequality
follows by the relevant denitions and by (B.29). Equality is achieved when c
1
= c(A;D
2
)
and c
2
= c(A;D
2
)D
2
.
The combination of all of the above arguments shows that Lemma 3.3 is valid. Indeed,
the choice of the memoryless watermarking channels (P
A
XjU
)
n
and (P
A
V jU;X
)
n
guarantees a
mutual information of at least
1
2
log(1 + s(A;D
1
; D
2
; 
2
u
)). Furthermore, when these water-
marking channels are used, the memoryless attack channel (P
A
Y jX
)
n
is optimal.
B.6 Proof of Lemma 4.3
Lemma B.8 (4.3). For any  > 0 and 
1
> 0, there exists an integer n
2
> 0 such that for
all n > n
2
, Pr
 

1
(Z
1
; Z
2
) < 

1
  
1

< .
Proof. Recall that the attacker has the form given in Section 4.1.2 and that the random
167
variables Z
1
and Z
2
are dened in (4.15) and (4.16). Thus,
Z
1
=
1
n


Y j
U
?


2
=
1
n



 

1
(X)X + 
2
(X)



U
?



2
=
1
n



1
(X)C
W
(U) + 
2
(X)j
U
?


2
 
2
1
(X)b
2
+ 
3
(X) + 2
1
(X)n
 1



2
(X)j
U
?
;C
W
(U )

= 
2
1
(X)b
2
+ 
3
(X) + 2
1
(X)n
 1



2
(X);C
W
(U )

; (B.30)
where the rst equality follows from the denition of Z
1
(4.15); the second equality from
the representation of the forgery as in (4.4); the third equality from the structure of the
encoder (4.11); the subsequent inequality from (4.8), the bound



2
(X)j
U
?


2




2
(X)


2
and (4.5); and the nal equality because C
W
(U ) 2 U
?
(4.9).
Similarly, we can show that
Z
2
= 
1
(X)b
2
+ n
 1
h
2
(X);C
W
(U )i: (B.31)
We now argue that the sequence of random variables n
 1
h
2
(X);C
W
(U)i approaches,
as n tends to innity, zero in probability uniformly over all attackers. First, note that given
the stegotext X = x, the random vector C
W
(U ) is distributed like b
2
x=A + C, where
C is uniformly distributed on S
n
(0;
p
nb
3
) and b
3
= b
2
(A   b
2
)=A. Consequently, for any
0 <  <
p
D
2
b
3
,
Pr
 


n
 1
h
2
(X);C
W
(U )i


> 


X = x

= Pr




D

2
(x)=
p
n
3
(x);C=
p
nb
3
E



> =
p

3
(x)b
3

 Pr




D

2
(x)=
p
n
3
(x);C=
p
nb
3
E



> =
p
D
2
b
3

=
2C
n 1
 
arccos
 
=
p
D
2
b
3

C
n 1
()
:
Here the rst equality follows by the conditional distribution of C
W
(U) and the fact that
h
2
(x);xi = 0, the subsequent inequality follows from 
3
(x)  D
2
(see (4.5)), and the
nal equality follows since C=
p
nb
3
is uniformly distributed on S
n
(0; 1) \ x
?
and since

2
(x)=
p
n
3
(x) also takes value in this set. Since the resulting upper bound, which tends
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to zero, does not depend on x, it must also hold for the unconditional probability.
Combining this fact with (B.30) and (B.31), we see that for any 
2
> 0 there exists some
n
2
such that
Pr
 
Z
1
 
2
1
(X)b
2
+ 
3
(X) + 
2
and Z
2
 
1
(X)b
2
  
2

 1   (B.32)
for all n > n
2
.
Since 
1
(z
1
; z
2
) is non-increasing in z
1
and non-decreasing in z
2
, it follows that (B.32)
implies
Pr
 

1
(Z
1
; Z
2
) 

1
(X)b
2
  
2
p
b
2
(
2
1
(X)b
2
+ 
3
(X) + 
2
)
!
 1   (B.33)
for all n > n
2
. Since n
 1
kXk
2
= A (4.12), it follows from (4.6) that with probability one

3
(X)=
2
1
(X)  D
2
=c so that

1
(X)b
2
p
b
2
(
2
1
(X)b
2
+ 
3
(X))
=
s
b
2
b
2
+ 
3
(X)=
2
1
(X)
 

1
: (B.34)
Thus, we can choose 
2
small enough (and the corresponding n
2
large enough) so that (B.32)
will imply via (B.33) and (B.34) that Pr (
1
(Z
1
; Z
2
)  

1
  
1
)  1  , for all n > n
2
.
B.7 Proof of Lemma 4.6
Lemma B.9 (4.6). Given X = x and Z = z, the random vector V
W
(U ) is uniformly
distributed over the set V(x; z) =

a
1
x+ v : v 2 S
n
(0;
p
na
2
) \ x
?
	
, where a
1
=

2
v
+(1 )z
n
 1
kxk
2
,
and a
2
=
(1 )
2
(
2
u

2
v
 z
2
)
n
 1
kxk
2
.
Proof. Conditional on the covertext U = u and on Z = z, the auxiliary codeword V
W
(U )
is uniformly distributed over the set
V
0
(u; z) =

v : n
 1
kvk
2
= 
2
v
and n
 1
hv;ui = z
	
;
as follows by the denition of Z (4.40) and the distribution of the codebook fV
j;k
g. Using
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the deterministic relation (4.37) we can now relate the appropriate conditional densities as
f
V
W
(U)jX;Z
(vjX = x; Z = z) = f
V
W
(U)jU ;Z

v



U =
x  v
1  
;Z = z

:
The proof will be concluded once we demonstrate that irrespective of z, it holds that
v 2 V(x; z) if, and only if, v 2 V
0
 
(x  v)=(1  ); z

.
Indeed, if v 2 V(x; z), then we can calculate that n
 1
kvk
2
= a
2
1
n
 1
kxk
2
+a
2
= 
2
v
using
the fact that
n
 1
kxk
2
= 
2
v
+ 2(1   )z + (1  )
2

2
u
: (B.35)
Furthermore,
1
n

v;
x  v
1  

=

2
v
+ (1  )z   
2
v
1  
= z;
and thus v 2 V
0
 
(x  v)=(1   ); z

.
Conversely, if v 2 V
0
 
(x  v)=(1   ); z

, then
1
n

v;
x  v
1  

=
n
 1
hv;xi   
2
v
1  
= z;
and hence vj
x
= a
1
x. Furthermore,
1
n


vj
x
?


2
=
1
n
kvk
2
 
1
n


vj
x


2
= 
2
v
 
a
2
1
kxk
2
n
= a
2
;
where we have again used (B.35), and thus v 2 V(x; z).
B.8 Proof of Lemma 4.8
Lemma B.10 (4.8). If the constants dened for the additive attack watermarking game
are used to design the sequence of encoders of Section 4.3.1, then for any  > 0 and 
2
> 0,
there exists an integer n
2
> 0 such that for all n > n
2
and for all the deterministic attacks
of Section 4.1.1, Pr
 

2
(Z;Z
3
; Z
4
) < 

(R
1
+ Æ)  
2

< .
Proof. Recall that a deterministic attacker of Section 4.1.1 is specied by a vector
~
y satis-
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fying (4.3). Fix some 
3
> 0 (to be chosen later) and choose n
2
large enough to ensure
Pr(E
1
\ E
2
\ E
3
)  1  ; 8n > n
2
; (B.36)
where the events E
1
, E
2
, and E
3
are dened by
E
1
=



2n
 1
hX;
~
yi


 
3
	
;
E
2
=



n
 1
hV
W
(U);
~
yi


 
3
	
;
and
E
3
= fZ  
2
u
g:
Note that whenever 
3
> 0, such an n
2
can always be found by the union of events bound,
because the probability of the complement of each of the events is vanishing uniformly
in
~
y, for all
~
y satisfying (4.3). Indeed, E
c
1
and E
c
2
have vanishing probabilities because
both U and V
W
(U ) are uniformly distributed on n-spheres (see Lemma 4.5) and since
X = V + (1  )U , and E
c
3
has vanishing probability by Lemma 4.7.
Event E
1
guarantees that
Z
3
=
1
n
kXk
2
+
2
n
hX ;
~
yi+
1
n
k
~
yk
2
 
2
v
+ 2(1   )Z + (1  )
2

2
u
+ 
3
+D
2
; (B.37)
where the equality follows by the denition of Z
3
(4.41) and the form of the attacker given in
Section 4.1.1, and where the inequality follows by (B.35), (4.3), and the inequality dening
E
1
.
From the denition of Z
4
(4.43) it follows that E
2
guarantees that Z
4
  
3
. Conse-
quently, the intersection E
1
\ E
2
guarantees that

2
(Z;Z
3
; Z
4
) 

2
v
+ (1  )Z   
3
p

2
v
+ 2(1  )Z + (1  )
2

2
u
+ 
3
+D
2
: (B.38)
For any 
3
> 0, the RHS of (B.38) is monotonically increasing in Z, so that the inter-
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section E
1
\ E
2
\ E
3
implies

2
(Z;Z
3
; Z
4
) 

2
v
+ (1  )
2
u
  
3
p

2
v
+ 2(1   )
2
u
+ (1  )
2

2
u
+ 
3
+D
2
: (B.39)
Recalling the denitions in Section 4.3.1 and the denition of 

(R
1
+ Æ) (4.49), one can
show using some algebra that for 
3
= 0, the RHS of (B.39) equals 

(R
1
+ Æ). Since
the RHS of (B.39) is continuous in 
3
, we can choose some 
3
> 0 small enough (and the
resulting n
2
large enough) so that the intersection E
1
\ E
2
\ E
3
will guarantee that

2
(Z;Z
3
; Z
4
)  

(R
1
+ Æ)   
2
:
The claim thus follows from (B.36).
B.9 Proof of Lemma 4.10
Lemma B.11 (4.10). If the constants dened for the general watermarking game are used
to design the sequence of encoders of Section 4.3.1, then for any  > 0 and 
2
> 0, there
exists an integer n
2
> 0 such that for all n > n
2
and for all attackers of Section 4.1.2,
Pr
 

2
(Z;Z
3
; Z
4
) < 

(R
1
+ Æ)  
2

< .
Proof. In order to prove the desired result, we need the following technical claim.
Lemma B.12. As n tends to innity, the sequence of random variables n
 1
h
2
(X);V
W
(U )i
approaches zero in probability uniformly over all the attackers of Section 4.1.2.
Proof. Conditional on X = x and Z = z, the random vector V
W
(U) is by Lemma 4.6
distributed like a
1
x + V , where V is uniformly distributed on S
n
(0;
p
na
2
) \ x
?
, and a
2
dened in (4.52) depends on z. Consequently for any 0 <  <
p
D
2

2
v
,
Pr
 


n
 1
h
2
(X);V
W
(U)i


> 


X = x; Z = z

= Pr




D

2
(x)=
p
n
3
(x);V =
p
na
2
E



> =
p

3
(x)a
2

 Pr




D

2
(x)=
p
n
3
(x);V =
p
na
2
E



> =
p
D
2

2
v

=
2C
n 1

arccos

=
p
D
2

2
v

C
n 1
()
:
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Here, the rst equality follows by Lemma 4.6 and the fact that 
2
(x) 2 x
?
, the subsequent
inequality follows from 
3
(x)  D
2
and a
2
 
2
v
(see (4.5) and (4.52)), and the nal equality
follows since V =
p
na
2
is uniformly distributed on S
n
(0; 1) \ x
?
and since 
2
(x)=
p
n
3
(x)
also takes value in this set. Since the resulting upper bound, which tends to zero, does not
depend on x or z, it must also hold for the unconditional probability.
We now proceed to prove Lemma 4.10. Choose n
2
large enough to ensure that
Pr(E
4
\ E
5
)  1  ; 8n > n
2
;
where E
4
= fZ  
2
u
+ g and E
5
=
n
n
 1
h
2
(X);V
W
(U )i   
2

v
 
p
A 
p
D
2

o
. Such
an n
2
can be found by the union of events bound since both E
c
4
and E
c
5
have vanishing
probabilities by Lemmas 4.9 and B.12, respectively.
For the deterministic attacker of Section 4.1.2, we can express the random variables Z
3
and Z
4
of (4.41) and (4.43) as
Z
3
= 
2
1
(X)n
 1
kXk
2
+ 
3
(X);
and
Z
4
= (
1
(X)  1)(
2
v
+ (1  )Z) + n
 1
h
2
(X);V
W
(U )i:
Substituting these expressions in 
2
(Z;Z
3
; Z
4
) of (4.44) yields

2
(Z;Z
3
; Z
4
)
=

2
v
+ (1  )Z + (
1
(X)  1)(
2
v
+ (1  )Z) + n
 1
h
2
(X);V
W
(U)i
p
(
2
1
n
 1
kXk
2
+ 
3
(X))
2
v
=

2
v
+ (1  )Z
q
 
n
 1
kXk
2
+ 
3
(X)=
2
1
(X)


2
v
+
n
 1
h
2
(X);V
W
(U)i
p
Z
3

2
v
: (B.40)
We conclude the proof by showing that the intersection E
4
\ E
5
implies that (B.40) exceeds


(R
1
+ Æ)  
2
.
We rst focus on the second term on the RHS of (B.40). Using the expression (B.35)
and the denitions of Section 4.3.1, we see that event E
4
implies that n
 1
kXk
2
is at least
A. When this is true, then the distortion constraint (2.3) and the triangle inequality imply
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that Z
3
is at least (
p
A 
p
D
2
)
2
. Thus, the intersection E
4
\E
5
guarantees that the second
term of (B.40) is at least  
2
.
We now turn to the rst term on the RHS of (B.40), which using (B.35) can be rewritten
as

2
v
+ (1  )Z
q
 

2
v
+ 2(1  )Z + (1  )
2

2
u
+ 
3
(X)=
2
1
(X)


2
v
;
and which, using (4.6) and the fact that E
4
implies n
 1
kXk
2
is at least A, can be lower
bounded by

2
v
+ (1  )Z
q
 

2
v
+ 2(1  )Z + (1  )
2

2
u
+
D
2
c


2
v
:
Since  < 1 (see (A.6)), the above term is increasing in Z. Substituting Z = 
2
u
+  into
this term yields 

(R
1
+ Æ), as can be veried using the denitions of R
1
(4.33) and 

()
(4.49), which yield


(R
1
+ Æ) =
 

2
v
+ (1  )(
2
u
+ )

r
c
A
2
v
:
The event E
4
thus implies that the rst term on the RHS of (B.40) is at least 

(R
1
+Æ).
B.10 Proof of Lemma 4.12
Lemma B.13 (4.12). For any encoder with corresponding watermarking channel P
XjU
satisfying (2.1), if the attacker g

n
of (4.65) with corresponding attack channel P

Y jX
is
used, then
1
n
I
P
U
P

1
P
XjU ;
1
P

Y jX
(X ;Y jK;U ;
1
)

m
X
k=1
Pr(K = k) 
1
2
log
 
1 + s(a
k
;D
1
;
~
D
2
; 
k
)

(B.41)
 E
K
h
C

(D
1
;
~
D
2
; 
K
)
i
: (B.42)
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Proof. To simplify the proof of this lemma, we will use the following notation:
c
(k)
= c(a
k
;
~
D
2
); (B.43)
b
(k)
1
= b
1
(a
k
;D
1
; 
k
); (B.44)
and
b
(k)
2
= b
2
(a
k
;D
1
; 
k
); (B.45)
where the functions c(; ), b
1
(; ; ), and b
2
(; ; ) are dened in Appendix A. We shall need
the following technical claim.
Lemma B.14. If the encoder satises the a.s. distortion constraint (2.1), then
E

1
n



g

n
(X ;
2
)  b
(k)
1
c
(k)
U



2




K = k

 c
(k)

c
(k)
b
(k)
2
+
~
D
2

;
for all k  1 such that Pr(K = k) > 0.
Proof. Recall that the attacker g

n
dened in (4.65) produces an IID sequence of N (0;
~
D
2
)
random variables V that is independent of (X ;U). Furthermore, since K is a function of
X, the random vector V is also independent of X and U given K. Thus, for all k  1 with
Pr(K = k) > 0,
E

n
 1



g

n
(X ;
2
)  b
(k)
1
c
(k)
U



2



K = k

= E

n
 1



c
(k)

X   b
(k)
1
U

+
p
c
(k)
V



2



K = k

= (c
(k)
)
2
E

n
 1



X   b
(k)
1
U



2



K = k

+ c
(k)
E
h
n
 1
kV k
2


K = k
i
= (c
(k)
)
2
E
h
n
 1

kXk
2
  b
(k)
1
2hX ;Ui+ (b
(k)
1
)
2
kUk
2




K = k
i
+ c
(k)
~
D
2
= (c
(k)
)
2

a
k
  b
(k)
1
E

2n
 1
hX ;UijK = k

+ (b
(k)
1
)
2

k

+ c
(k)
~
D
2
;
where the nal equality follows by the denitions of a
k
and 
k
(see (4.63) and (4.64)). The
proof will be concluded once we show
n
 1
E [hX;U i j K = k] 
1
2
(a
k
+ 
k
 D
1
); (B.46)
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because
a
k
  b
(k)
1
(a
k
+ 
k
 D
1
) + (b
(k)
1
)
2

k
= b
(k)
2
;
by (B.44) and (B.45).
We verify (B.46) by noting that for every k  1 such that Pr(K = k) > 0,
D
1
 E

n
 1
kX  Uk
2


K = k

= E

n
 1
kXk
2
  2n
 1
hX;U i+ n
 1
kUk
2


K = k

= a
k
 E

2n
 1
hX ;Ui


K = k

+ 
k
;
where the inequality follows since n
 1
kX Uk
2
 D
1
almost-surely so that the expectation
given any event with positive probability must also be at most D
1
.
We can now write the mutual information term of interest as
I(X ;Y jK;U ;
1
)
=
m
X
k=0
Pr(K = k)  I(X ;Y jK = k;U ;
1
)
=
m
X
k=1
Pr(K = k) 
 
h(Y jK = k;U ;
1
)  h(Y jX;K = k;U ;
1
)

; (B.47)
since by the structure of the attack channel all of the above dierential entropies exist for
all k  1, and since when k = 0 the above mutual information is zero.
To prove (B.41) we shall next verify that
I(X ;Y jK = k;U ;
1
) = h(Y jK = k;U ;
1
)  h(Y jX ;K = k;U ;
1
) (B.48)
is upper bounded by
1
2
log(1 + s(a
k
;D
1
;
~
D
2
; 
k
)), for all k  1 satisfying Pr(K = k) > 0.
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We can upper bound the rst term on the RHS of (B.48) as
h(Y jK = k;U ;
1
) = h
 
g

n
(X;
2
)


K = k;U ;
1

= h

g

n
(X ;
2
)  c
(k)
b
(k)
1
U


K = k;U ;
1

 h

g

n
(X ;
2
)  c
(k)
b
(k)
1
U


K = k


n
2
log

2eE

1
n



g

n
(X ;
2
)  c
(k)
b
(k)
1
U



2



K = k


n
2
log

2e

(c
(k)
)
2
b
(k)
2
+ c
(k)
~
D
2

; (B.49)
where the rst inequality follows since conditioning reduces entropy, the second inequality
follows since a Gaussian has the highest entropy subject to a second moment constraint,
and (B.49) follows by Lemma B.14.
We can write the second term on the RHS of (B.48) as
h(Y jX ;K = k;U ;
1
) = h

p
c
(k)
V


K

=
n
2
log

2ec
(k)
~
D
2

; (B.50)
for all k  1, where (B.50) follows since V is an IID sequence of N (0;
~
D
2
) random variables
independent of (X; U;
1
) and hence independent of K.
Combining (B.47), (B.49), and (B.50) and observing that s(a
k
;D
1
;
~
D
2
; 
k
) = c
(k)
b
(k)
2
=
~
D
2
,
proves (B.41). Finally, (B.42) follows from (B.41) by the denition of C

(D
1
;D
2
; 
2
u
)
(A.8).
B.11 Proof of Lemma 4.13
Lemma B.15 (4.13). For any ergodic covertext distribution P
U
with E

U
4
k

< 1 and
E

U
2
k

 
2
u
, there exists mappings Æ(; n) and n
0
() such that both the properties P1 and
P2 stated below hold, where P1 is \For every  > 0, lim
n!1
Æ(; n) = 0." and P2 is \For
every  > 0, n > n
0
(), and event E, if E

n
 1
kUk
2
jE

> 
2
u
+ 5, then Pr(E) < Æ(; n)."
Proof. First, note that the contrapositive (and hence equivalent) statement of property P2
is:
P2a. For every  > 0, n > n
0
(), and event E , if Pr(E)  Æ(; n), then E

n
 1
kUk
2
jE


177
2
u
+ 5.
Let us dene
S
U
2
;n
=
1
n
n
X
i=1
U
2
i
; (B.51)
and
m
U
2
= E

U
2
i

:
Since U is stationary, m
U
2
does not depend on i and E

S
U
2
;n

= m
U
2
for all n. Further
recall the assumption that m
U
2  
2
u
.
We rst prove the claim assuming that S
U
2
;n
has a density for all n, and return later to
the case when it does not. Fix  > 0, and choose n
0
() such that
Var(S
U
2
;n
)  
2
=2; 8n > n
0
(): (B.52)
This can be done sinceU is ergodic with nite fourth moment, and hence S
U
2
;n
is converging
in mean square to m
U
2
. Next, choose fs
n
g such that for all n > n
0
()
Pr(S
U
2
;n
 s
n
) =
Var(S
U
2
;n
)

2
; (B.53)
and
m
U
2
    s
n
 m
U
2
+ : (B.54)
Such an s
n
exists for all appropriate n by the intermediate value theorem of calculus because
our assumption that S
U
2
;n
has a density guarantees that Pr(S
U
2
;n
 ) is continuous in ,
and because
Pr
 
S
U
2
;n
 m
U
2
+ 


Var(S
U
2
;n
)

2
;
and
Pr
 
S
U
2
;n
 m
U
2
  

 1 
Var(S
U
2
;n
)

2

Var(S
U
2
;n
)

2
;
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which follow from Chebyshev's inequality and (B.52).
From (B.53) it follows that the choice
Æ(; n) = Pr(S
U
2
;n
 s
n
); (B.55)
guarantees Property P1, because Var(S
U
2
;n
) approaches zero.
We now show that with this choice of Æ(; n), Property P2a is also satised. Let the
event E satisfy Pr(E)  Æ(; n) so that by (B.55),
Pr(E)  Pr(S
U
2
;n
 s
n
) (B.56)
Then,
E

S
U
2
;n
jE

=
Z
1
0
Pr(S
U
2
;n
 tjE) dt
=
1
Pr(E)

Z
s
n
0
Pr(S
U
2
;n
 t; E) dt+
Z
1
s
n
Pr(S
U
2
;n
 t; E) dt


1
Pr(E)

Z
s
n
0
Pr(E) dt+
Z
1
s
n
Pr(S
U
2
;n
 t) dt

 s
n
+
1
Pr(S
U
2
;n
 s
n
)
Z
1
s
n
Pr(S
U
2
;n
 t) dt;
where the rst equality follows since S
U
2
;n
is a non-negative random variable and the nal
inequality follows by (B.56). Furthermore, for n > n
0
(),
Z
1
s
n
Pr(S
U
2
;n
 t) dt =
Z
s
n
+2
s
n
Pr(S
U
2
;n
 t) dt+
Z
1
s
n
+2
Pr(S
U
2
;n
 t) dt
 2Pr(S
U
2
;n
 s
n
) +
Z
1
s
n
+2
Var(S
U
2
;n
)
(t m
U
2)
2
dt
= 2Pr(S
U
2
;n
 s
n
) +
Var(S
U
2
;n
)
s
n
+ 2 m
U
2
 2Pr(S
U
2
;n
 s
n
) +
Var(S
U
2
;n
)

;
where the rst inequality follows since Pr(S
U
2
;n
 t) is non-increasing in t and by Cheby-
shev's inequality, and the nal inequality is valid by (B.54). Therefore,
E

S
U
2
;n
jE

 s
n
+ 2+
Var(S
U
2
;n
)
Pr(S
U
2
;n
 s
n
)
 m
U
2
+ 4;
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where the nal inequality follows by (B.53) and (B.54). This concludes the proof in the
case where S
U
2
;n
has a density.
We now return to the case when S
U
2
;n
does not necessarily have a density. Fix  > 0,
and let Z
k
= U
2
k
+ 
k
, for all k  1, where 
1
;
2
; : : : is an IID sequence of exponential
random variables with mean  independent of U . Since U is ergodic, Z is also ergodic.
Furthermore, S
Z;n
= n
 1
P
n
k=1
Z
k
has a density, and thus the above results hold for S
Z;n
.
In particular, we can choose fs
n
g and n
0
() such that Pr(S
Z;n
 s
n
) ! 0 and such that
Pr(E)  Pr(S
Z;n
 s
n
) and n > n
0
() imply that
E [S
Z;n
jE ]  m
Z
+ 4
= m
U
2
+ 5:
We complete the proof by noting that S
U
2
;n
 S
Z;n
a.s. and thus E

S
U
2
;n
jE

 E [S
Z;n
jE ]
for any event E with non-zero probability.
B.12 Proof of Lemma 5.6
Lemma B.16 (5.6). There exists a positive function f(A;D
1
; 
2
) such that if the n-vectors
u, x, and y, and the scalars D
2
and Æ satisfy


n
 1
kuk
2
  
2


< Æ,


n
 1
hu;x  b
1
ui


< Æ,


n
 1
kx  b
1
uk
2
  b
2


< Æ,


n
 1
hu;y   yj
x
i


< Æ, n
 1
ky xk
2
 D
2
< A, and Æ <
A
2(1+b
1
)
2
,
then
n
 1
ky   cb
1
uk
2
2c(cb
2
+D
2
)
 
n
 1
ky   cxk
2
2cD
2
>  Æf(A;D
1
; 
2
);
where b
1
= b
1
(A;D
1
; 
2
), b
2
= b
2
(A;D
1
; 
2
) and c = c(A;D
2
).
Proof. Consider the following chain of equalities and inequalities.
2(cb
2
+D
2
)

n
 1
ky   cb
1
uk
2
2c(cb
2
+D
2
)
 
n
 1
ky   cxk
2
2cD
2

=  
b
2
D
2
n
 1
kyk
2
  c

1 +
cb
2
D
2

n
 1
kxk
2
+ cb
2
1
n
 1
kuk
2
+ 2n
 1

y;

1 +
cb
2
D
2

x  b
1
u

=  
b
2
D
2
n
 1
kyk
2
  c

1 +
cb
2
D
2

n
 1
kxk
2
+ cb
2
1
n
 1
kuk
2
+ 2

1 +
cb
2
D
2
 
b
1
n
 1
hu;xi
n
 1
kxk
2

n
 1
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1
n
 1
hyj
x
?
;ui
180
=
b
2
(1 + c)
A
  c

n
 1
kxk
2
+ cb
2
1
n
 1
kuk
2
+ 2

1 
b
2
A
 
b
1
n
 1
hu;xi
n
 1
kxk
2

n
 1
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 
b
2
n
 1
ky   xk
2
D
2
  2b
1
n
 1
hyj
x
?
;ui
>  Æ





b
2
(1 + c)
A
  c




(1 + b
1
)
2
+ cb
2
1
+ 2b
1

+ 2

1 
b
2
A
 
b
1
n
 1
hu;xi
n
 1
kxk
2

n
 1
hy;xi
>  Æ
 




b
2
(1 + c)
A
  c




(1 + b
1
)
2
+ cb
2
1
+ 2b
1
+
2
 
(1  b
2
=A)(1 + b
1
)
2
+ b
1
(1 + b
1
+ b
2
1
)

A  Æ(1 + b
1
)
2
n
 1
hy;xi
!
;
and thus,
n
 1
ky   cb
1
uk
2
2c(cb
2
+D
2
)
 
n
 1
ky   cxk
2
2cD
2
>  Æ

1
A
 
1
2b
2

(1 + b
1
)
2
+
b
2
1
+ 2b
1
2b
2
+
6
b
2

1 
b
2
A

(1 + b
1
)
2
+ b
1
(1 + b
1
+ b
2
1
)

:
The rst equality is simply an expansion of the terms of interest. The second equality
uses the relations y = yj
x
+ yj
x
?
and yj
x
= (hu;xi=kxk
2
)x. The third equality uses the
denition c = 1   D
2
=A and the relation hx;yi = (kxk
2
+ kyk
2
  kx   yk
2
)=2. The rst
inequality uses (5.29), (5.28), (5.25), the fact that
jn
 1
kxk
2
 Aj < Æ(1 + b
1
)
2
(B.57)
(derived from (5.25), (5.26) and (5.27)), and the relation

b
2
(1 + c)
A
  c

A+ cb
2
1

2
  b
2
= 0:
The second inequality uses (B.57), the fact that jn
 1
hu;xi (A+
2
 D
1
)=2j < Æ(1+b
1
+b
2
1
)
(derived from (5.25), (5.26) and (5.27)), and the relation
1 
b
2
A
 
b
1
(A+ 
2
 D
1
)
2A
= 0:
The nal inequality uses (5.30), the fact that jn
 1
hx;yij < 3A (derived from (5.29), (5.30),
(B.57) using Cauchy-Schwartz), and the facts that c  1 and cb
2
+D
2
 b
2
.
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B.13 Proof of Lemma 5.10
Lemma B.17 (5.10). There exists a positive function
~
f(A;D
1
;
~
D
2
; 
2
) such that if the n-
vectors s, x, and y, and the scalars D
2
and Æ satisfy


n
 1
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2
  v


< Æ,


n
 1
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2
 A


< Æ,


n
 1
hs;xi   (  1)b
1

2
 A


< Æ,
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 1
hs;y   yj
x
i


< Æ, n
 1
ky   xk
2
 D
2
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Æ <
A
2
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)
 
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1
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~
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~
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; 
2
);
where all of the parameters are computed with respect to A, D
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Proof. First, we compute that
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2
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2
+ 2n
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which follows by (5.54) and (5.51). Second, we compute that
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which follows by (5.53). Next, we compute that
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>  6Æ(
1
v +A D
2
); (B.61)
where the rst inequality follows by (5.52) and the relevant denitions; the second inequality
follows by (5.51) and (5.55); and the nal inequality follows since n
 1
hx;yi < 3A using
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Cauchy-Schwartz along with (5.54), (5.51) and (5.55). Thus,
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where the rst inequality follows by (5.50), (B.58) and (B.59) and the second inequality
follows by (B.61). Dividing (B.62) by 2(A D
2
)
2
gives the desired result since 
1
and 
2
essentially only depend on D
2
through a A D
2
term; see (5.42) and (5.43).
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